
Clinton Presidential Records

Mandatory Declassification Review

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Aug-1993 18:58 EDT

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: CAL LUNCH: GLOBAL'S ITEMS

1. Funding UN Peacekeeping Operations

Issue: State has refused to supply the draft rules for interagency clearance for UN votes on peacekeeping.

EO 13526 1.4d

This issue takes on increased importance in light of four new PKO now under consideration (Rwanda, Liberia, Abkhazia, and Haiti).

2. Sudan: Deterring and Responding to Terrorism

EO 13526 1.4d

3. Somalia: The Next Phase

Issue: Who should give a major speech on Somalia?

Background: Both State and Defense are working on speeches on Somalia for their Secretaries. You may want to suggest that both of them give such speeches. In addition to noting the progress we have made in Somalia, the speeches could talk about peacekeeping more generally as part of the Funding Peacekeeping Strategy.

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4. Airlifting Musicians from Bosnia:

Wilson/Schwartz providing separately

5. DOD's Global Initiative Money:

Global will provide a separate memo with Rosner.

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Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 24-Aug-1993 18:44
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 013978
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE29:ZUVGR43LC.WPL
A1 Folder: AUG93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 24-Aug-1993 18:44
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Sep-1993 16:55 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Nicholas J. Rasmussen
(RASMUSSEN)

SUBJECT: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation

Mr. Lake/Mr. Berger --

Susan Rice asked that I bring to your attention the fact that the Security Council appears to be moving very quickly toward a vote on a resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. Informal consultations have already begun on the SYG's report (released Monday).

In keeping with our desire to proceed more deliberately before voting yea or nay on new UN operations, State is asking USUN to slow the process so that we can take a close look at the SYG's report, as well as at the cost analysis (still pending) from the UN budget people. Nonetheless, we will probably need to have a USG position by the beginning of next week.

We recommend that a Deputies Committee meeting be scheduled on Thursday or Friday to consider the issue. A number of issues should be discussed by Deputies, including funding of the U.S. share of an operation, French attempts to link the operation with a Liberia PKO, and how the operation stacks up against the PRD-13 criteria. State/AF is providing us with input which we will turn into a DC discussion paper. We can have a paper ready by mid-week. If a DC can be scheduled, we will coordinate the paper and agenda with Jennifer Ward. Alternatively, we can prepare a decision memorandum for Mr. Lake.

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Date Created: 27-Sep-1993 15:31
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 016485
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE23:ZUWOO6G4Q.WPL
A1 Folder: SEP93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 27-Sep-1993 15:31
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Oct-1993 13:17 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: RWANDA UPDATE

Sandy--

I have sent up to you a revised version of the President's letter to Mitterand taking into account the concerns that I understand you expressed to Dick.

I am assuming that we still plan to support the Rwanda mission, despite a rumor that Frank Wisner was reconsidering after looking more closely at the latest French resolution. Please let us know if our position has changed.

Late yesterday afternoon we had a working level interagency videoconference to try to respond to widespread concerns about the military concept of operations for the Rwanda mission and to reach consensus on a U.S. position on the draft resolution. While much common ground was found on the outline of the resolution, you should know that JCS and to a somewhat lesser extent OSD have very serious concerns about the mission as currently conceived.

In particular, they believe that since the mission is a traditional CH. VI in a supposedly completely permissive environment, the operation should be conducted by unarmed military observers (or at most very lightly armed observers) rather than the planned 2 infantry battalions. As the mission now stands, they "non-concur", and remain adamantly opposed for this reason.

State supports the 2 infantry battalions. I tend to agree with JCS that there is considerable dissonance between the concept of operations and the supposed permissive environment. We ought to be able to achieve the same goals with observers if the parties truly want peace. However, it will be difficult to move the French, the UN and the Rwandan parties in the short time we have before a vote. JCS and/or OSD may raise this at your level.

I think we ought to talk to the French and the UN in New York to address these issues, preferably before a vote, if JCS insists.

Distribution:

FOR: Samuel R. Berger

(BERGER)

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Date Created: 02-Oct-1993 13:04
Deletable Flag: Y
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A1 Folder: OCT93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 02-Oct-1993 13:04
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

04-Oct-1993 14:34 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: RWANDA

Sandy--

It seems that State and DOD/JCS have managed to come to agreement on instructions to USUN to support the Rwanda resolution. In short, JCS walked back from the cliff and agreed to more open-ended language about the composition of the force (armed battalions vs. unarmed military observers) in exchange for absolute clarity that this is meant to be a traditional (pacific) Chapter VI operation.

This is a good compromise. We are looking forward to rapidly clearing the x-hatched instruction cable.

I have tried to track down the message from the President to Mitterrand. As far as we can tell, the package went to the President on Saturday evening, but has not yet been signed out. Kathy Millison is checking further for us.

Susan

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Date Created: 04-Oct-1993 13:42

Deletable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 016991

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE42:ZUWVKU2TF.WPL

AI Folder: OCT93

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Message Format:

Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 04-Oct-1993 13:42

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Nov-1993 12:57 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: Meeting With Sadako Ogata, UNHCR, Tues. at 6:30 pm

Memorandum

November 9, 1993

To: Samuel Berger

Through: Richard Clarke

Fr: Eric Schwartz

Concurrences by: Jane Holl, Jennifer Ward, Larry Rossin

Subject: Meeting this evening with Mrs. Sadako Ogata of UNHCR

We expect Mrs. Ogata will raise UNHCR activities in Bosnia, the situation in Haiti and, possibly, the situation in Burundi.

In addition to discussing these issues with her, you will want to congratulate her on her recent reelection to a five year term and express strong U.S. support for her leadership at UNHCR.

I. BOSNIA

Background: Mrs. Ogata's visit comes at an increasingly difficult time for agency operations in Bosnia. Security conditions continue to deteriorate for humanitarian relief workers

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

POINTS TO MAKE/QUESTIONS TO RAISE:

- UNHCR in Bosnia: Express appreciation for continued UNHCR efforts in the region.
- Winterization Plans: What is Mrs. Ogata view of preparations and coordination between agencies?
- EC Initiative to Encourage Parties to Guarantee Supply Routes: How does Mrs. Ogata assess the prospects for this initiative?
- Tuzla: Reports indicate serious shortages in the Tuzla area. What are Mrs. Ogata's views on the opening of Tuzla airport and under what scenario does she think this might be

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accomplished?

[Note: UNHCR continues to believe the opening of the airport is vital. Before the airport were opened, Bosnian forces would probably have to abandon many of the buildings at the airport, which they have thus far refused to do. State suggests that the Europeans could handle the technical aspects of opening the airport.] EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

Other issues that might come up:

□

- UNHCR APPEAL FOR BOSNIA: we are now preparing a response, which should be ready within the next seven days.
- PERMITTING UNHCR TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN SERBIA: The refugee population in Serbia is distressed, and the Serbs are using this publicly as claimed evidence of discriminatory treatment of refugees. UNHCR urges aid to these populations, as well as to other vulnerable groups in Serbia. We have not taken a formal position, though Warren Zimmerman at State supports a carefully monitored and controlled aid program. Jane and I agree with Warren.

II. HAITI -- ISSUES MRS. OGATA MAY RAISE

Background: As you know, UNHCR opposes direct return. With other countries supporting the embargo with their own ships, the question of their policies on return may arise. As a result, the UNHCR Americas Directorate has requested a technical meeting in Geneva to discuss the treatment of Haitian boat people by ships of countries enforcing the embargo.] EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

If raised, you may want to point out that --

- Based on our own experience, we are very doubtful that a UNHCR meeting will come up with viable third country options.
- We continue to monitor the situation in Haiti and see no signs of a imminent exodus of large numbers.
- Our three refugee processing centers are operating in Haiti and U.S. officials continue to meet returning Haitians to assist those who wish to apply for refugee status.

III. BURUNDI

Background: As you know, elements of the Burundi military recently launched an attempted coup d'etat against the democratically-elected government of President Ndadaye, resulting in the death of the President and several members of his Cabinet, as well as inter-ethnic violence primarily in the countryside. We have no estimates of the number killed. Some 650,000 new

refugees have fled to neighboring states, primarily Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. As a result of this crisis, UNHCR has depleted its emergency fund and has now borrowed \$5 million from the UN's Central Emergency Revolving Fund. UNHCR has made an appeal for \$17 million to meet the needs of the refugees over the next three months. State R/P is preparing an ERMA (Africa) drawdown proposal for the President for \$20 million, of which \$4.25 million would go to the UNHCR for Burundian refugees.

POINTS TO MAKE:

- We want to be as helpful as possible in this humanitarian crisis and encourage UNHCR's efforts as well as those of the ICRC and WFP;
-
- AID's Office of Disaster Assistance has already approved contributions of \$50,000 as a result of our Ambassadors' having declared disasters in Rwanda and Burundi;
- We are working on a drawdown of monies from the President's emergency fund to provide substantial funding for your appeal.

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Date Created: 09-Nov-1993 12:56

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DOCNUM: 020044
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE53:ZUYFIIYZY.WPL
A1 Folder: NOV93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 09-Nov-1993 12:56
Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Dec-1993 22:01 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Upcoming Issues in UNSC

OMNIBUS PEACEKEEPING E-Mail

INFORMATION:

The Security Council is expected within the next week to renew routinely a number of peacekeeping mandates:

Cyprus

The UNSC will vote this week another 6 month renewal of UNFICYP. The last renewal came in the summer as the Canadians were leaving and after the Russians initially vetoed the resolution for procedural reasons. Today, the Argentines have replaced the Canadians, and the Russians seem satisfied on the issue. The U.S. and allies have also succeeded in getting Greece and Cyprus to pick up over 50% of the cost of the operation, thus reducing the U.S. share to roughly \$7 million/pa.

This week's vote should be an easy, pro forma extension. The draft resolution is a good one, stating that the status quo is unacceptable and calls for a thorough review of the future role of the UN in Cyprus in February.

Angola

The UNSC will vote by the 15th to extend UNAVEM's mandate at current strength for 3 months. As Jennifer has informed you, the U.S tabled a draft resolution that has been considered by the P-5. USUN is trying to ensure that it remains balanced to put appropriate political pressure on both sides.

Liberia

We are at the 3 month stage when the UNSC must decide to continue the mission in Liberia for the duration of its seven month mandate. This is very similar to the procedural issue we faced last week on Haiti. Again, this continuation can be achieved without any formal resolution, only a letter from UNSC Pres. to SYG or a statement. Not expected to be a big deal.

Rwanda

There are 2 Rwanda missions-- 80 border monitors looking for arms traffic on the Rwanda/Uganda border and a larger

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peacekeeping force in Kigali. The upcoming renewal (required by the 22nd) will give the Ugandan border mission its second 6-month mandate. Happily, the two missions, while formally separate for political reasons, are well-integrated in terms of command. Better yet, after Dec. 22 they will have a single budget, allowing us to capture all possible economies of scale.

ACTION:

South Africa: How to authorize and fund the anticipated UN election monitoring mission.

Normally, straight election monitoring (w/o peacekeepers) is a UNGA activity paid for on the regular budget, for which US pays 25%. But according to USUN, the South African parties, the Frontline States and many others want the UNSC to mandate the South Africa mission, because the UNGA can't move quickly and doesn't carry the same political weight.

The problem is that if the UNSC mandates it, the UNGA (which controls the UN purse strings) is likely to insist that it be paid for on the peacekeeping budget (we pay 31.7%). Funding non-peacekeeping on the Peacekeeping budget would set a terrible precedent.

ISSUE: If you agree, Jennifer and I will ask State to draft a cable to USUN, instructing them to submit quickly a strategy for speedy UN action on South Africa paid for on the regular budget. We propose to give them a relatively short time frame in which to implement that strategy.

If USUN fails, I think we will need a DC in early Jan. to decide whether the U.S. wants to work through the UNGA, which may be opposed by the parties and slow down deployment, or; whether we want to pay for this on the peacekeeping budget, which could raise serious questions on the Hill and would set a dangerous precedent.

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Date Created: 13-Dec-1993 21:09
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 023167
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE17:ZUZNH3T6.WPL
A1 Folder: DEC93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 13-Dec-1993 22:01
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 10:24 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR
DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.

I reported to you yesterday that Monique Mujawamariya, the Rwandan human rights activist who met the President, appeared to have been killed. I characterized the report as unconfirmed.

(The report was based on the fact that Monique had been talking by phone with a friend in the U.S. when soldiers who were killing her neighbors approached her home. The phone went dead and further attempts to reach Monique were unsuccessful, with men answering the phone and hanging up. [There is a Washington Post account of these events on today's Op Ed page.])

Thankfully, Monique appears not to have been killed. She apparently fled her home and hid in the bush. She is now back at her home and our Embassy if trying to figure out how we might help in getting her to a safe place.

THIS NEW INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR
DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.

Our Embassy's Task Force in Kigali believes strongly that Monique's chances of survival will be increased if she is believed to be dead, as Rwandan soldiers continue to look for her.

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Date Created: 08-Apr-1994 10:21
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035415
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A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 08-Apr-1994 10:21
Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Apr-1994 16:38 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: NEXT STEPS, FOR SUNDAY AND BEYOND

With dawn on Sunday, convoys two and three will leave the Danish Mission 2 kms from the border and drive into Burundi. During the nite the USMC force in Buj will run hourly radio checks on the status of the convoys. That will leave us with the following questions:

--how do we get the remaining Americans out?

--do we help the Belgians get in? (note: The Rwandan rebels are reportedly rpt reportedly moving toward Kigali.)

--do we pull the UN force out?

1. Getting the Americans out

The embassy may put together another convoy or may put the Americans out the French flights out. The first French flight out left late on Saturday.

2. Getting the Belgians in

There are 2000 Belgian citizens still at risk. Fighting is likely to escalate. Thus, once we know that our citizens are safe, we should work with the French to see if they can insure the safety of flights in to Kigali. If the French do secure the airbase area, we probably should fly the Belgians in.

3. Terminating the UN Force

We make a lot of noise about terminating UN forces that aren't working. Well, few could be as clearly not working. We should work with the French to gain a consensus to terminate the UN mission.

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Date Created: 09-Apr-1994 16:30
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035579
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE12:ZVEANRVT.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 09-Apr-1994 16:30
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 14:41 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA

According to Holly Burkhalter of Human Rights Watch, Monique Mujawamariya -- the Rwandan human rights activist who met the President -- is now safe and in Nairobi.

More details to come as I receive them.

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CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 11-Apr-1994 14:37

Deleteable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 035691

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE34:ZVECKZPP6.WPL

A1 Folder: APR94

Message Format:


Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 14:41

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 12:45 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED

TO: TL/SRB

FM: RAC

RE: RWANDA

The UN is planning to pull out the UN peacekeeping force, according to USUN.

The UN may rpt may ask for US airlift to get the force out fast.

Meanwhile, the French are beginning to pull their force out and the Belgians are continuing to insert troops.

If the UN asks for help getting out, USAF transports standing by in Kenya could be available.

ACTION REQUESTED:

Do you have any guidance for us on how we should respond to a UN request?

Distribution:

FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 11-Apr-1994 12:41
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035670
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE44:ZVECI88L0.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 12:41
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 15:03 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA: FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE

[0030]

Regarding the attached E mail on Monique Mujawamariya (which you should have already received):

PLEASE DO NOT REVEAL THE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT MONIQUE TO THE PRESS OR TO THE PUBLIC AT THIS POINT.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 11-Apr-1994 15:00

Deleteable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 035704

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE38:ZVECLIKV9.WPL

A1 Folder: APR94

Message Format:

Message Status: READ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 15:00
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 14:41 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA

[0036]

According to Holly Burkhalter of Human Rights Watch, Monique Mujawamariya -- the Rwandan human rights activist who met the President -- is now safe and in Nairobi.

More details to come as I receive them.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Morton H. Halperin	(HALPERIN)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
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CC: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
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CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 17:22 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Mary C. Emery
(EMERY)

SUBJECT: RE: RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED

Tony Lake has read e-mail and responded as follows:

Next to Action Requested: "Inclined to help. But decision
should go to Principals."

Distribution:

FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
CC: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: James W. Reed	(REED)
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CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 11-Apr-1994 17:21
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035741
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE36:ZVECOTS1F.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 17:21
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

RWANDA:

Rwanda

Tutsi Military Poised To Attack

The Rwandan military and Tutsi forces from the Rwandan Patriotic Front apparently are adhering to a cease-fire as the evacuation of foreign nationals proceeds, but at least 4,000 heavily armed RPF rebels continue to advance on the capital. Leaders of the RPF say they will let French and Belgian forces assist in removing their nationals but have threatened to attack the French forces if they intervene for the government's side. Rebel leaders also rejected talks with the new Hutu interim government, which they accuse of killing Tutsis and undermining ethnic reconciliation.

— *The RPF almost certainly intends to seize Kigali but is holding back until most expatriates are evacuated. It would be hard pressed to control the city, however, because armed militias and Hutu hardliners there vehemently oppose any sharing of power with Tutsis. (C-NF)*

The Hutu-dominated security forces are divided regionally between southerners and northerners, and clashes have been reported between Army and Gendarmerie forces, according to a foreign government service. Armed Hutu militias continue to rampage throughout the city and to threaten Belgian and French citizens. *Neither Paris nor Brussels wants to be drawn into Rwanda's civil war, and they probably will withdraw their troops as soon as the evacuation is complete.*

— A senior UN official privately has told Belgian, French, and US officials that the Secretary General believes the lightly armed UN force of 2,500, which already has suffered 16 killed, must be evacuated unless there is an effective cease-fire. *It probably will continue to be attacked if it remains in Kigali after the evacuation. (S-NF)*

A revived civil war in Rwanda could intensify the volatility of Burundi, where up to 150,000 people reportedly were killed after the Hutu president was assassinated last fall. In a move to support Tutsis in Rwanda, the Tutsi military could try to take over the Hutu-dominated government.
(C-NF) - CIA E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Top Secret
SC 01677/94
11 April 1994

Balance of Military Forces in Rwanda**Rwandan Security Forces**

Army: 31,000 troops . . . about 4,000 in Kigali . . . troubled by low morale, poor combat record, has depended on French forces and logistics.

[EO 13526 1.4c]

Interim Army Chief of Staff: Colonel Gatsinzi . . . commander of noncommissioned officers training school.

Gendarmerie (paramilitary police): 7,200 . . . 2,000 in Kigali.

[EO 13526 1.4c]

Rwandan Patriotic Front

Forces: 20,000 nationwide . . . has controlled northern territory since 1990 invasion from Uganda . . . UN escorted 600-man RPF security force to Kigali in December . . . highly motivated . . . effectively uses artillery, heavy mortars, recoilless rifles.

[EO 13526 1.4c]

[EO 13526 3.5c]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Apr-1994 09:10 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jane E. Holl (HOLL)

FROM: James W. Reed
(REED)

SUBJECT: Strike Two

[006a]

This is the second erroneous report on this (TL was PO'd when he passed the first report to the Pres, only to find out it was wrong) . . .

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 12-Apr-1994 08:59
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035814
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE7:ZVEDD36F8.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 12-Apr-1994 09:09
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS
□

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 20:26 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

[006b]

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)
SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIA: CORRECTED INFORMATION

I reported to you today that Human Rights Watch had been informed that Monique was safe and in Nairobi. State had also received this information from Human Rights Watch, which was based on a report provided informally by a UN official in New York.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY **DECLASSIFIED**
PER E.O. 13526

Unfortunately, the information was inaccurate -- the UN official apparently confused Monique with another Rwandan.

We do not have current information about Monique. We believe our Embassy's last contact with her was early Sunday morning in Rwanda. According to State, our DCM gave information on Monique's whereabouts to the ICRC and asked that they coordinate with UNAMIR in trying to get her to a place of safety.

I'm terribly sorry for the confusion on this. I will continue to follow up with State.

Under these circumstances, Monique's safety in Rwanda is again enhanced by the perception that she has been killed (as this perception will discourage soldiers from looking for her). Thus news of her being alive should not be discussed publicly or with the press.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Non ref
Friday

9/2

Rwanda

State

- Reading RPF officials The not - act

EO 13526 1.4c believes Uganda is actively aiding RPF

Cette cleared

Except - mainly

Brinelli says it would be easier for Rwanda to be involved
(if there's a ceasefire + agreement on gov)

End point = resettlement of displaced refugees
need sunset clause / 6 months

Force will not deliver assistance, but provide security of assistance
ICRC would provide assistance

ANGOLA

- likely to reach accord after 1-21 mos.

State of play - stopped progress in early March.

- Govt bought out package of lug's land, porches

- UNAV failed - wanted more personnel + got seat

Bennie response to Clinton from Dos Santos - wanted treaty of friends + cooperation
2nd Clinton letter -

GRA said Regd sign w/in a month

was skeptical... think Reg want to fight

UNGA has never seen this package... don't know if Reg'd accept.

Military side

- tried in GRA form - much more sophisticated form
- realized Reg can't do action as multiple fronts. Reg'd focus energy on one goal at a time.
- Sa'abti begin & think he could lose war. wants political deal now
 - may take limited military action
 - to bring military balance to negotiating table
 - Sa'abti = passing out weapons to civilians in the north.
 - open to deal.
- More war = forecast - w/ got slowing winning - power of years out but save slight chance that seems after months Sa'abti now might sell.
- Sa'abti may push to Beograd, if he's fighting to finish

New elections - 2nd set of national elections

agreed... on specific modalities

Run-off elections that never happened

GRA = confident of big victory & it will happen soon. \rightarrow elections when on

in consultation w/ Agolcas that trip is right.

Harm: one month roll-over
w/ no decrease

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Apr-1994 18:48 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Neal S. Wolin
(WOLIN)

SUBJECT: C-P-L lunch agenda -- 13 April

Below is a tentative agenda for tomorrow's C-P-L lunch. Where indicated, please provide me, by not later than 10:15 a.m. Wednesday, a short background paper (via e-mail) for Tony's use.

Lake:

- o Update on Efforts to Defeat Exxon-Grassley -- will discuss next steps on strategy for FY 95 budget conference. (Jeremy Rosner/Bob Bell please provide background.)
- o Bosnia Authorization Resolution -- will discuss advisability of seeking congressional authorization for use of force in Bosnia. (Alan Kreczko/Jeremy Rosner please provide background.)

Christopher:

- o Revitalizing Nunn-Lugar -- will ask Secretary Perry to become more engaged in seeking additional Nunn-Lugar funds. (Rose Gottemoeller please provide background.)
- o Bosnia Update -- will consult on where we are on Gorazde, discussions in Sarajevo, etc. (Jenonne Walker/Jane Holl please provide background.)
- o Skrunda -- will answer some of Secretary Perry's questions from last week's lunch regarding availability of State funds for Skrunda dismantlement. (John Beyrle please provide background.)

