The terms « value » and « human dignity » have become catch-all phrases, empty shells onto which everyone projects their desires, ideals, justifications, or morbid rationalizations.

Too often, they serve as alibis for absurd, even dangerous policies for our species.

Schopenhauer, with his usual sharpness, already criticized the phrase « dignity of Man, » popularized by Kant.

He saw it as a « shibboleth » wielded by moralists lacking solid arguments, relying on the public’s self-satisfaction in cloaking themselves in such « dignity » without ever questioning its foundation.

But what is a value?

Contrary to widespread belief, values do not exist in themselves, as entities floating in a metaphysical ether.

They only emerge through living organisms capable of evaluating what is beneficial or harmful to them.

A value is thus a relational property, always dependent on a specific context and, above all, on an evaluating organism.

To put it simply:

Something P has value for a being B, in a perspective C, under circumstances D, for a goal O, and with a level of knowledge N.

Values are thus akin to secondary properties, like color, which exists only in relation to a receiver.

Claiming that a principle or state of affairs has an « objective » value in an ontological sense is a gross error.

The only possible objectivity lies in epistemology, that is, the ability to establish consensus on what is beneficial or harmful to humanity under given conditions.

Recognizing the ontological relativism of values—their dependence on an evaluating subject—does not mean succumbing to epistemological relativism.

Human beings, sharing the same biology and fundamental needs, can converge on common evaluations.

Some values, contextual, vary depending on circumstances; others, universal, transcend cultural or historical differences.

For example, survival, health, and safety are primary or secondary needs that underpin universal values, as they concern all members of the human species.

Conversely, the idea of « dignity » or « values » imposed as absolutes, often invoked to justify violent or oppressive actions, does not withstand scrutiny.

History shows that these notions have never prevented conquests, exploitation, or massacres, even by those who claimed them.

Pragmatism, however, invites us to consider that progress lies in each person’s ability to make the most of this single earthly life while helping others do the same.

According to Bunge, with whom I agree, if X represents a thing, a property of a thing, or a process within a thing, and C a circumstance (natural, social…), then X can be considered:

A primary value for all members of the human species if X contributes to meeting at least one primary need (access to water, food…) of all members of the species under circumstances C—the satisfaction of this primary need being necessary to stay alive (a universal value from an epistemological perspective).

A secondary value for all members of the human species if X contributes to meeting at least one secondary need of all members of the species under circumstances C—the satisfaction of this secondary need being necessary to maintain good health or to heal (a universal value from an epistemological perspective).

A tertiary value for some members of a species under circumstances C when the thing, property, or process contributes to meeting at least one legitimate interest or aspiration of some members of the species under circumstances C, the interest being defined as legitimate if its satisfaction does not harm the satisfaction of primary and secondary needs of other members of the species.

Karl Popper reminds us of an essential truth:

« Rather than fighting for so-called higher values, politicians should focus on combating existing evils and reducing avoidable suffering. »

Adopting the terminology of the great Mario Bunge, we understand that any attempt to impose values becomes illegitimate as soon as it sacrifices the primary or secondary needs of others, something the American neoconservative movement has always struggled to grasp.

Take a burning example: the war in Ukraine.

When justified in the name of « values »—democracy, sovereignty, freedom—it paradoxically ends up trampling the most fundamental primary values: life, safety, peace.

This tragic inversion characterizes our era.

We elevate desires or interests, often illegitimate in Bunge’s sense, to the rank of « higher values, » while relegating vital needs—food, shelter, health—to the background.

Our era has truly inverted values, refusing to see primary values as higher values and mistaking idiosyncratic interests, aspirations, and desires for higher values.

It is time to return to a pragmatic ethic, rooted in biology and reason.

Values are not idols to worship but tools in service of life.

Only by ceasing to sacralize abstractions can we refocus our efforts on what truly matters: enabling every human being to live, thrive, and contribute to the common good, while respecting the fundamental needs of all.