Perry:

- o Peacekeeping Funding -- will discuss next steps on dealing with arrearages and PDD-13 funding issues after Monday's meeting with the President. (Dick Clarke/Susan Rice please provide background as appropriate.)
- o U.S. Support for Evacuation of Allies' Nationals from Rwanda -- will ask what support the USG ought to give the French and Belgians in evacuating their nationals from Rwanda. (Dick Clarke/Don Steinberg please provide background.)
- o North Korea -- will discuss plans for his impending trip to Asia. (Dan Poneman/Stanley Roth please provide background.)

Distribution:

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PER E.O. 13526

FOR: Jane E. Holl (HOLL)
FOR: Daniel Fried (FRIED)
FOR: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)
FOR: Rose E. Gottemoeller (GOTTEMOELLER)
FOR: Randy R. Beers (BEERS)
FOR: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
FOR: John R. Beyrle (BEYRLE)
FOR: Robert G. Bell (BELL)
FOR: Richard E. Feinberg (FEINBERG)
FOR: R. Nicholas Burns (BURNS)
FOR: Martin S. Indyk (INDYK)
FOR: George J. Tenet (TENET)
FOR: Jenonne R. Walker (WALKER)
FOR: Eileen B. Claussen (CLAUSSEN)
FOR: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
FOR: Kent M. Wiedemann (WIEDEMANN)
FOR: Jennifer C. Ward (WARD)
FOR: Alan J. Kreczko (KRECZKO)
FOR: Jeremy D. Rosner (ROSNER)
FOR: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
FOR: Daniel B. Poneman (PONEMAN)
FOR: Richard Schifter (SCHIFTER)
CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Nancy Soderberg (SODERBERG)
CC: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney (KENNEY)
CC: James W. Reed (REED)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 12-Apr-1994 17:27
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035942
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE5:ZVEDQVNGQ.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 12-Apr-1994 18:48
Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Apr-1994 13:27 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Susan E. Rice (RICE)
Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: PULL-OUT OF UNAMIR

I just heard from Human Rights Watch, pleading that we oppose a quick UNAMIR pull-out from Rwanda. Human Rights Watch seemed to indicate that UNAMIR is protecting thousands (25,000?) Rwandans and if they pull out, the Rwandans will quickly become victims of genocide.

Is this true? If so, shouldn't it be a major factor informing high-level decision-making on this issue? Has it been?

I am expecting to receive a fax on this shortly and will see that you get it.

Eric

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 19-Apr-1994 13:24
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 036828
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE27:ZVEKJ7Y73.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 19-Apr-1994 13:24
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

4/20/94 1. Rwanda (Refugee issue)

940 Bang	}	Mainly in Uganda - some surrounding stadiums - others in airports - Duallais opened + new hospital
400 - Goma		
420 - Belgrade out		
+		2,100 left
No Bangladesis have left, except handful or non-essential		

Stadiums = next to hotel, which is UNAMIR HQ

St. Elizabeths Church
Hospital

} how many under UNAMIR control?

- unclear
- 6-12,000 ; HR Watch = 20,000

What kind of assets of UNAMIR

6 APC's ; 2 trucks
Belgian helicopter ?
UNAMIR helicopters (4) ?

} not good enough
for 2,000 people

Jeeps / Trucks / Landcruisers (4 wheel drive; unarmed)

People under UNAMIR control = urban sprawl; fleeing only

Ted is primarily, but also fluctu

Is This
Rawson

Options

1) Take them + put them into RPF controlled areas often

- easiest

- most dangerous (lack of food; unclear RPF will maintain control)

2) Take them down to Tanzania → already 20k people moving south

- UNICEF could help them UNHCR trying to help these

- tough logistical problem

- have to pass through hostile Rw. Army territory

- Tanz. govt permission

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

3) Move North

- out of harm's way
- logistical issues
- not much in the North; no resources to receive people.

4) UNHCR withdraws w/ 12,000 friends into Uganda

- + leave them in refugee camps in Uganda.
- No static assistance effort - small water effort
- If UN protects them - could start @ 12,000 + end up w/ 200,000

Planners: only answer = ceasefire

Right control? unceasefire?
Government?

Caed:

- Move South
- in to fort lines
- destabilizes Rwanda

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PCG - Rwanda 4/21/94

Panel agrees to withdraw 200 tonight...

- 270 - protect SRSB
- UN should develop plan for protection for UN + civilians
- plan transition to 270 - political only.

} which resources

500 - 1 coy @ airport
 ↓ rest @ stadium protecting + controller HQ

270 total - need to do tonight

1 coy 120 Ghanaians
 80 Tanzanians

troops have been of alert

protection of SRSB...

general consensus that we ⁽¹⁵⁾ can sign up to Res. (including Nigeria)

Action not needed from UN

- bad precedent, potentially

1) Do we need resolution to withdraw

2) How do we protect people if forces are withdrawn

3) Do we want to hand this off to a regional approach
 as Maserani suggested

UNforce was 2,200

430 Belgians

880 Bangl.

480 Ghanaians

0
 (-200) 650
 400

→ or fair way down from DRC

Mainly protecting stadium (12,000)

1 company around stadium

- Detract but mid attack PC - probably

- Psychological watershed b/w Belgians + Other forces

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Safety of life = @ n/a

- Bengali = fundamental cultural problems
- Gleaners = morally respectable

Concerned abt. description in effect of fill pullout or bounds.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-Apr-1994 10:51 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)


SUBJECT: USG Actions on Rwanda

Stories throughout the weekend seem to suggest that we are sitting on our hands while the blood-letting in Rwanda rages. It is true that our capacity to end the killing is painfully limited, but we are undertaking a series of measures.

- It was our initiative to ask regional leaders in Tanzania and Uganda (now supported by the UN and OAU Secretary General Salim Salim) to draw together the leaders of the Rwandan army and the RPF to seek a cease fire and re-assert the Arusha process. Our Ambassadors in Tanzania (De Vos) and Uganda (Carson) have been deeply involved in these so-far largely unsuccessful efforts. We expect to send Ambassador Rawson back out to the region shortly to facilitate this process.
- Whereas we strongly supported efforts to safeguard the lives of the U.N. peacekeepers, we also insisted that the draw-down of the peacekeepers not be accomplished in a way that put at risk the lives of Rwandans under their protection.
- Following Tony's meeting on Friday with Rwandan human rights monitor Monique Mujawamarija, we issued a tough statement (attached) condemning the continued violence and calling on both sides to stop the killing, with the specific mention of names of the leaders of Rwandan armed forces (to put them on notice that we are watching them). We instructed our envoy to the Arusha talks to read the statement to the Government and RPF representatives there. He says that when he read the statement, the RPF representatives smiled, the Government representatives "blinked."
- We are about to announce new humanitarian assistance funds (\$15 million) for Burundi and Rwanda.
- We have contacted DOD to see if any of the U.S. military trainers who worked with Rwandan government forces in the past believe they have contacts within Rwanda that may be of use.

These efforts, of course, are not enough. I hope to sit down today with Ambassador Rawson to discuss other possible actions, especially in terms of greater involvement for other African leaders in the process. We will also discuss what we might do in Burundi to keep it from going the same route, especially in light of this morning's failed coup. State is holding a working group on Rwanda/Burundi tomorrow afternoon. I'll keep you posted.

□

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Apr-1994 18:10 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND THE UN

We floated the following idea with Strob, Peter Tarnoff, Madeleine Albright and some State bureaus (AF, IO):

--the President announces a \$15m ERMA drawdown

--we have the UNSC call upon the UNSYG to direct UNHCR to arrange cross border assistance to the 500,000 in country refugees concentrated along the borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire

--the UNSC calls upon those border countries to take steps immediately to engage in cross border feeding/assistance

--we authorize UNAMIR to station UN Civ Pol (police) in the UNHCR camps to provide security.

So far everyone likes the idea. USUN is exploring how to put it into a draft.

Distribution:


FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
FOR: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
FOR: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
FOR: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
FOR: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
FOR: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
FOR: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
FOR: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)

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FOR: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)
CC: Records (RECORDS)

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Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 26-Apr-1994 18:04
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Apr-1994 14:19 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: FOR BERGER: ADD RWANDA TO SOMALIA DC?

Sandy,

There is high level interest in State and here on Rwanda. I recommend that you add a 15 minute section to the Somalia DC on Friday to here from State, AID, and USUN on what we are doing on Rwanda.

Dick

Distribution:

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
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Message Status: READ
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Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Apr-1994 17:52 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: ***FOR CLEARANCE: RWANDA DC PAPER

~~SECRET~~

Deputies Committee Discussion Paper

RWANDA

Background

The UN reports that in excess of 100,000 Rwandans have been killed. Fighting between the government and rebel forces continues. Militia led massacres are also continuing, urged on by radio stations calling for more killing.

UNAMIR has drawdown to 270 troops and is attempting to arrange for the safety of Rwandans under its protection at the Kigali Amahoro stadium.

About 500,000 in-country refugees have fled to the border areas with Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. They are being prevented from crossing the borders and are in need of humanitarian assistance.

The White House issued a statement last Friday, mentioning specific military leaders who human rights groups believe have been implicated in the slaughters (tab 1).

Objectives

The IWG has identified six short-term policy objectives:

1. to stop the on-going massacres as quickly as possible through contacts with GOR and RPF leaders and demarches for similar representations with neighboring states, France, Belgium, and others.

2. to support the UN and others in attempts to achieve a ceasefire.

3. to encourage Tanzanian and other attempts to resume negotiations under the Arusha Framework.

4. to seek to prevent the violence from spreading outside Rwanda through contacts with neighboring states.

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5. to push in the UN to launch an immediate expanded humanitarian assistance effort.

6. to prevent a similar round of slaughter and disorder in Burundi by closely monitoring the situation there and staying in touch with the various elements in the country to dissuade.

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□

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- 2 -

Issues for Discussion

The Deputies should provide direction to the IWG on the degree of activism that they wish to encourage on further international steps aimed at addressing the slaughter and assisting refugees.

A new UNSC resolution is being co-drafted by the Czechs and Argentines. Among the possible elements in the resolution could be a genocide investigation, a call for UNHCR and border countries to engage in cross border assistance to the trapped in country refugees, limited protection for the refugees, and an arms embargo. In the new UNSCR debate, should the US support:


1. Genocide investigation: language that calls for an international investigation of human rights abuses and possible violations of the genocide convention?

2. In Country Protection of Refugees: language that authorizes the use of UNAMIR military or civilian police to protect in-country refugee camps receiving UNHCR or ICRC relief?

3. Arms embargo: language banning arms exports to Rwanda and would, inter alia, sanction the on going Ugandan aid to the rebels?

In addition to the UNSCR, are there additional actions that should be explored aimed at stopping the killing, or punishing those who may have planned it, or at least be seen to be pressuring the Rwandan government to have it punish them.

4. Counter-propaganda: should the US engage in additional propaganda activities to get a message into Rwanda to counter the radio stations that are urging killing?



5. Pressure to Punish Organizers of Killing: should the US work with other nations to explore directed sanctions (no admission on travel status, assets seizures, etc.) aimed at those who may have engineered the slaughter? and/or diplomatic sanctions (down grading relations, termination of non-emergency assistance) against Rwanda until those responsible are tried?

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□

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FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
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FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
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Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Apr-1994 16:36 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: FOR SANDY'S APPROVAL: DRAFT DC SUMMARY

~~SECRET~~

format: DC Summary

Subject: Somalia and Rwanda

The Deputies Committee decided that:

1. Consideration of Terminating UNOSOM: The US should not be seen as taking the lead to threaten termination of UNOSOM, but should make clear to the Somalis that donor and troop contributors may well decide to terminate operations soon because of the continued violence and failure to achieve a political solution.

Donors/Troop Contributors: State, AID, and DOD should consult with the donors and major troop contributors about their views on continuing the operation. We should urge them to make the risk of termination clear to the Somalis.

Special Envoy: State should consult with the UN (specifically the acting SRSG) and regional states (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda) to determine whether and when a trip to the region by a special US envoy would be helpful in reducing factional fighting and promoting a political settlement. If there is a consensus that such a trip should occur, then Amb. Oakley or some other envoy should head a team to the region.

Mandate Review Guidance: When the UNSC considers the UNOSOM mandate extension, USUN will support a 30 or 45 day extension only. It will support Council action to insure that there is a review toward the end of that period of the possibility of terminating or significantly reducing the mandate and UN presence, unless factional fighting has stopped and there has been significant progress toward a political settlement.

2. Protection of USLO: The current US Marine Fleet Area Security Team (FAST) is scheduled to depart Mogadishu on June 30. Senior State and Defense officials should consult immediately about State's plans for security of USLO after that date. If the departments have not reached consensus, the issue will be decided at higher levels no later than 15 May.

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3. Contingency Evacuation of UNOSOM: JCS and CINCENT should evaluate the UN plan for permissive and emergency evacuation. They should determine to what degree the UN is planning to rely upon the US, what US capabilities would be required, and what would be necessary to have those capabilities available in a timely manner. The Deputies decided to defer consideration of the proposal to consult with Congress on this contingency pending review of the JCS evaluation.

□

4. UNOSOM Personnel: Agencies will report immediately on candidates to fill positions on the UNOSOM staff: Development Office (AID), Judicial section (State/INM and Justice), political office (State), and Demining/Disarmament/and Demobilization (OSD and ACDA).

RWANDA

State will prepare a draft action plan for review Monday 3 May. It will be a vigorous program and include approaches to the UNSYG, the OAU leadership, concerned European states, and regional leaders. Among the ideas that we will solicit reaction to will be an OAU authorized peacekeeping force for Rwanda, a preventive diplomacy/deterrent force in Burundi, an arms embargo, a human rights/genocide investigation, and a UN protective operation for Rwandan refugees.

The Deputies will review the plan and the status of the issue at a teleconference early in the week.

USUN will support Security Council action to endorse an arms embargo, a genocide investigation, and assistance (including UNHCR) for the refugees.

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Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

01-May-1994 18:31 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Additional Actions on Rwanda

Tony/Sandy:

I hope we can meet with Dick early on Monday to review where we are and where we're going with respect to Rwanda. In particular, we need to review our potential support for OAU and regional efforts if/when they act to protect refugees on both sides of the border or take more aggressive action to end the massacre. In addition to the new instructions (State 114636) to the USUN on actions to pursue with respect to a resolution on Rwanda (based on Dick's suggestions), the following actions are being taken:

- The President's message yesterday is being pumped into Rwanda through VOA, BBC, Radio France and Radio Belge. We've already received indications that it is being heard, if not heeded, by the government and RPF leadership. It also received very heavy press play in the United States.
- We are continuing to work with the regional leaders, especially Presidents Mwinyi of Tanzania and Museveni of Uganda, to shore up their efforts at resolving the crisis. New talks are scheduled for Tuesday in Arusha, although it is uncertain whether the RPF (this time) will show up. Our Ambassador to Tanzania, Peter De Vos, will attend and help facilitate the discussions.
- AS John Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson will leave tomorrow (Monday) night to travel to the region, including Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania to shore up the regional leaders' efforts to achieve peace and protect refugees in Rwanda. The UN Commission for Human Rights is sending a team to the region to investigate the current abuses.
- Senior USG officials have been contacting Government and RPF leaders on a daily basis to urge a ceasefire and renewal of negotiations. For example, DAS Bushnell talked with General Bizimungo (RGF) and General Kagame (RPF) today to relate the President's message from yesterday. She also told the RPF that there are reports the RPF is impeding the flow of refugees to Tanzania, which he strongly denied.
- State is assembling a revised package of \$15 million in emergency relief assistance for the region. A team of refugee officials from our Embassy in Tanzania is going to the border with Rwanda to assess the current situation and make recommendations for new assistance.

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Distribution:

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CC: Non Records	(NONRECORD)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
CC: Jennifer C. Ward	(WARD)
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CC: Dan W. Mozena	(MOZENA)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: George M. Andricos	(ANDRICOS)
CC: Christina L. Funches	(FUNCHES)
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CC: Eric Liu	(LIU)
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Date Created: 01-May-1994 18:30

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A1 Folder: MAY94

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
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Read-Receipt Requested: NO

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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Source: FBI
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May 2, 1994

→ Georgia
cc: Remarks

MEMORANDUM FOR PEACEKEEPING CORE GROUP MEMBERS

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *NR*
SUBJECT: Summary and Conclusions of 2 May 94
Meeting

GEORGIA

1. State (NIS) will engage in a variety of diplomatic contacts with the Russians and Georgians this week to probe further the reasons for the May 10th "deadline" for a decision on peacekeeping.

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

3. State (IO) will prepare an analysis of the varying levels of UNSC action that might be taken with regard to a CIS peacekeeping force (e.g. acknowledgement, endorsement) and what "price" or conditions might be sought of the CIS in return (e.g. reporting, monitoring, mandate). The paper should be available to members of the Core Group by 6 May.

RWANDA

1. USUN will circulate to other concerned delegations the elements of a new resolution based on the guidance that was agreed on by the interagency community on April 30, with a view to approval of such a resolution later this week.

2. State will examine what funding authorities are available for US support to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations (Voluntary PKO account; FAA sections 506A, 522; ERMA). NSC will seek a White House announcement of \$15 million in emergency refugee assistance.

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

4. State (AF) will host a daily (M-F) video conference on Rwanda at noon, until further notice.

~~SECRET~~

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2

GENERAL

There was agreement that USAID should be routinely invited to all future meetings of the Core Group.

Additional Distribution:
State/NIS - Amb. Collins
State/AF - Asst Sec Moose

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-May-1994 10:04 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Kofi Annan Briefing Memo

May 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Kofi Annan, Tuesday, May 3, 1994, at 12:15 pm.

Kofi Annan, UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, is in Washington for meetings with Members of Congress, including a hearing yesterday before the Senate Africa Subcommittee on peacekeeping in Africa. Annan is likely to wish to cover a range of issues with you including: Bosnia, Rwanda, and possibly Somalia, the status of our PDD and peacekeeping funding.

Update on Peacekeeping Reform at the UN

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which Annan heads, has made significant progress in the past year in improving its capacity to manage peace operations. In addition to a substantial reorganization and increase in its staff, DPKO now has a 24-hour situation room and a stand-by forces planning team. The latter is the result of a year-long project to solicit voluntary, but non-binding commitments of troops, equipment, and services from member states. This effort has yielded pledges of over 50,000 troops, which should improve the UN's force planning and rapid deployment capabilities measurably.

Consistent with the PDD, the U.S. has not made any such pledges, but once the PDD is signed we will offer the UN information on potentially available U.S. forces or capabilities. We will, of course, make no commitments to provide such forces when they are requested.

Suggested Talking Points

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Bosnia

-- I appreciate the Secretary-General's expressed concern about criticism of U.S. policy by UNPROFOR officials. These statements have not been helpful to our shared goal of improved coordination between the UN and NATO.

□ -- This public sniping has to stop. What can we do, in your view to improve UN-NATO relations both on the ground and in the press?

-- We are very concerned that the Serbs continue to violate the Gorazde and Sarajevo exclusion zones. EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

Rwanda

-- We are very concerned about the grave situation in Rwanda. We are hopeful that African nations will respond favorably to the SYG's request for troops. What is your expectation? What role do you think peacekeepers could usefully play? How many do you expect are needed?

-- If adequate troops are available, we will do what we can to make voluntary contributions to deploy and sustain them. We do not think it would be wise, however, to fund a non-UN mission through UN assessments. This would set a bad precedent.

-- We are also planning to make available \$15 million to support the refugee and emergency relief effort and have dispatched Ambassador Rawson and John Shattuck to the region to try to reinvigorate the peace process.

Somalia

-- We have threatened to discontinue support for UNOSOM II if the parties fail to make substantial political progress. We are considering how to respond if this threat does not bring results.

-- Do you think, if the UNSC threatens to withdraw the force and donors threaten to cut assistance, this will yield any useful result? Do you think there is any collective will to carry out such a threat?

-- How confident are you that the major troops contributors will stay beyond May/June? If they are not likely to stay, wouldn't it be preferable for the UN to be seen to withdraw because the parties have failed to cooperate rather than because the UN mission crumbled?

Haiti

-- Do you have any sense of what role a reconfigured, more robust UNMIH might play, in the event that sanctions soften the military regime? Do you think there would be any appetite in the UN for a peace enforcement mission in Haiti?

Georgia

□ -- The Russians are pressing for the immediate dispatch of a UN mission to Georgia. This seems premature given the failure of the parties to reach any form of settlement. Do you see any role for UN peacekeepers at this stage? What role might the UN play if the Russians decide to go in unilaterally with a CIS force?

Peacekeeping Funding

(FYI: A NSC/State/OMB team travelled to the UN last week to try to obtain additional information on the UN's cash flow picture for presentation to Congress. Yesterday, and OMB-NSC team met with House and Senate appropriators. While the general mood was more or less cooperative and understanding of the severity of the problem, staff expressed serious doubt that Congress will be able to act before the August recess (when the cash flow crisis is likely to become severe) and concern that the House Republicans will try to extract additional conditions or hold up the supplemental over UN reform.

Another thing that was clear from these meetings is the importance of scheduling a Presidential meeting with the Defense authorizers/appropriators immediately. Many are feeling left out and increasingly angry.)

-- Thank you for your help in providing financial information to our team that visited the UN last week. We are working hard with Congress to try to find a solution to the funding problem. The President is personally committed to this effort.

-- We are hoping to be able to have some funds to the UN in August, but this will be difficult given the complexity of the appropriations process this year.

-- One thing is clear: It is absolutely crucial that we obtain an effective inspector general. Otherwise, we will never be able to pay off our debts in full. What do you think we can do to press our case more effectively both with the SYG and the membership?

Containing UN Peacekeeping Costs

-- We appreciate the efforts the UN has made to try to reduce the costs of on-going peacekeeping operations.

-- We would like to work with your staff in a low-key and quiet ways to try to identify additional, readily implementable cost-savings measures.

-- We would like to send a small team to New York to work with DPKO in the same cooperate spirit that our logistics teams did last Fall. How do you view this proposal?

Concurrences by: Jenonne Walker

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Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 03-May-1994 10:04
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-May-1994 10:08 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Slightly Revised Kofi Annan Memo

May 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Kofi Annan, Tuesday, May 3, 1994, at 12:15 pm.


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Suggested Talking Points

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

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Somalia

-- We have threatened to discontinue support for UNOSOM II if the parties fail to make substantial political progress. We are considering how to respond if this threat does not bring results.


-- Do you think, if the UNSC threatens to withdraw the force and donors threaten to cut assistance, this will yield any useful result? Do you think there is any collective will to carry out such a threat?

-- How confident are you that the major troops contributors will stay beyond May/June? If they are not likely to stay, wouldn't it be preferable for the UN to be seen to withdraw because the parties have failed to cooperate rather than because the UN mission crumbled?

Haiti

-- Do you have any sense of what role a reconfigured, more robust UNMIH might play, in the event that sanctions soften the military regime? Do you think there would be any appetite in the UN for a peace enforcement mission in Haiti?

Georgia



□ -- The Russians are pressing for the immediate dispatch of a UN mission to Georgia. This seems premature given the failure of the parties to reach any form of settlement. Do you see any role for UN peacekeepers at this stage? What role might the UN play if the Russians decide to go in unilaterally with a CIS force?

Peacekeeping Funding

(FYI: A NSC/State/OMB team travelled to the UN last week to try to obtain additional information on the UN's cash flow picture for presentation to Congress. Yesterday, and OMB-NSC team met with House and Senate appropriators. While the general mood was more or less cooperative and understanding of the severity of the problem, staff expressed serious doubt that Congress will be able to act before the August recess (when the cash flow crisis is likely to become severe) and concern that the House Republicans will try to extract additional conditions or hold up the supplemental over UN reform.

Another thing that was clear from these meetings is the importance of scheduling a Presidential meeting with the Defense authorizers/appropriators immediately. Many are feeling left out and increasingly angry.)

-- Thank you for your help in providing financial information to our team that visited the UN last week. We are working hard with Congress to try to find a solution to the funding problem. The President is personally committed to this effort.

-- We are hoping to be able to have some funds to the UN in August, but this will be difficult given the complexity of the appropriations process this year.

-- One thing is clear: It is absolutely crucial that we obtain an effective inspector general. Otherwise, we will never be able to pay off our debts in full. What do you think we can do to press our case more effectively both with the SYG and the membership?

Containing UN Peacekeeping Costs


-- We appreciate the efforts the UN has made to try to reduce the costs of on-going peacekeeping operations.

-- We would like to work with your staff in a low-key and quiet way to try to identify additional, readily implementable cost-savings measures.

-- We would like to send a small team to New York to work with DPKO in the same cooperative spirit that our logistics team did last Fall. How do you view this proposal?

Concurrences by: Jenonne Walker

Distribution:



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Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 03-May-1994 10:07
Deletable Flag: Y
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A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 03-May-1994 10:07
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

05-May-1994 13:28 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)
Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)

FROM: Sean J. Darragh
(DARRAGH)

SUBJECT: RWANDA WORKING GROUP

FALLOUT FROM RWANDA MEETING

- RPF IS MAKING A FINAL PUSH TO TAKE KIGALI. THEY WILL LIKELY SUCCEED.
- SHATTUCK MET WITH SALIM SALIM. HE IS IN SYNC WITH OUR POSITION.
- GEN'L DALIR (sp?) IS ASKING FOR 16 THOUSAND TROOPS. USUN HAS ASKED WHETHER WE ARE WILLING TO HELP OUTFIT SOME OF THEM. OUTFITTING MEANS EVERYTHING FROM WEB GEAR TO APCS.
- IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS REQUEST IS FOR AN ACCESSED OPERATION OR NOT. SUSAN ZELLE THINKS THE UN WILL PAY.
- BELGIUM'S AMB. TOLD MOOSE THEY WANT US TO TAKE THE LEAD. EVERYONE ACCEPT THE FRENCH SEEM TO AGREE THAT SOME TYPE OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATION SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED SOON. FRENCH WANT TWO SIDES TO AGREE TO AN OPERATION BEFORE THEY JUMP ON BOARD FOR SUCH A VENTURE.
- ALTHOUGH EVERYONE SEEMS TO BE SHYING AWAY FROM A FORMAL PK OPERATION BECAUSE THE DISPUTANTS SEEM ADVERSE TO IT AS YET, GEN'L DALIR'S PLAN SEEMS LIKE A PK OPERATION UNDER A NON-PKO GUISE.
- AMB ALBRIGHT WILL GET GUIDANCE TO FIND OUT MORE FROM BBG BEFORE WE EXPOSE OUR POSITION. THE FACT THAT WE DON'T HAVE ONE YET HAS A LOT TO DO WITH THAT. STATE IS CALLING FOR A DEPUTIES COMMITTEE.
- STATE IS DRAFTING A PAPER FOR A POTENTIAL DC IN CASE IT IS NEEDED. EVERYONE AGREES DICK'S CORE GROUP TONIGHT MIGHT MAKE A DC UNNECESSARY.
- THAT IS ALL

SEAN

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CC: Records

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Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 05-May-1994 13:16
Deletable Flag: Y
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A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 05-May-1994 13:16
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 17:27 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
Randy R. Beers (BEERS)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: VP talkers on Rwanda

Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et. al on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands prompt international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to the tragedy in Rwanda. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- The U.S. has not categorically ruled in or out any particular response.

-- We do, however, have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- In our view, there are several problems with this approach:

EO 13526 1.4d

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, no country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

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Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done by air.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim, particularly without the participation of a major military power.

-- There may, however, be a more limited but vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of an international force to protect those refugees and displaced persons that are in the most immediate danger-- that is those in the southern portion of Rwanda.

□ Such a force could not only provide protection, assist in refugee repatriation and in the distribution of humanitarian assistance but also serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi.

This mission would require fewer troops and be less complex logically.

It would also require the active support of the Burundi government and, preferably, the assent of the Rwandan parties.

-- If the troops were available for such a mission, the U.S. would endeavor to help by providing financial resources, equipment and lift as well as humanitarian assistance.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for any additional contributions of equipment or services.

-- I hope that we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution to this tragedy and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.

CC: Records

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Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 06-May-1994 17:27

Deletable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 039217

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE17:ZVFBOXVCS.WPL

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A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 06-May-1994 17:27
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 21:49 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Revised TPs for VP's Meeting on Rwanda

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et. al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands prompt international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of refugees on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone with an international force to provide security to populations in the southern portion of Rwanda, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a force could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require

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robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

It would, however, need the active support of the Burundi government and, preferably, the assent of the Rwandan parties.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would endeavor to help by providing financial resources, equipment and lift as well as humanitarian assistance.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for any additional contributions of equipment or services.

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

EO 13526 1.4d

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, no country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done by air.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim, particularly without the participation of a major military power.

-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.

CC: Records

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A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 06-May-1994 21:48
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 21:58 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

[COPy]

SUBJECT: Suggested Talking Points for VP's Meeting on Rwanda

Sandy,

Attached are suggested talking points for the Vice President's meeting with Boutros-Ghali et al. on Rwanda.

They have been informally cleared by JCS, State and OSD. Don Steinberg concurs as well.

Once you and your counterparts have cleared/commented, I will forward formally to the Vice President's office.

I will also provide the Vice President's office with a chart being prepared by State that summarizes the FY 94 resources that may still be available to support voluntary contributions to a potential Rwanda mission.

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A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 06-May-1994 21:58
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 21:49 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
Randy R. Beers (BEERS)

[0096]

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Revised TPs for VP's Meeting on Rwanda

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et. al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands prompt international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of refugees on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

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-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone with an international force to provide security to populations in the southern portion of Rwanda, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a force could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

It would, however, need the active support of the Burundi government and, preferably, the assent of the Rwandan parties.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would endeavor to help by providing financial resources, equipment and lift as well as humanitarian assistance.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for any additional contributions of equipment or services.

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

EO 13526 1.4d

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, no country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done by air.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim, particularly without the participation of a major military power.

-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 11:46 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Updated Talking Points on Rwanda

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et. al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands prompt international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of refugees on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone with an international force to provide security to populations in the southern portion of Rwanda, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a mission could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

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It would, however, need the active support of the Burundi and/or Tanzanian government and the assent of the Rwandan parties.

In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.

We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would endeavor to help by providing financial resources, equipment and lift as well as humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:


E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

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Thus far, no country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done by air.



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Finally, the chances of success appear slim, particularly without the participation of a major military power.


-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
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CC: Records	(RECORDS)
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CC: William M. Wise	(WISE)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 07-May-1994 11:45
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039286
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A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 07-May-1994 11:45
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 13:00 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

James A. Carman (CARMAN)
William M. Wise (WISE)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Rwanda TP's as agreed by State and JCS

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands immediate international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN, OAU, the Tanzanian government and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of displaced persons on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone along the Rwandan border with an international force to provide security to populations, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a mission could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but could also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The

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operation would require robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

It would, however, need the active support of neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Tanzania, and the assent of the Rwandan parties.

In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.

We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would fully support the operation politically and diplomatically and endeavor to help by providing financial resources, some lift, equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

EO 13526 1.4d

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, it is unclear that any country has

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committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done through an airport at the epicenter of a civil war.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim.

-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.

□

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 07-May-1994 13:00
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039287
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE18:ZVFCIL0JN.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 07-May-1994 13:00
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 15:26 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Final Rwanda Talking Points

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands immediate international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN, OAU, the Tanzanian government and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of displaced persons on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone along the Rwandan border with an international force to provide security to populations, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a mission could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but could also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

operation would require robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

It would, however, need the active support of neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Tanzania, and the assent of the Rwandan parties.

In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.

We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would fully support the operation politically and diplomatically and endeavor to help by providing financial resources, some lift, equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

[IF ASKED what direct support U.S. could provide:

If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.]

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

EO 13526 1.4d

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, it is unclear that any country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done through an airport at the epicenter of a civil war.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim.

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CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 07-May-1994 15:25
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039291
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE35:ZVFCM26S7.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 07-May-1994 15:25
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 16:18 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: rwanda talking points

[014a]

Ernie-- .

Rwanda points FYI. Have a great trip (and bring me back an ANC election or inauguaral T-shirt)!!

Susan

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 07-May-1994 16:17
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039294
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE13:ZVFCNARRL.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 07-May-1994 16:17
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS
[i]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 15:54 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

[014b]

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)
SUBJECT: Final Draft Rwanda Talking Points

Attached are final draft talking points on Rwanda for possible use by the Vice President.

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They have the full support of Mr. Lake and Mr. Berger as well as NSC staff, State, JCS, USUN. OSD has cleared at the DAS level and we expect senior level concurrence shortly.

OMB recommends against the Vice President meeting with Boutros-Ghali and Salim Salim on this subject, because OMB opposes any peacekeeping effort inside Rwanda and believes further consideration should be given to alternative options.

However, if the meeting does take place and there is discussion of options for providing security to persons inside Rwanda, OMB would not object to the final version of the talking points as drafted.

Distribution:

FOR: William M. Wise	(WISE)
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□

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 15:26 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

[014c]

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Final Rwanda Talking Points

CC: Records (RECORDS)

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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EO 13526 3.5c

CLASSIFICATION

May 8 5 22 PM '34

1970-00522

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

MSG NBR 325

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM EO 13526 3.5c OFFICE/DESK ALA 3.5c PHONE NBR EO 13526 3.5c

SUBJECT: PLUMBERS **PERIOD:** 1960

RWANDA BU

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES 6

(INCLUDING COVER)

HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE

IMMEDIATELY/URGENT

**NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY**

TRANSMIT TO

REMARKS:

Response to State/IO PKO OPTIONS

WASHFAX COVER SHEET

WASHFAX OPERATOR (703) 482-7680

EO 13526 3.5c

CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

8 May 1994

Rwanda: Comments on State/IO PKO Options Paper

1. The CIA does not clear policy papers. That said, a few observations on the paper follow:

- The capabilities and intentions of the FAR, RPF and militia forces are omitted from IO's draft paper. Attached to this memo is a brief assessment of the potential security threats to peacekeepers.
- The draft options paper understates Dallaire's proposal. He calls for a force to insure the delivery of humanitarian aid and "to prevent continuing massacres and to permit the free movement of people". This mission is, considerably more complex and dangerous than the version described in the IO paper.
- The objective of a PKO operation, "bringing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict" will almost certainly be viewed in Rwanda as a pro-Tutsi operation. "Enclaves" would be largely populated by Tutsis while the "hoodlums and roving gangs" are the Hutu militias who we believe are directed and supplied by elements of the FAR and Hutu hardline officials. The PKO would therefore be confronting a semi-organized force that is backed by key elements of the military and government. Hostility toward the PKO by many members of the Hutu majority population could be considerable, especially if the PKO began disarming Hutu militias. The militias can easily hide their weapons (AK-47s, grenades and pangas) from the PKO only to take them out at night to kill civilians or ambush peacekeepers. House-to-house searches for weapons will turn the Hutu population against the PKO, produce very few weapons, and subject PKO forces to considerable danger. The Rwandan military and Hutu militias have already demonstrated that they will not hesitate to kill UN forces who stand in their way.
- With so many moderate Hutu politicians and Hutu civil servants who might have been willing to work with Tutsis

EO 13526 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

killed by the militias, Rwandan politics is likely to become the politics of extremism. A PKO can hardly expect to remain neutral in an environment of extremism where each side will attempt to turn the PKO against the other or blame the PKO with taking sides. For example, what does the PKO do about the Hutu extremist radio broadcasts? Does the PKO attempt to stop arms from crossing the border?.

- One lesson from Somalia is that delivering humanitarian aid in a violent environment is very "troop intensive" and is only the first step in a larger mission. Securing enclaves and delivering aid merely freezes the larger political and ethnic problem in place. When the troops eventually depart--or are forced to withdraw as combat casualties mount, as in Somalia--the Tutsis in Rwanda will again be at risk and the refugees will still be refugees. What are the exit conditions for the PKO? No massacres today, no massacres next week, or no massacres next month? What political steps in Rwanda need to be taken before such exit conditions are met? Is reconciliation likely given the polarized politics and current ethnic slaughter? (S NF)

7 May 1994

Rwanda: Threats to Peacekeeping Forces

1. Rwanda could easily become a dangerous environment for international peacekeepers.

- Government and RPF forces, equipped and proficient in the use of light arms and small artillery, could become deadly opponents of a peacekeeping force. In addition, the Hutu militias armed with automatic weapons and grenades could attack peacekeepers.
- The Rwandan military and Hutu militias have already demonstrated that they will not hesitate to kill UN forces who stand in their way. 3.5c

2. Peacekeeping forces in Rwanda would depend on vulnerable lines of communication and supply. Kigali is landlocked. Supplies would need to pass on roads that could easily be closed by hostile forces. Kigali airport is vulnerable to attack; it has repeatedly been closed several times during the last month by mortar fire. The RPF and Rwandan military possess anti-aircraft weapons and in early April elements of government security forces probably fired the anti-aircraft missiles that downed President Habyarimana's airplane. This week a Canadian relief plane was hit by small arms fire. 3.5c

Military Capabilities:

3. Government military (FAR). The army has about 25 infantry battalions totalling between 15,000 and 20,000 men. After a month of fighting, DIA estimates that about 10,000 effective troops remain under government control. Most Western military observers believe the FAR performed poorly in recent years, but its ability to withstand the RPF's assault on Kigali suggests that at least some units remain effectively organized and moderately proficient. EO 13526 1.4c FAR weaponry includes 82 mm mortars and 122 mm howitzers, SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, 75 mm recoilless rifles and panhard armored cars. 3.5c

4. Gendarmerie. Before 6 April the paramilitary force totalled 7,200 men arrayed in 10 territorial groups. Their

EO 13526 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Threats to Peacekeeping Forces

current strength is unknown. They probably are only lightly armed, but some units may have mortars and machine guns. 3.5c

5. Militias. The militia of former President Habyarimana's MRND, the "Interahamwe"--or "Those who attack together"--was found in 1992. The MRND's ally, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR)--which has long called for the extermination of Tutsis--has its own militia, the "Impuzamugamhi" or "Those who have the same goal". We believe that the militias were organized, trained, and directed by senior military officers and Hutu hardline politicians. Almost certainly numbering in the thousands, the locally-based militias have been accused by aid workers of systematically killing Tutsis and moderate Hutus under the direction of local officials and in cooperation with the military. Earlier this year, EO 13526 1.4c the militias were being trained by the military and were receiving modern weapons, including AK-47s and G-3s. Militia arms caches were reportedly established around the country. EO 13526 1.4c reported militias working together with the military in manning checkpoints. 3.5c

6. Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). EO 13526 1.4c the RPF has 13,000 effective combat troops out of a force that had been estimated as high as 20,000. Although primarily a light infantry force, the RPF has 107 mm towed rocket launchers, 120 mm mortars, and SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles. Highly mobile and skilled in guerrilla tactics, the RPF is generally considered to be well disciplined. EO 13526 1.4c say the RPF has not conducted mass killings in territory it controls, but the rebels have executed Hutu military and militia believed to be responsible for ethnic killings. 3.5c

Intentions:

7. RPF. Although the RPF has generally cooperated with UNAMIR forces, it could target peacekeeping forces that it believed were siding with government forces, were protecting those responsible for mass killings, or were threatening RPF controlled territory. 3.5c

8. FAR. FAR forces, especially the Presidential Guard, have already attacked and killed UN troops. Ten Belgians and several Ghanaian and Pakistan soldiers were killed and wounded by FAR forces in early April. Earlier this month, several Ghanaians were seriously wounded in what the UN described as a deliberate attack on UNAMIR forces, almost certainly by FAR forces. 3.5c

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Threats to Peacekeeping Forces

9. The Militias. Bands of militias, armed with AK-47's and roaming the countryside, would pose a serious risk to small peacekeeping units posted to isolated towns or patrolling roads. The militia could evolve into a Hutu-extremist guerrilla force. If so, the risk of ambush, sniper attacks, and drive-by shooting would be high. Probably operating close to home villages, the militias would have the advantage of knowing the terrain, easily obtaining local intelligence on peacekeeping forces, and enjoying protection and resupply from their friends and relatives. 3.5c

10. Other Risks to Peacekeeping Forces

- Vulnerable Lines of Communication. Rwanda's hilly terrain offers numerous opportunities to ambush supply convoys or patrols. Landmines are common weapons; over 50,000 landmines are still uncleared in northern Rwanda. The RPF and FAR have mortars and SA-7s that could shut down nearly any airport or landing strip. For example, by mid-April, EO 13526 1.4c the roads out of Kigali so dangerous that forces were evacuated by air rather than overland.
- Armed Citizens. The militias, undistinguishable from unarmed civilians, could easily stage terrorist hit-and-run attacks against isolated military outposts or off-duty soldiers.
- Cross Fire. Even if peacekeepers were not directly targeted by military forces or militia, resumed fighting between the FAR and RPF would subject the peacekeepers to the risk of stray rounds. Kigali airport and other strategic locations occupied by peacekeeping forces would almost certainly be fought over by the two militaries, endangering peacekeepers and threatening their escape routes. Several UNAMIR soldiers have already been killed by stray gunfire. 3.5c

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Ruanda 5/9/94

US planes going out

- WFP has no > food in Burundi

- ICRC has convinced govt to do H2O purification in Kagali hospital areas

Flights x 2/day will begin Wed.

delay = 3-4d

- offloading issues

- same aircraft diverted to Geneva

- UNHCR asked for delay b/c no trucks to move it.

PR of flights - Joint Combat N clean going

Another Presidential Visit on Ruanda on Friday

To send cables w/ talking pts.

Where is refugee need greatest?

- Area along Burundi border = most intense

- can't be totally sure in this constraints of lack of info.

- RPF doing its best to secure Tanz border / Uganda = less concern.

- Zaire border = Black hole

JCS
RP agrees
CIA - Gitaramanda → Butembo
+ road

Critical problem = urban areas

ICRC may be best source of info

SAFE ZONE = magnet for populations

in Protective Zone in Sait...
How many Rwandans' refugees?

60,000 in Sait,

may be included in Displaced #

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

of Rwanda refugees in Burundi that may be treated back \rightarrow Rwanda.
~~50,000~~

- 65,000 Burundi in Rwanda (according to Catholic Relief Services)

20,000 Rwandan displaced in Burundi

35,000 Garama + — (w/o food, housing etc.)

- 100,000

25,000 Kagame

120,000 NM (under RPF control)

- 200,000

200,000 SE (under RPF control)

}

ICRC

~~ICRC~~

Area in South, around Burundi = greatest area of need.

Need to balance deployment

- if we deploy in South ... need to do in North (RPF)

- political balance

- Need to focus on political / diplomatic / humanitarian ways to slow balance / neutrality

in Rwanda, we went where need was greatest. + stated so up front

AF/C to bring together guys w/ maps + good knowledge of area
 to draw govt-off

Human Rights

- Shuttle trip

- general agreement on t of pth

- big measured ^{keynote} leaders that they are not a bur
 seller's govt better by of UN shrugging their problems back on regional orgs

Agreement 1) HR chks as large magnitude 3) Some kind of int'l presence (preferably expanded),
 or — 2) Ceasefire = v. import, but enhanced UNPROFOR = required \rightarrow Protection of civilian
 probably won't stop all killing 4) HR investigation needed
 @ same p. both to investigate & to
 + Reaching compre

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Rwanda and TCH

3 options

1. - Declare → unusual & 3 difficulty
 - less accessible than May
 - Afr. who control country
 - messier situation
 - interior lines problem - hard to support logistically
2. - Alleged state - set of adjoining countries or borderers
 - safe havens of border
 - ↳ assuming agreement of parties, it's doable for neighboring countries
 - cheap UN fighting - protect means shoot to kill
3. - Do nothing
 - Ok UN - have to wait until Reg. come off
yes. - Put military on defensives
 - would require more troops
 - have to occupy every \square unit of
territory
 - off

Doable if agreeance. Ok UN. Can African forces pull this off
estimates 5,000 \rightarrow 50,000 ratio
35,000: troops

(3) Don't use force +

- beseach regional states & help refugees, use Reg. military
to protect humanitarian
- may be beyond border state capability + not enough

(2) Do 350,000 really need protection? Int'l orgs. say:

- No danger to Rwandan refugees
- displaced: General agreement: small security problem
 - atay Tanz/ Uganda
 - \Rightarrow cattle disease

= 250,000

N + E

Along Burundi border (Butaro \rightarrow South)

v. serious danger

Rwanda - in Bur.
Burundi - in
- in Rwanda

Rwandans displaced

all in same degree
of danger

Look at most persecuted population

Safe havens in Rwanda

Small protective deployment in B.
if agreeable

- Will go hard to
protect out of Rwanda
- force
- get bandits out
of B.
- get Rwandans back
- puts ours back on the

Ch. VII

== size of safe havens?

incl. Butaro (30 miles from border)

could be 10,000 houses

protect
out of Burundi

Kigali has to be resolved politically

ORF - need free
to camp to
care people
+ in their
patrols

+ some no space free

Better w/ UN mandate

Plan ORF

Bad state?

Ruanda

5/13/94

update on ongoing
missions

- Coub. - Liberia
- Rwanda
- Angola

OSD to set up Ruanda Task Force - led by Vince Klem
Ed Bryner to take over

1) Humanitarian Assistance

- cable denying request for C130 into Kigali - wait go out
- Shultz wants to fly into Kigali; Perry will look into it.

IO - strategy to keep U.S. looking proactive
while returning this resolution. } French.

2) P100

- logically a burden for Burundi - political burden
- economic benefits - Burundi want of first PCF
- DAF to Bryner to talk to military } Rotatable
- Change to talk to Political Affairs folks to each. } to each.

Degree of Cost
C130 +
Other
Support

Any inducements for Burundi?

- better airfield
- reintegration assistance
- left equipment
- etc.

DEFREF
OF
US
COMMITMENT

- Our own resolution?
- what to do now
- that we're pressed to
- the wall

- useful during our option
vs. criteria + UN's
stand.

- JCS Op. Plan
- Burundi's View of
this option
- UN Political track
 - draft. Book-Body
 - what's our political
part.

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Director of
Central Intelligence

RU4

SECRET

EO 13526 3.5c

Richard Clarke
Director for Global Issues and
Multilateral Affairs
National Security Council
Room 302, OEOB

National Intelligence Council Memorandum

Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis

Key Points After the slaughter of an estimated 200,000 Rwandans, the tempo of ethnic bloodletting is slowing. Nonetheless, the massacres—of an even greater magnitude than the killings in Burundi last year—are creating an enormous and longlasting humanitarian crisis. In both countries, extremists with access to military power are using ethnic fears to derail democratic elections and power-sharing negotiations. Continued unrest has taken a heavy toll on moderates in both ethnic communities. 3.5c

In Rwanda, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) controls about half the country; it is contesting the capital and moving toward success. Should the rebels triumph, they will probably be able to co-opt other groups into an RPF-controlled regime. The only other way to end the bloodshed might be a Cyprus-type partition, entailing enormous population movements given the intermingling of majority Hutus and minority Tutsis. 3.5c

The disorder in one country feeds unrest in the other. Moreover, financing from the large Rwandan and to a lesser extent Burundian exile communities keeps revanchist movements going. 3.5c

We expect the number of Rwandans who have fled or have been displaced within the country to grow into the millions. Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi fear that the refugee influx will bring violence and that the human waves will include military forces. 3.5c

At the same time, aid donors are fatigued. Given their limited mandate, UN peacekeepers in Rwanda could not slow the bloodbath, and ethnic unrest has swept away whatever gains were achieved by the large flows of economic aid to both countries. 3.5c

This memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It is based on discussions among intelligence community analysts at a teleconference held on 10 May 1994. It was coordinated with representatives of CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA, and Army.

NIC 00270/94
13 May 1994

EO 13526 3.5c

SECRET

Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis

Never before in its 131-year history has the International Committee of the Red Cross seen at first hand such unmitigated hatred leading to the extermination of a significant part of the civilian population.

ICRC Aide-Memoire to Governments on the Rwanda Crisis, 29 April 1994

In both Rwanda and Burundi, the traditional enmity between the Hutus, who comprise 80-90 percent of the populations, and the Tutsis, who comprise the minority, will continue to fuel ethnic conflict—derailing efforts toward peaceful power sharing. Although the tempo of ethnic bloodletting in Rwanda is slowing, the massacres are creating an enormous and longlasting humanitarian crisis. 3.5c

Brutal slaughter of hundreds of thousands causes even more Rwandans to flee their homes

Following the death of the Rwandan and Burundian presidents in a plane crash on 6 April, hardline Rwandan Hutus, using their control of the army, unleashed massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus to scuttle the Arusha Accord that was to have given Tutsis greater political power. Aid agencies fear that more than 200,000 Rwandans—mainly Tutsis and Hutu moderates—have died and more than 300,000 from both groups have fled the country. At least 500,000 have been displaced within Rwanda, a number that could rise as high as 3 million.¹ 3.5c

Burundi could follow Rwanda's bloody lead

The death of the Burundian president has not sparked significant unrest, but renewed violence could erupt in Burundi at any time. Democratic presidential elections in June 1993—in which Melchior Ndadaye became the country's first Hutu president—have been followed by three attempted coups by the Tutsi-controlled military and the murder of Ndadaye and other leaders. The coup attempt last October set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as 50,000 and drove another 600,000 or so Burundians into neighboring countries. Recent developments—including the latest failed coup, disarmament of Hutu militias and civilians, and a Tutsi-inspired constitutional

¹ Out of the 8.4 million population of Rwanda, about 1.3 million, or 15 percent, are estimated to be Tutsi. The International Committee of the Red Cross says between 100,000 and 500,000 people have been killed. Several international humanitarian agencies have characterized the situation in Rwanda as genocide, considering that between 8 percent to a possible 40 percent of the Tutsi population may have been slaughtered. Burundi's population is 6.1 million, with Tutsis comprising over 15 percent, or some 900,000 people. (U)

challenge to President Ntibantunganya's legitimacy—have added to tensions. [3.5c]

Rwanda and Burundi to 1993

Unlike most African states, Rwanda and Burundi were not artificial creations of colonial rule; their existence as political entities goes back several centuries. Between the 15th and 17th centuries, Tutsi herders moved into the area from Ethiopia and established dominance over Hutu farmers. Hutus traditionally were the social inferiors of the Tutsi nobility, who exchanged cattle for personal services. Both groups share social structures and the related Kirundi and Kinyarwanda languages. (U)

Rwanda's Tutsi monarchy traditionally was more centralized and authoritarian than in Burundi, where the king's power rested on a shifting set of factional alliances. Rwanda also was marked by sharper social distinctions between Tutsis and Hutus. German and Belgian rule in the 20th century highlighted ethnic differences in both countries, as colonial authorities gave Tutsis disproportionate access to education and government jobs. (U)

Even before Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the Hutus had gained political power in civil strife marked by widespread ethnic violence and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis into exile. Two presidents—the southerner Grégoire Kayibanda (1962-1973) and the northerner Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1994)—ruled over single-party regimes. The country enjoyed relative stability and ethnic peace until Tutsi exiles of the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded from Uganda in 1990. The Rwandan peace pact in August 1993 (Arusha Accord) that ended the civil war between the Hutu-led government and the mainly Tutsi rebels was derailed by Hutu extremists. [3.5c]

In Burundi, Tutsis remained in control until last year. The contrast between Hutu rule in Rwanda and the group's oppression in Burundi led to Hutu uprisings—in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988—that resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Each Hutu attack fueled Tutsi fears of extermination, and each bloody repression reinforced the Hutus' desire for revenge. Periodic ethnic unrest resulted in three successful *coups d'état* and many failed attempts. The last Tutsi president, Pierre Buyoya, judged the situation was untenable and orchestrated last year's election and transfer of power to a Hutu successor. [3.5c]

Forces For Instability

The traditional enmity between Tutsis and Hutus continues to drive events in Rwanda and Burundi. Since independence, hardliners—from both groups and in both countries—have led coups and fueled massacres to block political and military power sharing and quash their ethnic rivals. 3.5c

Too many obstacles to reconciliation

In both countries, political and social institutions are too poorly developed and too tied to ethnic power bases to allow a peaceful transition to multi-ethnic power sharing. The forces for instability have repeatedly overwhelmed efforts at democratic elections, power-sharing accords, and ethnic reconciliation: 3.5c

Financing the Tutsi minority

- **Ethnic Intermingling.** Hutus and Tutsis live interspersed across the two countries. This intensifies episodes of tribal violence, because ethnically motivated killers manipulated by political elites frequently know victims and can incite their kinsmen to participate. Moreover, this demographic pattern makes it difficult to impose peace by separating the warring groups. 3.5c
- **Spillover Effects.** Disorder in one country feeds unrest in the other. The most concrete effect is the inter-flow of refugees, who strain the countries' limited resources and spread ethnic horror stories among their kinsmen. The cycle of violence strengthens the perception of duplicity on both sides and convinces each side that it cannot risk sharing power with the other. 3.5c
- **Exile Resources.** Many Rwandan Tutsi exiles work as professionals and businessmen in neighboring states, as well as in Europe and North America. Contributions from this community have been an important resource for the RPF and are likely to continue to be available to support armed Tutsi movements in Rwanda and perhaps in Burundi. 3.5c
- **Poverty.** With annual per capita GNP of less than \$300, Rwanda and Burundi are among the world's poorest countries; they are also the two most densely populated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1990, moreover, Rwanda's economy has shrunk by more than 10 percent and Burundi's by about 5 percent, while their populations have grown about 10 percent. Recent violence has kept farmers from tending the coffee crop—the main export of both countries—further battering rural incomes. In Rwanda, the RPF's demand for land for returning Tutsi exiles has been a

sticking point. A lasting solution in Burundi would have to include a role in the economy for Tutsi soldiers and civil servants replaced by Hutus. 3.5c

Forces Inhibiting Reconciliation

The recent violence has strengthened those elements in the social and political structure of Rwanda—and to a lesser extent in Burundi—that tend to block peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict: 3.5c

Few moderates left on either side

- **Middle Ground Eroded.** Much of the recent violence has targeted leaders seeking a common ground between Hutus and Tutsis. In Rwanda, most moderate Hutu leaders appear to have been murdered or to have fled, leaving the interim government under the control of hardliners. The RPF's public statements indicate the group views all surviving government leaders as complicit in the slaughter. Until the violence ends, Rwandan moderates will be unwilling to come forward. In Burundi, the coup attempts and efforts to disarm civilians appear to be polarizing the political leadership of both ethnic groups. 3.5c

Splits within each group also growing

- **Factionalism.** Continued unrest is increasing the number of factional fault lines in both countries and is undermining the ability of local leaders to convince their followers to adhere to a settlement. In Rwanda, government forces are divided between northern and southern elements. The rebels seem more unified, but divisions may develop between the Tutsi military leadership and Hutus serving as political window dressing or between Tutsis seeking revenge for the massacre of their kinsmen and others more disposed to reconciliation with the Hutu majority. 3.5c

Similar factionalism is rife in Burundi. Tutsi soldiers' political loyalties and support for coup attempts derive from their membership in rival clans. The Hutu community is split between PALIPEHUTU—which says only a violent uprising can earn Hutus equality with Tutsis—and the ruling FRODEBU party, which in turn is split between moderates and radicals. 3.5c

- **Obstacles to Outside Help.** In both countries, manipulation by contending factions of outside mediators and peacekeepers has made it much harder for disinterested parties—such as the UN, OAU, and Western powers—to help find or implement peaceful solutions. Rwandan government forces, after attacking UN

peacekeeping troops in early April and accusing the Belgian contingent of complicity in President Habyarimana's death, now say they want an expanded multilateral military presence, probably to block new RPF gains. The RPF has hedged statements that it would welcome a multilateral force to protect aid deliveries, probably because the rebels believe they will win in the weeks needed to deploy such a force. In Burundi, opposition by the Army's Tutsi hierarchy has sharply restricted the mission and size—from 200 to 31—of an OAU military observer force that is intended to build confidence between the regime and the troops.

3.5c

*Neighboring states
promoting their
own interests*

- **Meddling Neighbors.** Uganda and Zaire will continue to support their allies in Rwanda and Burundi. Uganda is likely to keep giving the RPF weaponry, logistical support, and sanctuary, and could provide some troop support. For Ugandan President Museveni, this aid repays his debt to the Rwandan rebels' military cadre, who were his comrades-in-arms during his fight for power. Museveni probably also judges that only an RPF victory would induce the estimated 200,000 Tutsi exiles in Uganda—where they have drawn native Ugandans' resentment—to return to Rwanda. If asked, Museveni might also aid any Burundian Tutsi group that allied with the RPF.

3.5c

Zaire's President Mobutu views the crises in Rwanda and Burundi as a chance to remind Western donors that his regime cannot be ignored and to burnish his regional and international image by mediating among the rival factions. At the same time, Mobutu probably will provide limited support to Rwandan and Burundian Hutus. The Zairian military intervened against the RPF in 1990 and sent Rwandan government forces some weapons last month. Kinshasa has not meddled as much in Burundi, but we believe that Mobutu would seriously consider a request by either an embattled Hutu government or radical Hutu militias for military help.

3.5c

Prospects and Implications for the United States

*Rwandan peace
accords not
salvageable*

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Disintegrating. The onset of civil war and massive ethnic slaughter in Rwanda last month sounded the death knell for the Arusha accords of August 1993 that promised power sharing, transition to electoral democracy, and military demobilization. Renewed fighting and widespread butchery have

dissipated the limited trust developed between the government and RPF during a year of negotiations. 3.5c

What if the rebels win...

The RPF controls about half the country, can isolate the capital at will, and is moving toward defeating government forces. Should the rebels triumph, they will try to co-opt other groups into an RPF-controlled regime. The rebels have already spoken of a "national conference" as a forum for establishing the legitimacy of a new government. 3.5c

Could the RPF Govern?

We believe the RPF, based on its negotiating history, realizes that a minority Tutsi government would not be viable. Should the rebels defeat the interim government, their ability to establish political control over Rwanda will depend on their ability to co-opt the surviving moderate Hutu leaders. The RPF's record suggests it probably would be able to do so if it wins quickly. The group has installed Hutus in visible political positions—such as RPF Chairman Kanyarengwe—and worked well with moderate Hutu representatives during the peace negotiations last year. Another factor in the RPF's favor is that rebel troops have refrained from retaliating on a massive scale for anti-Tutsi atrocities; their strong discipline leads us to judge that RPF troops will continue doing so. 3.5c

The ability of the rebels to establish a functioning government would decline, however, if the war dragged on. Hutus amenable to cooperation with the RPF would be hunted down by the interim government's security forces and hardline militias, and continued massacres of Tutsis could reduce the RPF's willingness to cooperate across ethnic lines. 3.5c

...or could a stalemate result in a Cyprus-like partition?

On the other hand, if a military stalemate develops, continued fighting probably will deepen mistrust even further and preclude a negotiated political settlement for some time. In this case, a more radical solution—for example, a *de facto*, Cyprus-like partition between a mainly Tutsi, RPF-held sector and a mainly Hutu, government-controlled zone—may be the only way to end the bloodletting. Partition would require massive shifts of population and would impose enormous humanitarian and financial costs. The final extent of the massacres probably would determine whether the RPF would even consider this option. Such a step would have significant long-term risks. 3.5c

In Burundi, the process that led to last year's democratic election and the transfer of political power to the Hutu majority is under extreme pressure. We believe the most immediate challenge is that of ensuring the physical security of each ethnic group. The deaths of two Hutu presidents within six months highlight the vulnerability of Burundi's politicians, and extremists could try to massacre moderate leaders in a power grab. On the other hand, Tutsis suspect that efforts to protect the political leadership, such as the creation of a separate Presidential Guard, are steps designed to impose Hutu military dominance over the minority group and could leave them defenseless against Hutu mobs and militias. 3.5c

Regional Refugee Situation

Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi fear that the influx of more than 300,000 Rwandan refugees will be economically costly, lead to violence, and that the human waves will include military forces:

- At least 250,000 Rwandans have crossed into remote western Tanzania and have been moved to an area some 18 kilometers from the border. International agencies are scrambling for funds, workers, and relief goods to avert a health catastrophe from cholera, measles, and other diseases.
- More than 50,000 Rwandan Tutsis have fled to Burundi, along with about 200,000 Burundian Hutu refugees who had fled last fall to escape violence and are now returning. The fragile ethnic balance in Burundi could easily be upset if local people believe the recent arrivals are monopolizing relief supplies. Some 60,000 Burundian Hutu refugees remain in Rwanda.
- Zaire claims it has received some 8,500 Rwandan refugees, and another 5,500 Rwandans are in Uganda. Some 22,000 Burundians have fled into Zaire from refugee camps in Rwanda. Although the numbers are relatively small, the remoteness of the border camps and poor transport systems are straining the relief effort. 3.5c

Massive humanitarian crisis will continue

Chronic Humanitarian Crisis. Continued political instability and ethnic violence will exact a heavy human price. We expect the number of Rwandans who have fled or have been displaced within the country—we estimate 800,000—to rise into the millions. Similarly, the 200,000 Burundians who recently returned from camps in Rwanda may remain displaced within Burundi. These population

*Another blow to UN
peacekeeping efforts...*

displacements also have disrupted food production; Rwandan farmers probably have drastically reduced planting during the current long rainy season, and last year Burundi lost an estimated two-thirds of the food crops planted during the short rains. [3.5c]

Donor Fatigue. Rwanda and Burundi's cycle of violence has spun out of control despite considerable political and economic aid from the outside. Some donors are reassessing assistance to Africa, especially for peacekeeping operations. The limited mandate of the 2,500-man UN contingent in Rwanda prevented it from intervening to halt or slow the bloodbath:

- Belgium—which had 10 peacekeepers murdered—is reevaluating its participation in any future UN military operations.
- Because of their experiences in other operations, Nigeria and other African countries say they will participate in a proposed multilateral force to protect aid deliveries only if they have prior commitments of logistical and transport support from the United States and other Western powers. [3.5c]

*...and to economic
assistance to Africa*

The experience of Rwanda and Burundi may also cause donors to reconsider economic assistance. Donors disbursed \$1.3 billion to Rwanda and \$1.0 billion to Burundi—representing about 20 percent of their GDPs—between 1986 and 1990, when the World Bank said they were generally pursuing the right economic course. But since then, ethnic violence has swept away the gains achieved by these resource transfers. [3.5c]

Rwanda and Burundi: Societies in Crisis

Annex: Military Forces in Rwanda and Burundi

Rwanda

Rwandan Armed Forces (Government):

Combat Effective manpower nationwide: 10,000

Combat Effective manpower in Kigali: 2,500

Major weapons systems:

Armored cars:	62
Mortars (60 mm, 80 mm, 120 mm)	250
122 mm howitzers	6
Air defense machine guns	35
SA-7 air defense missiles	unk
75 mm recoilless rifles	50
Helicopters	6

Hutu Militias (Pro-Government):

Combat Effective manpower nationwide: well over 10,000

Weapons: AK-47 assault rifles, hand grenades

Rwandan Patriotic Army (Rebels):

Combat Effective manpower nationwide: 13,000

Combat Effective manpower in Kigali: 4,500

Major weapons systems (quantities unknown):

107 mm towed multiple rocket launchers
60 mm, 80 mm, 120 mm mortars
Towed air defense guns
SA-7 man-portable missiles

United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR):

50 military observers in Kigali; authorized strength of 270.

3.5c

Burundi**Burundian Armed Forces**

Estimated manpower nationwide: 13,500

(includes Army, Gendarmerie, Security Service)

Major weapons systems:

Armored cars:	85
122-mm howitzers and rocket-launchers	22
3-inch, 82-mm, 120-mm mortars	109
75-mm recoilless rifles	13
40-mm antitank grenade launchers	69
Air defense artillery	188
Helicopters (operational)	10
C-47 Transport (operational)	2
Trainers (operational)	2
Light fixed-wing (operational)	2

Hutu Party Militias


Unknown number of militiamen armed with various light infantry weapons, possibly including rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

OAU Inter-African Observer Mission in Burundi (MIOB)

31 military observers; authorized strength of 47.

3.5c


Concentrations of Displaced Rwandans Attempting to Flee Country, Late April 1994



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Challenges to Proposed UN Forces




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
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Military Situation, Early May 1994



Rwanda: Concentrations Of Displaced Persons And Refugees, 11 May 1994



Confidential EO 13526 3.5c

PREPARED 11 MAY 94

Russell

Guanda 5/18/94

Different tasks w/ different free levels. \Rightarrow What can 5,500
do under varying
constraints?

- Ask Principals if we want to engage or disengage:
Learn or not.

Clinic - do nothing - pay + be farmed

try to fiddle - affect or margins, pay + be farmed

Pay won 08b, 072A, State

3 assumptions for possible environments \rightarrow 5,500

JCS/DSR can decide if Reg
want to play.

3 ~~redundant~~

Deputies

- segment
- degree of USB support
- do we engage w/ vs

Troops in front of Country

Asi es fort logique

Rwanda

24 May 1994

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Risks to an Expanded UN Force in Rwanda

1. The expansion of UNAMIR--the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda--to a strength of 5,500 men is likely to occur before the civil war between Rwanda's interim government and the rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) abates or a firm cease-fire is in place. The two sides have radically divergent expectations of the mission of a multilateral force, and either side could quickly come to believe that UN troops were not neutral and were fair game for attack. In any case, supply lines in mountainous and landlocked Rwanda will be highly vulnerable to attack by local forces and to the political sensitivities and inadequate infrastructure of neighboring states. 3.5c

Differences Over Expanded UNAMIR Mandate

2. EO 13526 1.4c say neither side has given unconditional consent to the conditions that the Security Council has set for deploying an expanded contingent to Rwanda. Rwanda's Ambassador to the UN--a member of the Security Council--voted in favor of expanding UNAMIR, after pushing for a larger force that would enforce a cease-fire and back up a political settlement. Beleaguered by the RPF's capture of Kigali's airport this week, the Hutu-controlled interim government probably hopes a UN force will freeze current battle lines, block further rebel advances, and reinforce its domestic and international legitimacy. Leaders of the Tutsi-dominated RPF, however, say they will not be bound by a resolution that the government voted for, and they have demanded "bilateral agreements" with countries providing UNAMIR contingents. The RPF wants the UN force to have no more than 2,500 soldiers and a mission limited to protecting civilians--including disarmament of suspected mass murderers--and humanitarian relief. RPF leaders have rejected negotiation of a cease-fire with regime leaders, claiming this would give political legitimacy to the regime without ending the slaughter of the rebels' ethnic Tutsi kinsmen in areas still under government control. 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

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PER E.O. 13526

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Risks From the Factions

3. Any enhanced UNAMIR force will face considerable risks from the Rwandan combatants, whether the peacekeepers are based in Kigali or in protected zones along the borders. Each side suspects the UN of supporting the other.

3.5c

4. From the government... Security forces and progovernment militias--responsible for UNAMIR's 11 combat deaths since last month, as well as for most of the ethnic slaughter--probably would resist an active UN effort to prevent further killings or to investigate past murders. The Army retains a core of some 10,000 combat-effective troops, who are equipped with armored vehicles, air defense missiles and machineguns, RPGs, and other heavy weapons. The Presidential Guard Battalion probably is the greatest risk to UN forces. Early last month PGB troops murdered opposition leaders--including the Prime Minister--and Belgian peacekeepers trying to protect them, and eyewitnesses have told [EO 13526 1.4c] that they organized the onset of ethnic butchery in southern Rwanda.

3.5c

5. There are also at least 10,000 members of radical Hutu party militias, who earlier this year were trained and given rifles by the security forces. These irregulars--responsible for slaughtering civilians and harassing foreign aid workers, according to press [EO 13526 1.4c] reports--could evolve into a guerrilla force capable of taking on UN troops. The regime says it is recruiting 50,000 new troops, who probably will receive the same radical indoctrination, cursory training, and light weapons as the militias.

3.5c

6. The absence of command-and-control calls into serious question the government's ability to implement any agreement its commanders or political leaders might make with UN forces. According to press [EO 13526 1.4c] reports, Rwandan diplomats outside the country and Army commanders reached by telephone in Kigali say they have no way to contact the interim government, and they deny having any control over the militias. Although regime leaders may be exaggerating communications problems to deflect blame for ethnic massacres, their ability and willingness to prevent isolated, renegade forces from attacking UN peacekeepers will remain problematic for the foreseeable future.

3.5c

7. From the rebels. RPF forces to date have been more cooperative than government troops with the UN contingent and with aid groups. We estimate that the rebels have some 13,000 combat-effective troops, who are far better led and disciplined than their government counterparts. Although mainly a light infantry force, the RPF has SA-7 air defense missiles, 107 mm towed rocket launchers, and 120 mm mortars. 3.5c

8. Although we believe the rebels are less likely to seek an open confrontation with UN forces EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] says the RPF would engage any UN force that, in its view, was taking an active role in the civil war. In particular, a perception that UN troops were protecting those responsible for mass killings or were threatening the rebels' control of their territory could provoke an RPF attack. Moreover, the extended heavy fighting and evidence of the slaughter of RPF fighters' ethnic kinsmen appear to be fraying the rebel troops' discipline and increasing the risk of incidents with UN peacekeepers.

-- The RPF has admitted that its troops fired on a convoy transporting a French aid official from Gitarama to Kigali, blaming the incident on confusion in a combat zone.

-- [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c says rebels began killing civilians when they realized how many of their supporters had been killed, and UN officials accuse RPF troops of murdering civilians along the Tanzanian border. 3.5c

Logistic Problems in Rwanda

9. The supply lines of an enhanced UN contingent based within Rwanda would be vulnerable to interruption. Kigali's airport--the only one in the country capable of receiving large transport aircraft--has been on the front line between government and rebel forces, and UN resupply flights have regularly been prevented from landing there. Both sides have weapons capable of shutting down any airfield in the country. 3.5c

10. Surface transportation also presents a number of hazards and risks. Only about 1 percent of Rwanda's 4,885-km road network is paved, and the fighting almost certainly has prevented repair of culverts and shoulders eroded in

the current season of heavy rains. In addition, the country's hilly terrain offers numerous opportunities to ambush supply convoys or patrols.

- Retreating government forces are blowing up highway bridges, including one about 10 kms west of Kigali on the main road to Burundi, according to press reports.
- There are more than 50,000 uncleared mines in the north. 3.5c

Problems Along the Borders

11. UNAMIR will also face potentially threatening logistic and political problems if it deploys along Rwanda's borders to protect refugees and displaced persons or to guard the supply lines of a contingent in Rwanda. A force based in Burundi to protect vulnerable civilian populations in southern Rwanda risks upsetting the already unstable balance between the Hutu-led government and the Tutsi-dominated military. EO 13526 1.4c the military--elements of which have launched three abortive coup attempts since June 1993--are chary of any foreign military presence, probably in part because the security forces fear this would encourage unrest among the Hutu majority. Hutu militants, for their part, could see a UN force as a shield from reprisals if they rose up against the Army.

- Unrest has flared several times in Bujumbura--which has Burundi's only airfield capable of handling large transport aircraft--as security forces have moved to disarm Hutu civilians and anti-Tutsi militias.
- EO 13526 1.4c in northern Burundi competition for relief supplies is sparking unrest between some 60,000 mostly Tutsi Rwandan refugees and an estimated 600,000 Burundian Hutus there who were displaced by ethnic unrest late last year.
- In the Rwandan prefectures along the Burundi border, hundreds of thousands of civilians remain at risk of attack from government forces and party militias.
- Food aid shipments reportedly are straining Bujumbura's port on Lake Tanganyika and, to a lesser extent, its airport, and soldiers have harassed trucks carrying relief supplies to Rwanda. 3.5c

12. Any activities by a UN force in Uganda--through which Rwanda's most direct link to a seaport passes--would require the full cooperation of President Museveni, who has longstanding ties to the RPF. Although Museveni probably would make a pretense of cooperating with UNAMIR to protect his international image, he is likely to continue covertly giving the Rwandan rebels supplies and sanctuary.

EO 13526 1.4c most senior officers in the Ugandan Army--undoubtedly reflecting Museveni's views--oppose expanding UNAMIR's role and believe the RPF should be allowed to gain a military victory.

-- About 10,000 Rwandans have fled to Uganda. Neither they nor populations on the Rwandan side of the border face any immediate security threat.

3.5c

13. Zairian interests in the conflict also are likely to impede efforts to support a UN force from along Rwanda's western border.

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

-- Although two Zairian border towns have airfields capable of receiving C-130-size aircraft, eastern Zaire's road network is rudimentary, and the mountainous region is subject to chronic shortages of fuel and other supplies.

-- We judge there is little security risk to the estimated 10,000 Rwandans and 91,000 Burundian Hutu refugees from Rwanda who have fled to eastern Zaire since early April. Rwandan government troops along the frontier, however, have detained thousands of mostly Tutsi civilians, who are subject to arbitrary beatings and execution.

3.5c

14. Tanzania's government is likely to remain supportive of a UN effort and

EO 13526 1.4c

believes it is the only neighbor interested in impartial mediation of the Rwandan crisis. Dar Es Salaam might even send troops. The arrival of an estimated 340,000 Rwandan refugees in remote northwestern Tanzania, however, has severely strained the country's infrastructure.

EO 13526 1.4c

the heavy traffic of humanitarian relief flights has stressed the


runways at Mwanza's airfield and exhausted fuel stocks there. In addition, the region's road network is dilapidated.

-- We assess the security threat to the Rwandan refugees in northwestern Tanzania to be fairly low. Reports of RPF killings in rebel-occupied southeastern Rwanda, however, indicate the risks to civilians are rising there. 3.5c

Implications for the United States

15. Many potential contributors to UNAMIR are likely to remain reluctant to provide troops for the force until they are convinced Washington will take a leading role. Ghana, for example, says an augmentation of the 200 troops which it has already deployed to Kigali will depend on the willingness of the United States and other Western states to provide military supplies and political leadership. A survey of press EO 13526 1.4c reporting indicates that many other African and non regional states share this view. Although neither side is anti-American, US forces providing logistic support would face the same risks as other UNAMIR contingents. 3.5c

Regional Dimensions Of The Rwandan Crisis, May 1994



Unclassified

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Review

Buranda Humanitarian

5/27/94

\$15 mill of DOD funds - mainly transport, could procure
37 sorties (15 USAF)

22 million contracted

DOD can import + provide

generators,
ambulances

construction
engineering
trucks
medical

UNHCR, ICRC, WFP

UN + OFDA -
procured { grains, oil, medical, trucks, fruits, ~~etc~~
plastic sheeting

spent \$3 mill + another 2 mill obligated ≈ 5 + mill

83 sorties → Bujumbura will give as soon as airport permits
DOD contracted (grain, oil)

Ans Rep

* 10 mill in DOD & available. Not asked to procure.

OPDA - projecting \$15-20 mill - for regular supply

\$2 mill FCRs
1.5 UNICEF
700 K CRS
} spent

DART Team in Nairobi - (as of yesterday) getting set up

\$10 mill - to be dispersed in field areas

Food. \$34 mill of food aid thus far (USDA + Food for Peace) - Rwanda
for Southern drought = Burundi
April - present

All OFDA \$ = in country

900 K - WFP
600 K - ICRC

Need another \$20 mill from ERMA

Work to Uganda for OFDA
Contract of Liberia
world relief

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Real problem w/ Bujumbura - slow unloading
8 hr. shifts etc.

↙ put muscle on Burundi to speed up port + output

Needs

Tanzania - needs vehicles
- we can supply

- no field hospital / SF medical
regimes

Burundi not making Ngara airfield (3500' capable?) → check
Tanzania
check airport

Do relief organizations in Tanz. need any additional logistical help?
What do NGOs need that they are not getting?

Food problems

US
Natural wheat reserve?

Surplus wheat - USDA

→ NGOs people =
going after it. Can Springfield board?

✓ Check

- Trucks - fly in, purpose
- \$15-20/m - from ERMA
- Field hosp. ? DART team?
- Tanzania
- Wheat needed
- Bujumbura
- puts →
→ Burundi

Burundi 5/31/94

FACT SHEET
DATA &

RPF delaying political negotiations until Thurs / Increasingly recalcitrant
- little incentive to negotiate (about to seize Kigali + Gitega)
- fired on UN convoys evacuating displaced万人
1 Senegalese soldier killed in x-fire

Don Clark: militaries = art of war
not w/ Atwood

Nairobi 09554
today

5200 troops not viable
rejected safe haven idea as protecting military members

Huge mass movement Gitega → Butare

Burundi: tension building

Thus going to Burundi almost certain to be killed by Tutsi

not there next week

Tunney - people in Butare but not where expected.
(Monday)

ODD: APCs - Army is unlikely to procure + lease:

46 M113 A-2 conventionally configured
among 50.

w/ 3 ~~red~~ Recovery vehicles M578

1 Ambulance M113

no drivers? 50

Cost to ship in 2 large, if US ships → Uganda

UN could also use IL-76s (as in Somalia)

preparation
lease documents
completed this
week.

Spare parts document
next week.

Trucking concept → what is max speed we can push some portion of vehicles. (0.8 will look into.)

Tuesday meeting w/ kofi - or demarche to Bureaucrats.

Refugees - massive flow forth. - CIA looks huge.

arrived Butare. (over 50,000) ^{be cleared}

Humanitarian lift to Bujumbura + Arusha/Poti capacity

- liaison - charge - discussions = organizing ~~task~~

one level to discuss delegate?? → JA Review
need > space to

accepts mission
(Humanitarian + consult)
in very fashion.

Demarche to Paris

to receive embargo - w/ Zaire

we're done a lot w/ illusions

UNSPCO Rwanda 5/31

Rwanda: RPF guide advance; swift retreat of RGF
Country divided into 2

- RPF zone = empty - people concentrated in camps, being screened for those who committed atrocities
- Govt zone - vast # of refugees - having fled before + RPF advance
 - confusion in gov't zone. (self-opted gov't in future; little control beyond 60+ km)

Humanitarian Ops have started in RPF areas

(NGOs + UN agencies) under rather stringent RPF zones \rightarrow civilian constraints
relative to RPF personnel

Little humanitarian support in RGF zones (camps of 20-30,000)

no organized humanitarian ops. } when we consider major ethical
must demands

1.5 - 2.0 mill = internally displaced - mainly in RGF

400,000 - Refugees mainly Tang, but also in Bur./Zaire \rightarrow getting about

Most folks @ risk = D.P. in control part of RGF zones.

RPF refuses any control of humanitarian ops.

Casafin - RPF did agree to talk to military commanders in Kigali as only visit w/ any extent of control, but no political negotiations

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Deployment Plan

- only 35 observers deployed; others can't deploy b/c not able to deploy safely or w/ a role to play. \rightarrow No tasks for them to perform.

UN must go outside by air

Task: secure Rwandans people + help w/ ~~humanitarian~~

- concept needs to adapt to war over which we have no control
- go asap + do as much as possible to save lives.

Burundi agreed to cooperate + to deployment of mission

Drop in Kigali in RPF hands for last 40 days - wait give away but will share.
Have secured immediate perimeter.

- in artillery range + possibly mortar (5 shells last night)
- runway limited (but not desirable) capability
- airport = operational

Phase I - needs to happen asap. - concept needs to be fine tuned + deployment adusted

- priority security in Kigali. Needs less b/c some DPs have moved w/ RPF to ~~town~~
- airport secured by RPF - only need 1 coy @ airport
1-2 coy \rightarrow go outside to Rwandan area ($20,000$ in ~~area~~ ^{refugees})
- sending coy only works w/ agreement of govt among gendarmerie. Must try to see how far files will reach.
- Force town. Needs be Congo. . . if FAR have control + orgs.
but can't control militia as a whole, but may be able to control a wedge

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Phase I + II = simultaneous b/c of trip delay

- Cant come into Kigali (use Zaire, Burundi or Uganda) \Rightarrow to risky & difficult
 - 1 mech. batt.
 - 1 mechanized batt
- Humanitarian/Security role has to happen in context of C.R.
- If paralysed, no further deployment - if possible create R&E unit

Op. must be totally flexible - we don't know what's going to happen

Deployment

- Kigali can't take it, only willing to
- Have contact w/ gov't of Uganda ^{of Rwanda} now w/ us. have food/fuel contact
- can use Entebbe + Luquarture (a little unstable now, maybe ^{had @ 1st} Zaire - too unstable, had to get fuel - could use if necessary)

Phase I + II: have to come from 2 entry pts: Kigali + Uganda or Burundi

- difficult to get (S.G. support - working @ BTR \rightarrow 2 hours fly's away)
- working @ log base outside Kigali until safe (Uganda etc.)
- if we use Uganda as base, R&E unit be happy.

Troop availability / regiments

<u>Ethiopia</u> } <u>SAF</u> } <u>no</u> <u>equity</u>	<u>Ghana</u> } <u>mech. trained</u> <u>batts</u> } <u>in</u> <u>no</u> <u>Paras</u> } <u>no</u> <u>equipped</u>		
<u>Zim</u>	<u>Senegal</u>		<u>NO APCs</u>

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Italy, Netherlands = adding C130s to Canadian plane } purely
territorial
+ UNAMIR
resupply

Canada likely to give commercial resupply

Russia may provide helicopters, cog + strategic airlift

Key element: ceasefire or not.

- RPF not likely to occupy whole country. Want to direct fire
in Goma.

Scenario 1

IF:
- Ceasefire = best to operate; people may begin to go back.
Humanitarian assistance = possible

Scenario 2

- If fighting continues ("unlikely") = v. different + will have to judge
what we do. (e.g. do we bring in 2nd platoon)

V. difficult to have precise clarity on op-plans.

Ship: Def. ceasefire?

Ria: - killings must stop; RPF must demonstrate commitment to end killing.

- agreement b/w RPF/RPF ceasefire.

- Radio incitement must stop + tell people to stop killing + will punish offenders
- clean up militias

Copy Please I&II - not conditioned on ceasefire, but Phase III is

Ship: - 1st time we fire + get RPF + Goma, were lost credibility. Way that will come when
Russia to collapse.

RPF don't have total control. They know. RPF would fight militias for us. They want to control.
Russia to us.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

UN agrees → Safe zones - UN protect ^{if threatened} in areas where DP are concentrated
These actively under attacked

UN presence may give the R.A.F. courage to bring militia under control. - safe havens
→ Safe areas don't have to be based into to any particular area

Step - take care of these inside of Rwanda - wherever

Step - ok - we don't want to pinpoint any spot

Do we want to est. safe areas where it's already safe (Step - yes) ?

and do we want to go to unsafe areas + create safe areas (e.g. Sanne) ? (No ~~Step~~)

Ria - We can't wait for C.F. Can't retain neutrality - Our approach = deploy -

Kofi - CF + principles of deployment. Can do what we're doing in logistics.
W/ ceasefire we can do much more.

- Go where threatened people are.

Phase I + II - now for doesn't matter

Phase III - next steps depend greatly on if.

UN will need consent / co-operation of forces

Bonin - ch. VI + VII - revised
UN = unwilling to wait for ceasefire

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

UN = not going to take them on + stop killing

Riga: No intent to plan offensive operations; we can't do it

Report has to be clear: on Ch. 6. operatiⁿ in Ch. VII current

@ immediate use = estimated 150,000 +

Need defined objectives, def. success., timeframe

Report - mandate limited

Kofi: don't use success - issue = when do we say int'l. community has done enough.
+ people can carry on.

Use 60 APCs in Somalia → Rwanda

get spare, new gear + New replace in Somalia
from Europe.

N.S. = lease

Mar 4th -

Records

Records

6/10/94

DART Team - amazed by magnitude of problem

- situation in Kigali deteriorating fast + relief/NBOS/UN - targets UNRCCF building used.

- NB not clear where people are but mass movement

- access in South + SW = terrible. Still huge potential for violence

- Deploying assessment teams behind RPF lines.

- RPF nice reputation rapidly being tarnished as > + > reports of atrocities come in

- Fuel problems in Bujumbura, which will not allow export of vehicles fuel.

- Buj + Ruwanda look better than feared (according to DART team)

Photos

- Basic picture = great deal of movement within country + various directions. Movement of clumps of 100's, thousands.
- No evidence of mass movement / herds as in late April.
- General movement South/West. Probably moving by village

EO 13526 1.4c

Dartteam = pessimistic about CE talks.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

1. US Team → Brigadiers (Scott Fisher)

- political situation
- command situation
- logistic support

- think they have right deal w/ larger movement → team.

APCG - signs last today

- Tiwny - Egyptian confidentiality + perhaps

Arab. Cairo Right to be - favorable

UN vetoes Cairo = too complicated

- We're doing cable to Africa to assure them that we think Mog. airport =
secure & viable option.

Equipment @ JFK - helicopters + H₂O purification parts → Somalia.

- try to prevent future哥theros

⑧ Consider blanket export license of UN for items required under 607.

More focused on equipment - Ghana.


quicker, practical response

Use UN as vehicle, UN contacting factories, finding, standards.

Rwanda

5/13/94

Situation Update, 12 June 1994



EO 13526 3.5c

732412 (R01317) 6-94

- RPF could take all sunmer towns.
- Killings will continue by govt + RPF (due to indiscriminate recruitment)
- No control over such towns; some control over qts
- Burundi = weaker govt; but if no-drops in, border to control Burundi
- UN-free + inhibited in RPF

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY Russia

PCG 6/13/94

Equipment

- what is really needed
- priorities
- who else is being asked

Figure Sheet US can provide + determine other go to help.

Netherlands 1 Folter,

Italy C130

Canada Signaller

Russia 8 transport helicopters

transport (strategic lift) planes

US

Monday - Team to NYC on troops/ equipment/ planning

- Cables to UNIS capitals getting them into action. - Rude

✓ - Meeting of potential donors/ troop contributors {UNIS/ TAF} \Rightarrow refined list of requirements + avail
- have organized fatalities out of other PCDs

✓ off planning staff (2-3 days) - Mozambique
deployment/ planning flow.

✓ Adopt a contingent equipment + logistics how + having DOD to use EAT to
- US - Ghana
get credit as - emergency
- FR - Senegal to greatest extent possible
- UK - Zimbabwe

series of bilateral
planning discussions
in Ghana

✓ Use UN to have masters list for contingent

Elements of bilateral cable > chain activating planning channel.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Angola

- UNITA said he'd accept latest mediation deal, if he gets Huambo.
- But will not give him Huambo (He's been offered
Rebel etc.)
- - - - -
- Savimbi will reject mediated deal
- Opposition will follow.

If Savimbi accepts = unstable deal b/c it doesn't give him anything
he'd look to back out

But = getting stronger + building up assets

Zaire = regularly supplying UNITA. lots of planes + others (Paragons, Pumas)
- well supplied Rwandans

June 30 - UNITA expects to be sanctioned if he rejects deal.

✓ Cable to get 1 week extension - 10 days

- get to Hill on big Pkwy + damaging

Georgia

- CIS Council opposed using Res forces. No final v'tg of CIS to sanction force. Russians claiming Red CS endorsement of May 14 ~~confidential~~
- Federation Council will vote soon (possibly today) + end CIS force. Russians will deploy w/in 3-5 days
- Force will be all Russian, including trained troops

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Russians have said - no agreement to maintaining CIS forces.

Need to go back to Deputies - for decisions on enormous

Clarifying/vetting language
after 8/6/93 report.

Bob Howard - get him on board

to handle rest of teams

5 people/3 cars/travel budget/paid to live in N.Y.C.

that's elements → ours

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-Jun-1994 20:21 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Susan E. Rice (RICE)
MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: E-Mail to Tony on Rwanda

Tony:

Thank you for your raising the Rwandan issue at the CPL lunch. We worked out today a schedule for the introduction of APC's into Rwanda that involves shipment of the first APC's this Sunday into Kampala, with the shipment of the entire 50 contingent to be completed by next Friday. This timetable involves shipment by two C-5's making a total of nine runs into Rwanda (each can carry 6 APC's per load). It would be possible to finish the deployment a few days quicker if the President declared this our top military priority, but since the U.N. has said they cannot use them before next Friday in any case, and given the current situations in North Korea, Haiti, Bosnia, etc., we think it makes sense to stick to this schedule.

In addition, ten more APC's from Somalia are being shipped today or tomorrow to Rwanda, making a total of 15 which have been transferred from there. The UN is proceeding apace on the issues of training for the Ghanaians on the APC's (which will likely occur in Somalia). We are moving rapidly on providing additional equipment for this unit.

Incidentally, our figure for humanitarian assistance approved for Rwanda/Burundi this fiscal year has now reached more than \$115 million, including \$94 million since the beginning of the current crisis in early April.

Tomorrow, we've got a background session with journalists and a closed-press roundtable on the Hill where we will walk people through all of our humanitarian, peacekeeping and other actions on Rwanda.

Don/Susan/Mac

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 15-Jun-1994 20:19

DEC 1994
PERIOD 1526

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 043928
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA22:ZVGPT2472.WPL
A1 Folder: JUN94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 15-Jun-1994 20:19
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

Rwanda

Rwanda 6/22/94

RPF - blocking UNAMIR resupply

~~FR~~ told UNAMIR - to leave RPF held areas

French-speaking Pkrs = evacuated overland \rightarrow Uganda

FR say Reg won't go into Kigali. RPF will still fight FR \rightarrow not back down.

Ghanaians troops - backtracking [due to equipment shortage - as Reg claim] \rightarrow Reg claim FR = ~~is up against~~ backtracking

French + policies / careers playing into reluctance

Ghanaians won't join intervention - plus unless OAU blesses it +

OAU = backtracking

Ethiopia = now requesting training for APCs - which will delay

Has had UNAMIR in Tanzania - in camps

US - attempt to outfly RPF in Goma (Zaire) - US flights

Low threat now.

- area = well behind front lines

- RPF forced into to intercept ops \rightarrow to disrupt FR + 2 areas resupply of front.

- FR will base inside Zaire

both have

- Both sides have anti-aircraft guns + SA-7; non-portable anti-aircraft missiles

UNAMIR = under greater threat


- 2 Pk attacked Friday - deliberately \rightarrow RPF will engage UNAMIR; threats are credible

FR can't lift our forces into Goma

- FR have already requested lift for FR + Senegalese \rightarrow FARCA
- FR have chartered Russian planes \rightarrow Beijing, but unwilling to go to Goma.
- Goma not C-5 capable
C141 capable

12 APCs arrived \rightarrow 30 June Ray close

UNOSOM APCs sitting @ Ugandan border } implications for our APCs





Washington, D.C. 20505

3.5c

23 June 1994

Zaire's Goma Airfield: Base for French Operations in Rwanda

The French military has selected Goma airfield as the operational and logistic hub for its intervention in Rwanda

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c Its 9,843-foot-long runway is in generally good condition, and the facility is frequently used by IL-76 and B-707 aircraft: the French plan to operate C-160's and C-130's to Goma.

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

Nonetheless, flight operations in Goma will face a number of difficulties:

-- Rwandan Government forces and their Zairian allies have used the facility for weapons shipments and might try to interfere with activity impeding this activity. Moreover, these arms deliveries may lead the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels to consider Goma a legitimate target.

EO 13526 1.4c

-- Provision of other support services will be problematic, reflecting the region's scant land transportation links to the rest of Zaire. Most goods and services are in short supply, and vendors typically demand payment in hard currency cash--preferably 1990 series US dollar banknotes.


-- Military flights will compete for landing slots with the six or so humanitarian aid flights that have been arriving each day in Goma since the Rwanda crisis erupted in early April.

3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Regional Airfields Supporting French Deployment To Rwanda



Confidential EO 13526 3.5c

PREPARED 23 JUNE 94


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Transport Aircraft

Country	Model	Payload (in tons)	Range (in thousand miles)	Ramp for Loading/Unloading	Aerial Refueling
USA	C-5	130.5	6.5	Yes	Yes
	C-130	19.5	4.9	Yes	Yes
	C-141	45.4	2.9	Yes	Yes
France	DC-8	22.8	7.2	No	No
	A-310-300	37.5	5.1	No	No
	C-160*	7.8	3.1	Yes	Yes
	B-707	45.7	4.3	No	No
Russia/Ukraine	AN-124	165.3	2.8	Yes	No

*Internal dimensions as well as weight limitations preclude moving all but France's smallest helicopters and lightest armored vehicles by C-160 aircraft.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



Allied Strategic and Tactical Airlift

CONFIDENTIAL [EO 13526 3.5c]

CONFIDENTIAL [EO 13526 3.5c]

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PER E.O. 13526

DC:

- Liberia
- Angola
- Rwanda
- Georgia
- Haiti

Rwanda 6/24/94

Cable # 168777

APCs are coming. They.

8 in Uganda; 16 by tomorrow. UN has refused to accept APCs.

RPF public position on UNAMIR = stronger than reality on ground.

Ghanaians equipment

PTA data should be received late this evening + go from DSAA to UN
by then

no security
provided by UN
Siting on runway
unprotected

Kampala airport = heavily secured
by Ugandans

Cable to
UN. Tech
Reveget off ~~area~~
Reassess

OSD - Can we ask Uganda to secure APCs for us. /

UN - doesn't have trucks + won't leave for 3 weeks.

Options

Ghana Equipment

- State proposes sending 300 tons to Accra

- State have Embassy to go in at high

level + ask Ghanaians what they're doing.

* French → leave Ghanaians alone. ?? (may do it really)

- UN security
- Ugandan security
- Private security
- Stop airlift

GOMA

- Fe asked finally for 100 tons/day to Goma for 7 days

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

State proposing to lift French → back on redistributable basis

Most of Senya's
equipment is French

Issue:

- do we lift water Senegalese from Dakar? NO
- do we lift French/equipment + Senegalese equipment to Guera? NO

French equipment

6/27/94

France

* DDCI (Paris) called to say that Paris has finally withdrawn request for airdrop due to Runnymede concerns.

Any outstanding request from France?

Senegalese request

- Troops - in Dakar

→ could use any C-130 - no need of C-17.

Equipment

- Why couldn't France send?

- no immediate request

Ghanaians

- Troop contributions meeting

- Scrubbing Ghanaian list??

- UN doesn't want the planning → said said they didn't need/want

~~Final list from DSAA or P+A~~ ^{Any-day} ~~sent to UN~~ (for Ghana)

radios

no fire for trucks

night vision

H2O purification

??

} most conceivable

we have

} DSA & going back
to other sources

doesn't
steal
alternatives

~~1. Tell Ghana: That 2nd UN list is operative list & put ours back
or return~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Let's energize UN - or moving w/ UNAMIR.

Ghanaians → moving slowly

- can we demand Accra - state to do. Want air support
- have Kofi talk to Ghana's ambassador
- DAAT will go to Accra to discuss list - ICs to look at sending ECOWAS
- var to go to Ghana's ambassador. logistics to
- Moore to talk to Rawlings + energy

Who's where who's willing to go

- Zimbabwe?
- Congo?
- Zambia?
- Ethiopia?
- Senegal?
- France?

} ask Salim tomorrow.

+ UN

APCs in Kampala

security resolved

* missed radio/
air

RPF have backtracked.

APCs - don't have radios (2-4 weeks away) // ammunition

preferably take off + will go in last

→ OSS to work w/ DAAT

try to expedite

How do we get Ethiopia / RPA adopted?

Joint suggestion about
adopting Ethiopia
+ Zimbabwe

cable to WPA + OECD countries

state to go to Pueblo → no SA APCs

Have lymphen go on to OSA

10 countries
have this

Wrong \Rightarrow no observers

Cost containment teams

- no \$ @ state
- could we structure in cost system.
- \$/people = issues
- premature to bring Bob H. to NYC.

Group together later this week to talk abt > resources.

Cost containment teams Frus/Friday

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPH

Rwanda 6/29/94

- Rwanans?
- Other contributors?
- Ghana equip.
- APCs - not equipped; maintenance
- adopting Zimbabweans; Ethiopians?
- Target to speak in Burundi - carrots + sticks
- Emerging OAU observers?



fly back USA later

³⁰
Nurs - Kivumu (East of Butare) - very near RPF front lines
1 American

- UN will try to negotiate French into Nurs. French may not want to get that close to RPF. (one time basis)

UNAMIR maintenance having + good

- Ghanaians did go to Somalia for 2 weeks with cause
- Were concerned that Reg won't be able to do 1st / 2nd order maintenance
- Burn + Root may do maintenance contracting
UN has agreed to do 2nd + 3rd order maintenance



Kampala cable

APCs 2/5
cost
(\$250,000) -> under sending MTT,
UN would accept

UN concerned abt agreement (lease)
to UN generally. Maintenance having
must be paid

Rebunda

Rebunda 7/1/99

Burundi - high level official to Burundi
Steubing / Moose?

- situation = v. tense

All 50 APCs in Kampala.

- MITs - maintenance \rightarrow 2nd / 3rd tier - UN is contracting w/ B+R
- accessories ?
PAKs in UNOSOM to do 1st eschelers
duty of Ghana in Somalia.
Ghanaians don't want to have ^{an ACO} until
all equipment is there.

Moose - Pauling message, sent/delivered

Salim also talked to Rose

Shali wants full sustainable package

- USG to ensure training
- right now \rightarrow willingness to accept UN's plan, if it occurs
- Ghanaians will go to Mog. w/in next few days.

Other equipment for Ghanaians BA II

Ghanaians
ready w/in 2 weeks

Get list to UN

Squeeze UN to make quick decision

USG leaves food packaging + moving equipment

Ship as soon as possible w/in weeks

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Rwandan

Rwanda 7/6/94

* ~~Report of situation~~ & Senegalese?

* P+A - note

FR presentation to UNIS

explained plan

tried to assure that zone = for unarmed civilians; strictly neutral zone

Guineans

- 151 Guineans have arrived in Goma & manned up w/ APCs.

* everything ok.

- long term spare parts will arrive 17 July;

- Guineans will deploy into Rwanda day after tomorrow (200)

Rwandans will deploy in 4 weeks; more dependent on ^{air equipment}
P+A date sent up to USUN; told them we need contact committee asap

** // + this week + we're already preparing COTAs

Senegalese

- FR realize that we can't move 60; 15 jeeps; LAVs { want us to move any or all of it

- We're looking forward to do this. Joint Staff will alert AMC/EUCOM.

- No need for DOD to absorb costs. French fully expect to pay

- State wants DOD to pay; DOD willing to lift but remunerable only

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Memo to Sec. State on non-recognition of Rwanda in Paris.

Also trying to remove Rwanda from UNSC

- ask UN administration cent. to UNBA + UNSC - saying associated diplomats don't represent legitimate govt.

Rwanda 7/8/94

Burundi

Kigali = relatively calm, pushing civilians toward Kibuye

Kibuye - refugees advancing, RPF moving toward Kibuye
French advancing + on alert

~~XX~~ - massacres are proceeding in FR zone

900,000 DP in zone; some from French can handle

Some progress on building bridge to UNAMIR II → drag-on until
at least Sept

~~Q~~ Ghassanis arrived; they may hold back on
final deployment until equipment

Canadians will deploy by 25 July

Frenchans by July 18?

Russians asked for 100

Senegalese @ 240 by next week

Burundi

- Tutsi military concerned about # of refugees crossing (need Russ
not to fire on refugees)
- Most refugees being urged to go to French zone.

esp. if Hutus
are armed

- July 11 - new President; not convinced Tutsi leadership
will acquiesce

Ghassanis - moved into Kigali; US APCs = still on camp in Kavalya

^{way to} ~~way to~~ ^{6/} day CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

UN P+A - is in NY.

- no accelerated contract committee

- Contracts ref. on Tuesday (early one?)

French request for Senegal

- to fly 300 + equipment

- 60 people - DBE

- checked on cable

} to get process going

"Adopt" - a Battalion not going well.

- what do we do if we are else helps, ^{or equipment}??

- Paper for DC?

Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal

RWANDA

7/18/94

RP - suggesting military support.

Water = critical

Food also

1500 MT. of food being airdropped in \rightarrow GOMA
150 MT - medicine

- sheets (100 ST)
- blankets
- tucks \rightarrow Nairobi
- laundry - 23 \rightarrow Nairobi

Heavy trucks

Major transport problem @ Goma

- Rail still works against mercenaries; FLN need to take over
airfield

Nam "Worst humanitarian crisis in 20+ years"

Barker - whole BATT of Rwandan forces
could try to exercise some control in Goma

Guarantor Equipment

- APCs stored somewhere

- * ALCEC
- * Medics/Civ. Affairs
- * Seabees?

Rwanda 7/20/94

Refugees

200,000 Rwandans in Burundi

> 80 massacred in Burundi

1.2. Zaire in Congo

400-800,000 in Burundi

Rwandan
equipment

Balikin

- Secure 4-man assessment teams

- C130 (Fiji/SC) - flies to act on assessment + add assessors

- liaison to France + UNHCR

. acting w/ support of FR./UNHCR

- P-3 Anacraft out of Kenya/Uganda to
overfly + give real-time results
w/ in 24 hrs.

- UNHCR asked for additional to expand air-cell
in Geneva

UNICEF equipment

* We need fastening from State

. may pick up in Copenhagen.

. need to conclude w/ UNHCR operationally (air-cell: JCS will do)

Congressional ✓
Press ✓
UN? ✓
State ✓
- Zaire ✓
- FR ✓
- UNHCR / Pency
calls ✓
✓ paper letters
to State Budget
Conclusion ✓
w/ Dallaire ✓

Deutsch -> Lake

- what we're doing

Recognition of New Govt

UNION - try to clarify
w/ UN as to who
has local agency

responsibility
for Zaire + Rwanda.

UNHCR & CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Cable to Zaire (POL+Presidency) out

- already alerted ambassador by phone
- inform them & ask for quick cooperation

V: PRETREWAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 27, 1994

Rwandan

Memorandum to: The President

From: Anthony Lake

Subject: Rwandan Relief Operations - An Update

The Airlift: USAF aircraft flew into Goma in Zaire, Kigali in Rwanda, Entebbe in Uganda, Harare in Zimbabwe, and Nairobi in Kenya today as part of a multipronged relief effort. The first US water purification machines began pumping potable water into trucks and storage bladders in Goma. One C-5 flew non-stop from near San Francisco, refuelled in the air three times, and landed at Goma 22 hours later carrying water purification devices.

The airlift is hampered by the small size of the airports at Goma and especially at Bukavu. Strenuous utilization has cracked the apron at Goma, thereby further limiting flights. As a result, General Joulwan is looking at increasing flights into other locations and establishing road convoys into the effected area. Another limiting factor may be the availability of aviation fuel in the few airports that we are using. The solution to that may be to aerial refuel USAF cargo aircraft with tankers stationed nearby.

On the ground: Although one estimate suggests that 50,000 refugees have returned into Rwanda, most are settling in to the makeshift camps. Cholera continues to claim high fatalities, but it is apparently not of the communicable strain. Thus, the water purification plan and the rehydration program should be gain the upper hand over the disease in the days ahead. For now, however, dealing with the dead is a high priority. Burial is difficult in the volcanic soil. A US Army Engineer unit with heavy equipment to assist in this task will begin arriving tomorrow. A US Army Green Beret battalion will begin arriving soon to provide Special Forces who have paramedic and camp organizaing skills.

Our Plans: Although the press began running the story that we were going to put 2000 US troops into Rwanda, we were able to correct that impression with backgrounding and a Bill Perry press conference. The truth is that the Pentagon is developing options for refugee repatriation programs and an airhead in Rwanda, for review by the Principals Committee late in the week. The UN and the charitable groups may be able to do much of what is needed inside Rwanda. A US military survey team is in Kigali, Rwanda now. Bill Perry and Gen. Joulwan will further assess these requirements on the ground over the weekend.

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Others' Donations: The Israeli Army is opening a field hospital, flown in on eight of their C-130s. We are flying in German water purification trucks. The United Kingdom today offered a Royal Engineer battalion to the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, following offers by Canada and Australia to send small technical units to support that group. Overall, however, the response to the UN's appeals has been limited. Of the eight "service packages" that the UN asked nations assume, we have assumed four and no other nation has come forward to accept the others (such as sanitation, road repair).

Funding: OMB is pulling together a small emergency supplemental for Defense, State, and AID to cover some of their Rwanda related costs. There is substantial sympathy among most concerned Members, although it may require some special work with one or two.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CONSTANT FORCES
- UNIFORM

Folk

- 1) Outfit/Shares
- 2) Left contingent (reimbursable)
- 3) Overequip

Rivanda (Fred Warner's Office - 7/27/94)

Vince Kelly
start to file 5pm.
today

THURSDAY

- who?
- how many
- what species
- how old/size

What's been done? What must be done

End Product - County by county fact sheet, plus U.S. analysis

High level contacts

- danach
- DADS
- putting
in other

what more is U.S.
ready for.

High level contacts:

- Scud away

4 prongs - DATA
 - Sec. def
 - Sec. state

ISRAEL
ETHIOPIA?

EQUIPMENT today (030)
- ETIOPIA - What's problem?
Fix it / APCs

U.S. LIFE
UNREQUEST

NEW
TROOPS

— **GHANIM** — H. L.
DEMARCHE + CONCRETE

- FRANZO BATT / SENEGAL

- FRENCH / A
BELGIANS

- OTHERS: 2ms - Burns to back - long

NIGERIA - Brit

John Scott / WA

NIGERIA - Brit Joint Snt/UN
TUNESIA? - others to & from PTA (other adaptors - Germans } Alles regt
- move UNIT out of SOMALIA => US/UN/JCS }

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

What are key questions we must be able to answer to recruit / troops?

- What is U.S. Role?

ISD - are we going to provide initial log. support to incoming batts?

ICS - what is relationship between JTF + UNAMIR?

OSD - what bilateral sweeteners beyond CIN are we going to provide?

OSD - Are we prepared to lift on non-reciprocal basis outside UN LOA?

• We need blanket UN LOA for lift?

U.S. Support

- status of unamir plan (Ballou) for support to deploying batts

Rwanda PCB

Deploying Troops - Diplomatic channels

- 1) Tell Zaire (assume they want object)
- 2) Tell French

* Plan to deploy some military assets + like to work out relationship w/ French in bil-bil channels *

UNHCR

- don't need to change mandate to focus on mandate for refugee resettlement / approval.
- Need other faces. esp 1st world loggers.
 - any chance of suggesting to UN self-sustaining European batts.
- Tell UNHCR will go @ high levels to capitals (Need UN permission)
 - Presidential letters.
 -
- What is U.S. going to do?
 - will help left, equip
 - high level diplomatic appeals -
 - Can we make more specific commitments before talking to FR
 - * LOG, ALCE, MIL MEDICINE, H₂O units
 - major effort

Chas.
communications
& logistics

Country
Germany
Japan
Australia
Canadians

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

EUCOM status report / JCS

- Team from CENTCOM (deployed 4 people)
 - o Goma / Bukavu
- Site assessment - assess + stay in place. (Want save day quick readback)
 - o medical, power, H2O, civil affairs etc.
- any alert orders - yes. (JTF)
- when conflict flow begins?

→ Need to keep FR + UNHCR in lead, under FR.

- Teams to Generals + UNHCR

PRESS GUIDANCE: common statement

- waiting on assessment team report, }
 we're ready to be responsive } *we're been active from start*
- press guidance after FR team meeting FR.

Refugee receive flight - EUCOM

Beefing up AIRCOM

J-TIDS → UNAMIR.

11 a.m.

Tanzania: Dealing With Rwandan Refugees

In our judgement, the Tanzanian government lacks the resources, manpower and political will to meet the security threats from refugee camps in the Ngara and Karagwe areas where up to 440,000 Rwandan refugees have fled since late April. In particular, Dar Es Salaam is probably leery of provoking an armed conflict with former Rwandan Army (FAR) troops

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c by using the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force (TPDF) to prevent FAR troops from raiding Rwanda. The Tanzanians are also reluctant to tackle the task of arresting Hutu militia members without clear evidence of wrongdoing on Tanzanian soil.

3.5c

So far, security within the camps--which DAR treats as a police rather than military issue--has not been a significant problem.

--Violent incidents in the camps are not at the level or frequency of those reported in the Zaire camps, according to a variety of reports.

- EO 13526 1.4c Benaco camp--which holds 238,000 refugees--has only about one murder a night and numerous reports of theft.

3.5c

Refugees Continue to Take Flight

Reports of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) revenge killings in southeastern Rwanda have led some 100,000 Hutus to flee to Tanzania since mid-July, however, discouraging all but a few Hutus from repatriating to Rwanda.

- EO 13526 1.4c new arrivals say the RPF is burning Hutu homes and killing villagers. Such reprisals are driving some 10-12,000 Rwandans per week to the Ngara camps and another 500 per week to the Karagwe region.

- EO 13526 1.4c Hutu extremists retain control over the refugee population, using food distribution and intimidation tactics to undermine repatriation efforts.

3.5c

Camps Remain a Threat

Hutu militants retain the capability and determination to mount raids into Rwanda that could trigger escalating conflict with the RPF.

- EO 13526 1.4c Hutu refugees still retain weapons--probably small arms and machetes--and have continued their campaign of terror against Tutsi refugees.

Moreover, [EO 13526 1.4c] some recruiting by FAR soldiers is taking place in the Benaco camp.

-- [EO 13526 1.4c] the FAR has launched raids from the Karagwe region into Rwanda over the past few weeks, which risks provoking RPF troops to attack FAR forces in Tanzania. [3.5c]

Dar Es Salaam Trying to Bolster Security

The Tanzanian Government is aware of the unrest Hutu militias and FAR troops can bring to the camps--in June, the detention of Hutu hardliner and former commune leader Gatete provoked Rwandan refugees to riot and forced aid workers to withdraw temporarily from the Benaco camp in Ngara--and is trying to obtain information and bolster security. Dar Es Salaam probably will also try to convince the RPF that it is not providing the Hutus with a base of operations for incursions into Rwanda.

-- [EO 13526 1.4c]
-- Tanzanian police field forces have been deployed to help the TPDF control border crossings in the Karagwe area, where FAR forces have conducted raids [EO 13526 1.4c]
[EO 13526 1.4c] DAR also promised to send police to the refugee camps to begin disarming Hutu militia members and to identify those suspected of war crimes, but the Tanzanians subsequently indicated they could not deploy significant numbers of police without outside financial help. [3.5c]

But Lacks Commitment and Ability

Despite these measures, the Karagwe and Ngara areas remain unsafe, with rising violence and murders of suspected Tutsi sympathizers causing some relief workers and local residents to fear for their safety.

-- To address security concerns, this month the UNHCR tried to move camps 100-200 kilometers away from the border; however the idea was rejected by the Tanzanian government after the UN spent \$450,000 preparing a new site [EO 13526 1.4c]

-- [EO 13526 1.4c] only 56 police officers have been deployed to the camps, despite Dar Es Salaam's mid-June agreement with the UNHCR to send an additional 300 officers. [3.5c]

Moreover, while Dar Es Salaam's plan to disarm the militias and prevent FAR raids is ambitious, its ability and willingness to do so is open to doubt. In our view, even if additional security forces are sent to the border area [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

they will be outmanned and outgunned by armed Hutu troops and militiamen.

--To deploy a substantial TPDF force to monitor the Rwandan border and prevent RPF-FAR clashes, DAR would at a minimum probably require logistic and materiel assistance. [redacted] 3.5c

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Rwanda

Rwanda 7/28

Lake questions → JCS


- Security for overhead
- Plan options for US role } Lake city known.
- need to see papers before PC.

Coordinating Mechanism

US.

- in civilian side of UN
- UN agencies

- Ogata has contacted Rwanda
- Hard time deciding who has lead inside Rwanda



One lead agency → UNHCR

Ghana

- 280 waiting
- Ghana equipment

APCs - 50 entered 1/2 by road → Kigali / start out next day
Binoculars, Mine detectors, H2O - leave to be signed this week +

Trucks → P+A to UN

→ as delivery by road

Binoculars, Mine detectors, H2O - leave to be signed this week +

out next week

days ago. CC met + didn't act. earliest CC action - Tues. Can't

Move out until 7-10 days after

OSD will look into providing Trucks now reusable

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ETHIOPIA

- 850 Motorized BATT
- advance team in by Aug?
- want pilots, SATCOM terminal, plane; aircrafts
expect to be in by 18 Aug.

Common Sing
sheet

what have
we said?
why not
cancel

FRANCOPHONE BATT

- 4/5 Senegalese + others
- concept broached \rightarrow instead = add another Senegalese batt \Rightarrow BATT
- Pery raised equipping SOD already there, plus another Senegalese
try + leave as much
of equipment
as possible \rightarrow stay

TUNISIA / ZAIRE

- Tabled initial list = very large
 - JCS/VN scrubbed list + got agreement
- Zaire want prior payment \rightarrow maybe never.
 \hookrightarrow BATT in Somalia?

} bennu to spacer

\hookrightarrow bennu any involvement

- Should Lake talk re: Bundeswehr role.

UNBOSY

- ~~PAK~~ BATT \rightarrow UNBOSY

- 2nd Mech. BATT

PAKS - very same

\hookrightarrow like Kofi \rightarrow blocker

PAKS - blocker (PAK)

Germany
utterly
to help us

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4:30 w/3

Rwanda 7/29/94

New flow into FR zone \rightarrow to 2nd, 3rd, 4th - Flow may increase
due to FR pullout; RPF clash w/ FR forces

RPF - if FR don't pullout by Aug = "Act of War"

Up to 2,000
killed

Tutsis \rightarrow Hutus
civilians
killing

Burundi - Threat of violence legis. Violence has not spread to Burj.
- Burundi, military
 > loose accusations.
 > killings + burning of houses.

Tanzania influx \rightarrow Ngara + elsewhere \rightarrow 5,000/day

must be something going on in Kibungo provinces we
don't know about?? Hutus

Kigali Assessment

- State doesn't mind working w/ Kigali but not JTF in Entebbe



Left of APCs

4/ APCs \rightarrow
* 20 Kigali by land; then contact border dams.
- maybe UN request to lift it
- contact has not broken dams. The problem is capacity of infrastructure
- An lift of wall + reimbursable only

* working now & going into LC
* when we do more = parity

Zimbabwe

- calling Embassy re: what is feasible

Tunisia DAT ~~1000~~ \rightarrow Tunisians may be willing to work w/o any

~~1000~~
equipment but would be ineffective w/o minimal equipment

- what additional eqpt requirements \rightarrow 1st cut = 6 items
- APCs \rightarrow - Water tanks
- Tents
- -

Start with
Germany

Noshjits Members
Until Aug. 2
More
- w/leunga being invited by
OBP
up

Germany may provide 30 APCs \Rightarrow will not adopt Tunisians only for log. support
Poland may give 8 + some APCs, maybe.

Ghanaians

More

- ready to call Raulwigs - where are we on list
• what was faxed this am

↓

same stuff issuing

✓ Shaq

US vehicles - UN will lease all. DSAA to prepare lease \rightarrow USUN

Rowse - UN has lease - no CC. Support case will go to CC (Tunis)
- univ. detectors

CC (Tunis)

\Rightarrow to go up this
afternoon

Zips / Gambians

Spares
trains - BTR? (quality assurance team)
trucks

team still here

✓

Tunisia (950-1200 Tunisians)

- assessment teams in Tunis \rightarrow list will increase. Cleaners 2nd
afternoon

✓

Ethiopians - status. Issue = airlift. Ethiopians have offered to self deploy
on reimbursable basis.

PC in with

- UN

- SA

- ~~Australia~~ Australia

Mali - list

- don't need machine guns + rifles

- MRFS - for various

Airlift P/A data - on Ethiopians / Malis, } OSD

not ready Ethiopia / Mal
etc.

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PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

July 29, 1994

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached memo contains a daily report on the situation in Rwanda.

Water production and distribution is up to 100,000 gallons per day. Additional production units should arrive on Thursday, but we remain short of the objective of 3.4 million gallons per day. Additional water supplies will begin arriving by ship in Mombassa, Kenya on Saturday and will be trucked or helcoptered to Goma.

Aircraft sorties have increased, but remain limited by runway capacity at Goma.

925 US Special Forces troops will arrive over the weekend, and a US engineering battalion will arrive on Friday to assist with burials.

Yesterday's briefing with non-governmental organizations went well, and Tony plans to repeat the briefing today in the press room.

Paul

R. Paul Richard

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN

8/1/94

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 29, 1994

94 JUL 29 A10 : 53

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Daily Report

Situation in Goma

-- **Water** production and distribution was up again today to 100,000 gallons per day. Trucks for distribution of water remain in short supply, but more vehicles are due to arrive in the region on the weekend. Additional water production units should arrive Thursday, but we are still far from the overall objective of 3.4 million gallons per day.

-- **Aircraft sorties** are up, but the runway capacity at Goma continues to be a limiting factor. We are awaiting the recommendation of the Kigali survey team before making a final decision on opening that airport to the relief effort. Aviation fuel in theater may also become a problem. Rapid turn-around of aircraft at forward bases requires forward deployed fuel and therefore additional aircraft and fuel bladders. EUCOM is working on this problem.

-- **Additional Water Supplies** will also start arriving by ship on Saturday in Mombassa, Kenya. These supplies include water purification equipment, water pipes, tanker trucks and general purpose trucks. This equipment will then either be trucked or, possibly, helicopter-lifted to Goma and elsewhere to avoid taking up valuable runway space.

U.S. Deployment

-- **925 U.S. Special Forces Troops** will begin arriving in Goma over the weekend to provide medical, communications and other support as well as to help control refugee flows.

-- **A full U.S. Engineering Battalion** should begin arriving on Friday with bulldozers and other heavy equipment to assist with burials.

Efforts to Galvanize Support for UNHCR's 8 Requirements

Following your letter last weekend, we have continued to press in foreign capitals for contributions to fulfill UNHCR's other 4 requirements -- those that the U.S. is not addressing. UNHCR is holding a pledging and coordination meeting in Geneva on Friday.

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Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHOTOCOPY

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Political Efforts

Assistant Secretary George Moose will travel with Secretary Perry to Zaire and then continue on to Kigali to meet with representatives of the new government. He will stress four themes:

- The importance of government support for the humanitarian relief effort;
- The need to expand the government's political base to ensure that it is adequately representative;
- The need to respect the rule of law and refrain from reprisals against adversaries;
- The importance of creating a secure and stable environment for the return of refugees.

The NGO Briefing

-- **Thursday's briefing for NGOs was a great success.** Shali's presentation was excellent. He was applauded by the NGOs. They also had some good ideas about better coordination, encouraging the UN to do more, etc. We will continue the dialogue here and with the UN in New York.

-- **The NGOs went out to the press afterward and praised our effort.** Even Lionel Rosenblatt who has been a frequent critic expressed his support for our efforts. With some breathing space from some of our critics, we should now have time to produce even more results.

-- Given the response to Shali's briefing, we will replicate it today in the White House Press Room.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Rwanda 8/1/94

SCTREPS

Goma - armed tribesmen = major threat
- increasingly belligerent → intimidating NGOs

Burundi - violence continuing + spreading + dire

Perry Trip - very successful. Not enough tanks. Impressed
by H2O production capabilities → Need more tanks.
- We're not here for long haul but only to get a head

Mosso - need to collect HR effort

JCS: 157,000 gal/day, 15th distributed
- 10 5,000 tankers
- Trailers for Friulian + UNHCR
- German RONPs 3 closing today
- 15 5000 gal. tankers

* 2 off coast; 1 today; another arrives on 7th

* Ground transport set of standards - issue of transiting Rwanda
= still open, but if going around Rwanda = diff. issues

KPARYA - more?

- exchange of notes to confirm all procedures of overland transport
- We can leave overland: now.

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* TRANS TO PHASE 2 IN RUANDA

- SCS/OSD → U.S. role in Rwanda, including way stations
- CINCS have asked JTF for concept by Aug 5.
 - ~ Europe would talk to UNHCR + find out what their plan is.
 - ~ long haul road sys. w/ 50 US trucks + 50 commercial trucks
- UNHCR - Planning abt. assistance required for refugee returns / way stns.
 - Our phase I teams should sit down w/ UN, USAID, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR to begin to flesh out concept of "way stns."
 - Need to get meeting going. { DOD to do w/ EUROPE, STATE THROUGH ITS CHANNELS

→ Italy + Geneva

* GETTING UNHCR GOING

- Ambassador in Rabat saw king. king said govt of Rwanda = 1st to recognize POLLARD!!
- Move to RABAT, if necessary. If not GORE.

US APCS
18 & GID
in Subsidiary
Ghang : mine detectors, H₂O, binoculars } need to get authorized to use by CC.
+ Trucks.

- moving 260K worth of arms. With 10 days to pull stuff together
to take from FAR. Need Papers
from state → Ready to go.
15 day clock & get into flow.
1 week + →

Ethiopians - modest request : flares, SATCOM, Malaria pills.
Air transport ?

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Dutu to Zambia

- used to press on to scab.

Tunisia - JCIO to scrub lists

- Germans? →

- UN team talking

→ DATO to meet w/ Tunisian Govs
To review.

Plane call strategy

- get info. / executive calls.
- mtg. in our house.

Burundi

- violence spreading to violence - pure when precise

- Political talks deadlocked.

- State plan?

→ Moore will be in Bujumbura tomorrow.

→ Strategy going up to Secretary today. → PAPER TO BE SENT AROUND


- high level {
 - UN FIR monitor
 - &
- with
dissidents {
 - Accountability press of rebels/riders committing atrocities
 - FR + Belg. high level visit

Remarks of HCRU Army in Zaire

- some disengagement but FAR unable to clean all
- FAR intimidating PROs & returning HCRU.
- FR not willing to confront their extremists in Zaire
- Need monitors
- Specific Radio stations

Rwand

Refugees and Displaced Persons, 2 August 1994



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Rwanda 8/3/94

Burundi - V. troubling

Zaire forces crossing into B & killing

Reports of near-fake extremist radio stns. (mobile out of zone)

- no proof that radio stations = completely off air - may still be broadcasting fm. Z
- no reports of French joining
- local leaders have said even refugees who are still being told not to go back.

US Psysops - need to get on the ground.

Refugees - ~~not leaving~~ leaving now

↳ not leaving - RPF may be committing atrocities in SW.

Tanzania

CAC thinks there may be enough trucks + solar equipment on ground.

for UNHCR + PVOs - may not need US trucks (not ~~for~~ trucks)

Still need H₂O trucks

H₂O

US H₂O trucks coming in by
air - not

↳ Nothing has been offloaded @ Mombasa.

Water systems - on green border - Ay. 10 - off border

French - 700 troops remain. Will bring in a little later (maybe 2nd)

10 x 3,000 Gal ~~10~~ Gas

13 x 5,000 UNHCR

6 x 5,000 Gal

137,500 CAP / day

5 x 2,500 Gal

55,000

Fuels

122,500 x 2 or 3 RTBs.

103 x 800
51,000

137 x 3,000
3,000

4 x 5,000
today in all
4 x 2,500
5 x 2,500
5 x 2,500
5 x 2,500

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Vehicles agreed - lost

mine detectors, Buisc, spare - Delease agreed

Round/aircraft not agreed b/c of cost - will review. Cf time
left of M - CC time. May expand later,
MREs - late expected time

} due to

S.A. members - dropped

German APCs * - good to go

Australian left - lost @ UN

not
certainty

Ghana - issues - ADDID
held up in state
leg-affairs

Contingents

- Netherlands will adopt Zambia (on scrubbed list)

We're going to press Germans & Tunis

UN says lost 50 APCs will close the request

Egyptians
want direct
embark

Egyptians still need

- SARCO
- Melania Pills
- Flak jacket

West side
send up to
Hill

PC

will not
left

for equipment + 200 pages
will self deploy of 600

Night vision
binoculars

- unit deploy who satisfies
these request

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~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 13526 3.5c

SITE A

CIA

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SUBJECT: Paper for Friday's 0945 Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda

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(INCLUDING COVER)

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TOP SECRET EO 13526 3.5c

4 August 1994

Threats to Returning Rwandan Refugees

Forces of the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front--motivated by desire for unchallenged control over Rwanda and for revenge against mass killers of Tutsis--are the greatest threat to returning Hutu refugees.

-- EO 13526 1.4c

[REDACTED] RPF soldiers and other Tutsis have been executing suspected Hutu mass murderers in both central and northwestern Rwanda. [REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4c [REDACTED] the RPF is systematically screening refugees returning from Zaire for "troublemakers."

-- EO 13526 1.4c [REDACTED] RPF troops have killed Hutus and looted property in Butare--Rwanda's second city--and relief workers have told our Embassy in Kigali that the RPF has blocked access to the countryside east of Butare.

-- Relief workers also say that thousands of Hutus continue to arrive Tanzania from eastern Rwanda; we believe many of these new refugees may be fleeing RPF violence. [REDACTED] 3.5c

We doubt that the RPF attacks on returnees and other Hutus will reach the genocidal proportions of those carried out by the ousted Hutu regime. Much of the violence probably stems from fraying discipline within RPF ranks, which has heavily recruited to swell its early April strength of some 20,000, and to a lesser extent from a calculated effort to quash resistance.

-- The RPF regime's Prime Minister--a Hutu--yesterday told a French newspaper that his government wanted to punish some 30,000 suspected mass murderers.

Hutu extremists pose another threat to refugees who may want to return. [REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4c [REDACTED] the ousted Hutu leadership views the refugee population as its power base.

-- We cannot rule out the possibility that soldiers or militiamen will attack returnees, either within or outside of Rwanda--possibly in the hope their kinsmen and the international community will blame the RPF.

-- The odds of such intra-Hutu violence will increase over time, in our view, as wretched conditions for some refugees make return increasingly attractive. [REDACTED] 3.5c

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(1)

4 August 1994

ZAIRE: Weapons, Location, and Capabilities of the Former
Rwandan Army 3.5c

Background. In late July, some 10,000 soldiers of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Army (FAR) and another 10,000 Hutu militiamen crossed into Zaire along with some 1.7 million Rwandan refugees. The suddenness of the Rwandan exodus and Zaire's porous and poorly monitored border allowed a large number of these soldiers to enter Zaire with their weapons. While some of these arms--especially larger crew serviced weapons--have been confiscated by Zairian authorities, we believe that a number of small arms remain in FAR hands and that the heavier weapons may not be secure. 3.5c

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2. Who controls these weapons? We judge that troops from the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) probably control these depots, although we have no specific reporting to confirm this.

- o There has been no reported FAR presence in the area 100 km north of Goma where the FAZ military camp is located.
- o In addition, FAR forces are reportedly camped several km away from the other two depots on the outskirts of Goma and Bukavu. 3.5c

3. In our view, Zairian President Mobutu and his senior military commanders in Kinshasa probably exert little control over confiscated FAR weapons, which local commanders

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and individual FAZ soldiers are probably tempted to sell to survive, especially smaller, portable weapons.

- o The 2,000-2,500 Zairian troops in Kivu--including as many as 1,000 of Mobutu's relatively more reliable security forces--are stretched thin, lack rudimentary military discipline, and suffer severe economic hardship.

3.5c

4. Can Mobutu gain control of the heavy weapons?

Mobutu is anxious to garner additional Western goodwill and he would likely respond favorably to a Western request that he confiscate and dispose of heavy FAR weapons. Mobutu likely would have to deploy additional units of his more reliable security units to the Kivu area along with a number of senior officers to gain control of the weapons, however. He would probably request that the West pay the salaries and logistical fees associated with such a deployment to ensure troop discipline. Once in his control, Mobutu would likely be willing to turn the weapons over to Western hands, but he probably would demand some diplomatic or financial quid pro quo.

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5. How much are the confiscated FAR weapons worth? We estimate that the FAR's helicopters and armored cars could probably fetch several hundred thousand dollars on the gray arms market, depending on their condition. The artillery and mortar pieces could also be worth a few hundred thousand dollars.

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6. What weapons do the FAR forces in Zaire have? In both Goma and Bukavu, we judge that there may be 5,000 to 7,000 armed FAR troops who pose a security threat to US forces and Western relief workers, and who--although their ammunition is in short supply--threaten to restart hostilities inside Rwanda.

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- o In Goma, there are numerous reports that as many as 5,000 FAR troops may be armed. The defense attache reported earlier this week that he observed FAR troops in company and battalion size formations in their camps northwest of Goma. FAR forces had a 37 mm anti-aircraft gun, as well as numerous buses, 2.5 ton trucks, and two command jeeps. Most of the FAR senior leadership is reportedly in Goma.

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- o FAR forces may have access to additional weapons in Zaire. A cache of FAR explosives was discovered near Bukavu last week and the attache reports that piles of confiscated weapons remain unguarded in Goma. 3.5c

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Shawd9

Intelligence Report

Office of African and Latin American Analysis

4 August 1994

Burundi: Ethnic Tensions Reaching Boiling Point

3.5c

Tensions in Burundi, where the ethnic composition mirrors Rwanda's, could boil over with little warning, and recent developments are raising the temperature. Both Burundi's coup-prone, Tutsi-dominated, military and the civilian Tutsi opposition--emboldened by events in Rwanda--appear more opposed than ever to Hutu majority rule. EO 13526 1.4c *The Hutu-dominated government is virtually powerless in the face of Tutsi intransigence. This, in turn, is strengthening hardline Burundian Hutu leaders, who are increasingly willing to see conflict as their only means to consolidate their shaky hold on power.*

- EO 13526 1.4c *hardline Hutus are rearming and expanding their militias; they apparently are trying to recruit Zairians and Rwandan Hutu refugees in Zaire, as well as local Hutus.*
- *These Hutus' nascent military capabilities may tempt them to provoke conflict with the Tutsi military in the hope that international peacekeepers will intervene.* 3.5c

These developments are raising the odds of an ethnic explosion in Burundi that could trigger massive new flows of refugees, overwhelm international humanitarian capabilities, and add to instability in the region. Fearful of Rwanda's new Tutsi-dominated government, Burundian Hutu refugees probably would head instead for Tanzania or Zaire. 3.5c

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Rwandan Developments Polarizing Burundian Hutus and Tutsis

Although the recent wave of ethnic violence in Rwanda has not yet spread into Burundi--which shares its neighbor's demographic makeup--the massive bloodletting and population movements in Rwanda are raising the level of mutual distrust between Burundian Hutus and Tutsis. Each side is increasingly convinced that it cannot risk sharing power with the other, which is undercutting the influence of the few remaining moderates who favor peaceful power sharing. 3.5c

History of Bloodletting

Recent events in Burundi reflect longstanding tensions. Previous episodes of massive ethnic violence in Burundi--in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988--began as Hutu uprisings against oppression by the Tutsi minority. Centuries of Tutsi dominance seemed to be coming to an end with the democratic presidential election in June 1993, which Melchior Ndadaye's pro-Hutu FRODEBU party swept with more than 60 percent of the vote. The election results, however, have been subverted by the Tutsi-controlled military. A coup attempt last October resulted in the murder of President Ndadaye--as well as his constitutionally designated direct successors--and set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as 50,000, drove another 600,000 into neighboring countries, and displaced about 1 million within the country. This year, Ndadaye's appointed Hutu successor died in the plane crash that also killed Rwandan Hutu President Habyarimana, the Tutsi Army launched another abortive coup, and the Tutsi opposition has blocked Acting President Ntibantunganya's efforts to gain legitimacy and control the government. 3.5c

Tutsis Digging In. Burundian Tutsi fears of sharing power with the Hutu majority have deepened since the massacres of nearly two-thirds of Rwanda's Tutsis between early April and mid-July, and the group's desire to regain full control of the government appears stronger than ever. EO 13526 1.4c the mainly Tutsi UPRONA party and other opposition groups hold little stock in the democratic process, saying it has been subverted by deep-seated ethnic mistrust and would bring to power a Hutu majority government that would by definition be repressive.

- In early August, UPRONA pulled out of power-sharing talks with FRODEBU, claiming recent appointments of security and local officials violated the negotiations' ground rules, EO 13526 1.4c The Tutsi opposition has demanded near parity in government jobs and the creation of the office of vice president, to be filled by a Tutsi. 3.5c

The 13,000-strong mostly Tutsi security forces remain the Tutsis' insurance policy. Both officers and rank and file appear as opposed as the Tutsi political opposition to Hutu majority rule. EO 13526 1.4c the current

This report was prepared by 3.5c Office of Africa and Latin American Analysis, with contributions from 3.5c ALA. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, 3.5c ALA, on 3.5c

Army Chief, the Defense Minister, and other Tutsi military leaders, who were among the instigators of the bloody coup attempt last October, all adamantly reject the idea of sharing power with Hutus. Their willingness to revolt and ability to do so with impunity have highlighted the helplessness of Acting President Ntibantuganya and intimidated many other Hutu politicians, further emboldening the Tutsis-led opposition.

- Much of Burundi's recent ethnic violence--in which about 1,000 civilians have been killed since April--has stemmed from the Tutsi Army's "cleansing" operations in areas where it suspected Hutus of harboring weapons and party militias

EO 13526 1.4c

Hutus Edging Toward Conflict. Developments in Rwanda have also diminished the commitment of Burundi's Hutu leaders to finding a peaceful outcome to their country's crisis. Some Hutu officials view UPRONA's negotiating strategy as the first step toward a bloodless coup d'état that would restore Tutsi dominance,

EO 13526 1.4c

these officials probably are correct.

The widespread Hutu suspicion that the Tutsi Burundian military helped the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front oust the Hutu regime in Kigali, and the weakness of the Hutu-controlled government in the face of Tutsi intransigence, appear to be making an armed conflict increasingly attractive to Hutu hardliners.

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As Burundi's radical Hutus, including Interior Minister Nyangoma, acquire more military capabilities, they may provoke the Tutsi military into conflict in the hope that international peacekeepers would deploy to Burundi and disarm the Tutsi military.

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Another Humanitarian Disaster Looming

The hardening attitudes of both Hutus and Tutsis appear to be propelling Burundi toward large-scale ethnic clashes that could spark another humanitarian disaster. More than 1.3 million displaced persons and former Burundian refugees who have returned from neighboring countries are already receiving humanitarian assistance. In addition, nearly 220,000 Burundian refugees remain in Zaire, Tanzania, and Rwanda. If bloodletting erupts in Burundi, international aid workers in the region would be overwhelmed by another mass exodus.

- Burundian Hutus would be likely to stay away from their traditional safehaven in Rwanda, fearing crackdowns by the new Tutsi-dominated government in Kigali. Fear of the rebels who now control that government has prompted many of the 300,000 Burundian refugees who fled to Rwanda last October to return to Burundi; the 53,000 who remain in Rwanda are mostly in the French-designated safehaven.
- New waves of Burundian Hutu refugees probably would head for Tanzania or Zaire; some 20,000 fled to Zaire last October alone.
- Tanzania and Zaire--which already host 60,000 and 106,000 Burundian refugees, respectively--would be under even more pressure if they had to cope with a new influx. Both countries face serious security threats as a result of Hutu irredentist activity in the Rwandan refugee camps. 3.5c

Meanwhile, the arrival of more Rwandan Hutu refugees could overwhelm Burundi's infrastructure and further aggravate Hutu-Tutsi tensions. Some 373,000 Rwandans--mostly Hutus--have already arrived; aid workers say 1 million or more displaced Rwandans along the border face growing threats from malnutrition and disease, and they may move with little notice. 3.5c

Rwanda
Ad Hoc Group on Rwandan Relief

Chaired by Mr. Lake

5 August 1994

AGENDA

1. Introduction.....Mr. Lake
2. Sitreps.....CIA/JCS
 - Status of the four relief "packages"
 - Additional needs
3. Consideration of Phase 2.....OSD/JCS
4. Expanding UNAMIR.....OSD
5. Burundi.....State
6. The Hutu Army in Zaire/Moroccan troops.....State
7. Promoting Repatriation
 - Principles to Guide Repatriation Effort.....State
 - Information Campaign.....OSD/JCS
 - Promoting Reconciliation in Rwanda.....State
8. Other business.....Mr. Lake

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 11 NARA, Date 1/15/05

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Rwand



10 August 1994

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Burundi: Background to Crisis

Summary

- Recent developments make an ethnic explosion in Burundi likely in the next six months. The crisis could begin with little additional warning. This would trigger massive new flows of refugees, overwhelm international humanitarian capabilities, and add to instability in the region. Fearful of Rwanda's new Tutsi-dominated government, Burundian Hutu refugees probably would head instead for Tanzania or Zaire. 3.5c
- Both Burundi's coup-prone, Tutsi-dominated, military and the civilian Tutsi opposition appear more opposed than ever to Hutu majority rule. The Hutu-dominated government is virtually powerless in the face of Tutsi intransigence. This, in turn, is strengthening hardline Burundian Hutu leaders, who increasingly see conflict as their only means to consolidate their shaky hold on power. 3.5c

Rwandan Developments Polarizing Burundian Hutus and Tutsis. The massive bloodletting in Rwanda has raised the level of mutual distrust between Burundian Hutus and Tutsis. Each side is convinced that it cannot risk sharing power with the other, which is undercutting the influence of the few remaining moderates who favor power sharing. 3.5c

Burundian Tutsi fears of sharing power with the Hutu majority have deepened since the massacres of nearly two-thirds of Rwanda's Tutsis between early April and mid-July, and the group's desire to regain full control of the government appears stronger than ever. The mainly Tutsi UPRONA party and other opposition groups place little stock in the democratic process, saying it would bring to power a Hutu majority government that would by definition be repressive.

- In early August, UPRONA pulled out of power-sharing talks with the "ruling" Hutu FRODEBU party, claiming recent appointments of security and local officials violated the negotiations' ground rules. The Tutsi opposition has demanded near parity in government jobs and the creation of the office of vice president, to be filled by a Tutsi. 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

SUBJECT: Burundi: Background to Crisis

The 13,000-strong mostly Tutsi security forces remain the Tutsis' insurance policy. The current Army Chief, the Defense Minister, and other Tutsi military leaders, who were among the instigators of the bloody coup attempt last October, all adamantly reject the idea of sharing power with Hutus. Their willingness to revolt and ability to do so with impunity have highlighted the helplessness of Acting President Ntibantuganya and intimidated many other Hutu politicians.

- Much of Burundi's recent ethnic violence--in which about 1,000 civilians have been killed since April--has stemmed from the Tutsi Army's "cleansing" operations in areas where it suspected Hutu party militias of harboring weapons. 3.5c

Hutus Edging Toward Conflict. Developments in Rwanda have also diminished the commitment of Burundi's Hutu leaders to finding a peaceful outcome to their country's crisis. Some Hutu officials view UPRONA's negotiating strategy as the first step toward a bloodless coup d'état that would restore Tutsi dominance; these officials probably are correct. Consequently, armed conflict is increasingly attractive to Hutu hardliners.

- The radical Hutu PALIPEHUTU movement has been reorganizing and rearming its 5,000 fighters since April.
- Burundian government officials have been recruiting Zairian nationals and Hutu refugees in Zaire's South Kivu Region to fight the Burundian Army. 3.5c

Another Humanitarian Disaster Looming. The hardening attitudes of both Hutus and Tutsis are propelling Burundi toward large-scale ethnic clashes that will create another humanitarian disaster. More than 1.3 million displaced persons and former Burundian refugees who have returned from neighboring countries are already receiving humanitarian assistance. In addition, nearly 220,000 Burundian refugees remain in Zaire, Tanzania, and Rwanda.

- Burundian Hutus would likely stay away from their traditional safehaven in Rwanda, fearing the new Tutsi-dominated government in Kigali. Fear of the Tutsi has prompted many of the 300,000 Burundian refugees who fled to Rwanda last October to return to Burundi; the 53,000 who remain in Rwanda are mostly in the French-designated safehaven.
- New waves of Burundian Hutu refugees probably would head for Tanzania or Zaire. 3.5c

APPENDIX

Burundi: A "Cliff Notes" History

Unlike most African states, Rwanda and Burundi were not artificial creations of colonial rule; their existence as political entities goes back several centuries. Between the 15th and 17th centuries, Tutsi herders moved into the area from Ethiopia and established dominance over Hutu farmers. Hutus traditionally were the social inferiors of the Tutsi nobility, who exchanged cattle for personal services. Both groups share social structures and the related Kirundi and Kinyarwanda languages. 3.5c

Rwanda's Tutsi monarchy traditionally was more centralized and authoritarian than in Burundi, where the king's power rested on a shifting set of factional alliances. Rwanda also was marked by sharper social distinctions between Tutsis and Hutus. German and Belgian rule in the 20th century highlighted ethnic differences in both countries, as colonial authorities gave Tutsis disproportionate access to education and government jobs.

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In Burundi, Tutsis remained in control until last year. The contrast between Hutu rule in Rwanda and the group's oppression in Burundi led to Hutu uprisings--in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988--that resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Each Hutu attack fueled Tutsi fears of extermination, and each bloody repression reinforced the Hutus' desire for revenge. Periodic ethnic unrest resulted in three successful coups d'état and many failed attempts. The last Tutsi president, Pierre Buyoya, judged the situation was untenable and orchestrated last year's election and transfer of power. 3.5c

In the June 1993 election, Melchoir Ndadaye's pro-Hutu FRODEBU party won with more than 60 percent of the vote. The election results, however, have been subverted by the Tutsi-controlled military. A coup attempt last October resulted in the murder of President Ndadaye--as well as his constitutionally designated direct successors--and set off ethnic bloodletting that killed as many as 50,000, drove another 600,000 into neighboring countries, and displaced about 1 million within the country. This year, Ndadaye's appointed Hutu successor died in the plane crash that also killed Rwandan Hutu President Habyarimana, the Tutsi Army launched another abortive coup, and the Tutsi opposition has blocked Acting President Ntibantunganya's efforts to gain legitimacy and control the government. 3.5c

Rice, Susan E.

From: Clarke, Richard A.
To: @AFRICA - African Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs
Subject: RWANDA Memo to POTUS for your clearance!
Date: Thursday, August 11, 1994 5:17PM
Priority: High

Package as Info Memo to Pres Covered by a Note from me to Lake

TO: Lake
FM: RAC
RE: Rwanda

Attached is the memorandum to the President you requested.

TO: POTUS
FM: LAKE
RE: Rwanda

While we have made progress of the emergency relief situation in and around Goma, three problems threaten the success of the Rwandan relief operation.

First, the volcano near Goma is emitting ash and may soon erupt with lava that could threaten the refugees. The US Geological Survey's expert believes that the current activity is an indicator that a major lava eruption could occur within four weeks. We are providing the UN with all of the information we have on the volcano's status and are urgently consulting with them, the French, and the Rwandan government about what should be done with the refugees near the volcano. We may be able to use the volcanic activity as a catalyst to begin large scale refugee repatriation. Before such repatriation occurs, however, we need to have a relief and security system in place in Rwanda. The Rwandan government and the UN (both the peacekeepers and the refugee programs) would have to coooperate quickly and effectively to begin a major repatriation effort soon.

Second, the Hutu dominated former Rwandan army is disrupting relief operations in Zaire and is intimidating refugees who may want to return. The Zaire Army is not very capable of dealing with security problems in this remote part of the country. We are consulting with the French and Zaire about what can be done to insure the disarmament and control of this force. While the solution is likely to require the introduction of some non-American peacekeeping force in the Goma area, we are examining whether there are things that the US could do to help address this problem.

Third, ethnic tensions in Burundi are increasing. A Hutu/Tutsi massacre there could rival what happened in Rwanda. We are taking steps to encourage mediation and conciliation. The Organization of African Unity has deployed human rights observers. Several Deputy Representatives to the UN Security Council will visit Burundi as a team in the next few days. We are trying to assemble a team of prominent Americans to visit there soon. Finally, at the UNSYG Boutros-Ghali's request, we have offered to have some US Air Force relief cargo flights for the Rwandan refugees land in Burundi as a reminder that the international community is watching. We have declined for now to place a US Air Force airport team there, however, because a larger presence of US military might be counterproductive and destabilizing.

Revised

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Rwanda Relief Ad Hoc Group

Summary & Conclusions

12 Aug 94 Meeting

1. Volcano: USGC experts will be dispatched to the area around Goma immediately to do an assessment of the risk of a lava flow or gaseous spread on Lake Kivu.

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3. UNAMIR: State will work with USUN to insure that the remaining problems holding up the Ethiopian deployment are resolved ASAP. State and USUN will insure that the UN issues an LOI indicating intention to pay for USAF flights supporting the Tunisian deployment.

State will request Secretary Christopher to send a letter to Secretary Perry requesting support for UNAMIR under the legal arrangements of the United Nations Participation Act. This formal request will permit DOD to act prior to the completion of UN contracts to repay DOD.

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5. Burundi: The US will support Salem-Salem (OAU) in his call for a summit in Bujumbura. EUCOM will work with UNHCR to identify loads that USAF can fly in to Bujumbura, to create a periodic USAF presence there. State and NSC will work to create a high level US Delegation that will visit Burundi soon as a stabilizing measure.

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Rwanda

Rwanda 8/29/94

Short Term Strategy + Goals

ClA:

Zaire

- Burundi - no mass exodus

15-20,000 refugees in Goma ready to go over
xUNHCR deal short of trucks

- Goma - security problems

* Convoy attacked & dead

* Convoy repatriating attacked ♂ 1 fatality

- * Huts burning & fire

Tanzania

- USAID says 40,000 refugees have fled SE Rwanda
with fleeing RPF attacks / repels 15 roads
by trucks from Tanz → Rw.

- Relief supplies under strain. Could not supply
by land - SC

- Convoy security problems. 25 RPF sympathizers
killed in Tanzania before this week

Rwanda - saying good possibility of war if refugees don't return.
Afraid of attacks from Zaire

- Tanzanian soldiers & responds to civilian command

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Seuinde

- ~~Confused notees : 20 lead in desecration and by~~
 ~~they us. their comp~~
- ~~Success will extend beyond 26ⁿ~~
- ~~Burmese refugees will flee to Thailand anticipating~~
 ~~violence~~

४८

- Troop level - 3,700 today - outlook
 - Tunisian / Saudi west
 - INMARSAT -> equip by 27th
 - Tunisian cog 1 Sept. (equip. issue resolved)
- French act.
- Goma - UNHCR accepted full respo. JTF transfer completed. will redeploy on 28th
- Is US Army pulling out of Kayedi? - news to JCS. by Aug 31??

DUNAWEIR

- Tunisia ready 1 Sept. - 1st cap self-deploying
Offer 2 will ask for UN lift (or maybe)
 - will use 40 German ATVs - held up in finance office - ~~can't afford~~
 - Offer equip? - Wait come to us
- Zambia

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- Ethiopia = not happy
 - want flat jales, UN Protected Vehicles, night curfences
 - UN claims to have closed loop w/ Ethiopians. Will be shipped once powered.
- Ghina - still missing US sources (Ghina yesterday signed FAF (DB) should go next week)
 - vehicles caught up in UN \rightarrow refurbishment - CC next week
- Zambian - 25th
 - UN looking @ lift - right now we don't expect OJG lift
- French - Did they leave any equipment - some left. We don't know what.
 - Will it come up w/ Deutch?

Op Support Hope / GOMA

- Hand off completed in Goma. US military out on 25th \Rightarrow UNHCR
- Press Conference ??

TACCE team will fly into GOMA each day & flight out over night

RADIOS

88D

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1000

- VOA broadcast (action \rightarrow legal to assess needed legal ^{radio} capabilities \rightarrow should allow Gvt to address camps
 - do we want to help craft message?
 - do we want to help set it up / support?
- Do we join? (legal issues / technical issues) - State paper (P. Sutor)
- Do we give radio equipment to CINAUER? Better to exp \rightarrow no. Radio legal unless govt fielded radio
- Radio Rwanda can reach Burundi, etc. $\begin{cases} \text{dead} \\ \text{issues} \end{cases}$
- should we fund. AID prepared if agreed by Aleg.

Security in Zaire

AFB

||

- Zaire wants to remove members of military + paramilitaries (Congo wrote 800 soldiers UN assistance to remove Rebels west in Zaire \rightarrow encourage Alesca for UN assistance ~~Kenya 4953~~ \rightarrow 20,000 - Burundi)
- Mobutu may be looking for another army of his own. $\begin{cases} \text{Bur} \\ \text{West} \\ \text{Kenya} \end{cases}$ $\begin{cases} 1,000 \text{ Gvt officials} \\ \text{Rebels} \end{cases}$
- May create other problems - State (AF/PM) will do / CLA 1 page ~~assess~~

Burundi - security. Moore raised w/ FR + Belp.

TANZ - Gvt ~~assured~~ to provide security in Burundi

for 300 police + security in camps + on border
 \rightarrow AF ~~looking~~ \rightarrow OAU \rightarrow

Rwandan - continued reports of killings, border invasions

- status of FR ~~invites~~
Dir. . . . see HR case

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HR Monitors → UNHCR will advance to 1 Jan 90 (20 weeks) → UNHRC
for Rwanda. Now actively recruiting. Can get someone
in 10-15 days.

AID → UNHCR will recruit → UNHRC

Rawson talked to RPF → were doing best to control our people, but

- Ree's stuff out of our control.
- We need better info. → HR groups.

Plane clearing → in 5 days

→ CIA: RPF engaging in systematic killings + recruiting.
↳ info = secondhand, nuclear, circumstantial

Rawson will look into it as he returns.

Can UNAMIR go in? HR groups / NGOs? Their amb. will go right

- HR MONITORS
- UNAMIR
- RPF



do we expand IMOT → RPF fort.

Reis + HR → £150,000 in 85 for Rwanda.

ALL EPF
WAR CRIMES
7 weeks
WORLD
RPF: AD
HR MONITOR

Rwandan

- concerned to our report
- USF RPF tip on
- start/finish date paper → COB forum
- update of strategy on the borders

what are we doing?

what > can we do.

25 August 1994

Zaire-Rwanda: Moving FAR Units North to Bunia 3.5c

1. What is the status of the Former Rwandan Army (FAR) in eastern Zaire? We believe that there are some 10,000-12,000 soldiers of the FAR in eastern Zaire who retain their personal weapons. About 10,000 are near Goma in battalion size camps; they have retained military discipline, train each morning, and respond to senior command and control. While most of the FAR's heavy equipment was seized when they crossed the border last month, they continue to control a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun and a few truck mounted mortars. Most of the 7,000-8,000 FAR troops near Bukavu do not appear to have retained their weapons and they are reportedly less disciplined, more disorganized, and less loyal to their officers than their comrades near Goma. EO 13526 3.5c

2. Can the FAR be persuaded to move? Most of the armed FAR troops in Goma probably are committed to remaining an organized force near the Rwandan border in order to more easily resume hostilities against the new Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government. They reportedly have received four months of salary in advance, are receiving (partly through theft of relief assistance) adequate food, water, and medical supplies, and live in military-style tents. FAR units near Bukavu probably would also resist moving, but many soldiers in this area are reportedly selling their weapons to buy food, suggesting that some might be willing to move to new camps that offered better living conditions. 3.5c

3. What is President Mobutu's view? EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c Mobutu has publicly stated that he will prevent the FAR from resuming hostilities, but we have no specific evidence that he is actively pursuing such an objective. Mobutu has long-standing political and military ties to the former Hutu regime. 3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

EO 13526 3.5c

4. Can Mobutu's military forces forcibly move the FAR? Probably not. Even if Mobutu openly supported such a policy, there are only about 2,500 Zairian troops--perhaps as many as 1,000 from Mobutu's Special Presidential Division (DSP)--in Kivu. Zairian troops are deployed primarily in Goma and Bukavu and rarely travel to FAR camps located outside of town. These troops are ill-disciplined, poorly trained and led, and receive little logistical support; Zairian troops are likely responsible for at least half of all security incidents near Goma. Zairian troops would almost be certainly reluctant to forcibly attempt to redeploy the FAR, fearing--correctly in our view--that they would be outmanned, outgunned, and outclassed. The FAR senior leadership does spend considerable time in Goma and Bukavu, however, and Zairian forces would likely stand a better chance of detaining individual officers. 3.5c

5. Would moving the FAR to Bunia significantly undermine its capabilities to renew hostilities? Yes. Bunia is over 400 km north of Goma on the Ugandan border, sharply limiting their ability to conduct operations in Rwanda. The roads in the area are very poor--especially during the current rainy season--and the town's airport probably cannot handle sizable transport aircraft. There are few Hutus among the indigenous population, denying the FAR a natural base of support. 3.5c

6. What are the implications for Zaire? Putting the FAR in Bunia would probably have little immediate impact on Zaire's political dynamics. Kinshasa would likely demand that international relief agencies provide for FAR troop welfare in order to minimize their threat to the local community. Mobutu has scattered thousands of ill-disciplined, disloyal regular Army soldiers throughout Zaire's interior with no obvious means of logistic support. Although these troops occasionally engage in violent looting to survive, the unrest is usually contained to the individual town and has had no political impact. 3.5c

7. The deployment, however, could potentially complicate Zaire's relations with Uganda, which have often been tense. The border area has long hosted numerous armed groups that engage in cross-border unrest. The FAR, which views Uganda as an enemy for supporting the RPF, could try to destabilize President Museveni as well as looking for opportunities to launch attacks against Rwanda. Under such circumstances, Uganda might retaliate with cross border attacks or support to anti-Zairian groups. 3.5c

*

26 August 1994

Human Rights Abuses by the Rwandan Patriotic Front

Reports from a range of sources says that forces loyal to the Rwandan Patriotic Front are killing ethnic Hutus, seizing property, and committing other abuses throughout Rwanda. These reports appear plausible to us. They reflect both conscious policy by the RPF, which dominates the new regime in Kigali, and serious problems of discipline and command-and-control among RPF troops. We estimate that at most several thousand Hutus have been killed by RPF troops and supporters--far short of the genocide perpetrated by the ousted Hutu regime against ethnic Tutsis. Nonetheless, whatever the motivation, the abuses are aggravating the regional refugee crisis by driving more Hutus out of Rwanda and by bolstering radical Hutu leaders' claims that, because returnees face slaughter at the RPF's hands, they should remain outside the country's borders. 3.5c

Evidence of Policies Encouraging Abuses

-- Continued flight of refugees into Tanzania--some 40,000 have left this month--suggests a systematic RPF crackdown on the Hutu population of Kibungo Prefecture, which the Front has controlled for four months. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c Hutu refugees' descriptions of harsh RPF measures; Tanzanian authorities have been pulling 20 to 30 bodies each week from the Kagera River on the border. Since mid-May we have received a steady stream of similar reports of RPF brutality

EO 13526 1.4c

We believe this behavior represents scorched-earth tactics by the RPF in response to an ongoing armed threat from Hutu elements in Kibungo. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

-- We believe that similar crackdowns--meant to encourage Tutsis' return as well as to punish Hutus--have taken place elsewhere in Rwanda. EO 13526 1.4c relief

agencies were not allowed into the eastern portions of Butare and Gitarama Prefectures during most of July--a period when EO 13526 1.4c destruction or seizure of Hutu property in the towns of Butare and Gitarama. This suggests the RPF wanted no outside witnesses of a violent rooting out of suspected enemies. 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

In Kigali, according to press reports, Tutsi exiles returning from Uganda say the RPF has given them houses and businesses seized from Hutus. We view this as evidence that the Front is actively working to tilt the capital's ethnic balance in its favor. 3.5c

- The above actions would be consistent with the RPF's practice during the civil war of not letting civilian or humanitarian concerns keep it from obtaining military objectives. The RPF's remorseless shelling of Hutu positions in Kigali between May and July inflicted heavy collateral losses, including barrages that damaged Red Cross hospitals and UN facilities. Similarly, an RPF mortar attack on fleeing Hutu troops in Goma, Zaire, in mid-July set off a deadly panicked stampede among civilian refugees in the target zone. 3.5c
- RPF leaders have created an atmosphere conducive to abuses with public pronouncements on the need for "justice" on a massive scale against the authors of the anti-Tutsi genocide. Some have spoken of the need to arrest, try, and punish up to 40,000 mass murderers, and the RPF has circulated lists with hundreds of names of suspected ringleaders. 3.5c

Evidence of Uncontrollable Armed Groups

- EO 13526 1.4c the Rwandan Patriotic Army's control over its troops has shrunk as its strength has swollen past 25,000 from an early April level of 10,000. EO 13526 1.4c RPF troops went on a spree of rapine and summary executions after they captured Kigali on 4 July. The RPF regime's announcement this week of the execution of two soldiers for atrocities and the arrest of 60 others indicates that it is aware indiscipline is a problem. Prime Minister Twagiramungu--not an RPF member--says that the military's discipline has evaporated and that Defense Minister Kagame may have lost control of the force. EO 13526 1.4c
- EO 13526 1.4c the RPF has armed returning Tutsi refugees and given military training to nearly every able-bodied Tutsi to defend against Hutu raids. These vigilante groups have killed Hutus who have fallen under suspicion due to their education, purported political beliefs, or coveted possessions. 3.5c
- Outside of "hot" zones such as Kibungo, we believe these vigilantes and undisciplined, vengeful soldiers--operating on their own--have been responsible for the atrocities. This was almost certainly the case in the murder of the Catholic Archbishop of Kigali and other clergymen in early June. It probably has also been true of reported massacres of Hutu villagers along the edge of the former French security zone in southwestern Rwanda and apparent killings of some returning refugees in Gisenyi Prefecture. 3.5c

-- The RPF may lack the muscle and the political will to rein in freelance Tutsi killers. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] the dispersal of RPF troops across Rwanda has greatly diluted the command-and-control exercised by commanders. At the same time, as long as the regime feels under threat of attack, it is likely to be reluctant to rein in--much less punish--its enthusiastic supporters among the vigilante bands and newly recruited troops. [redacted] 3.5c

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Rwanda

Rwandan Ad hoc Mtg. 8/20/94

SITREP

(b)(3)

Huge new militia on Tutsi side - (25,000 to 30,000 digited 10,000 RPF)

flutes

5, - 7,000 in Buharo - not as serious - + Interhamwe

10 + K in Gava, only some serious

④ ~~3,000~~^{flutes} militia in Buharo. Planning atrocities (SE Rwanda),
- many more bodies in river. Flow into Tanzania

- scattered at field level. → not at HQ. They know what community
leadership want RPA under control, but commanders
on ground may see things differently

Presidental Guard,

Tanzanians moving heavy arms out of area, → possibly for own acquisition
1 35 mill. Anti aircraft weapons still in TAC hands May sell back
to Hutus or

Ayolgo =>
highest bidder.

Wood

Death rate in Gava 350-400/day = v. high std. ~~100~~

= 5-8/10,000

normal = 1/10,000

Issues: availability of H2O, sanitation, unequal distribution of food + health
care = security issue. PWDs claimed, seeking private security firms.
What to do in camps = serious

Burundi - conversations = moving along. Real substantial political discussions
but military talking corp. - 3 serious corp plots.

- corp would succeed. Pretty clear, probably. Hutus will be won't
response, recruiting Hutus in refugee camps in regions.

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UNAID - Ted Warren

- mostly good news, except UN = resting on its laurels.
- Zambians upto 4,700.
- Info. in that Tunisians ready by mid Sept. + German equipment
 - UN slowing down to end of Sept.

doesn't make sense given internal situation in Rwanda

* Francophone 2nd 400 (plan in w/ Op. Tigray.)

equipped

by French, in SW. w/ Ethiopia + Ghana

- Burundi potential
- Zaire camps.

- do we press FR for last 400. Concern that 2nd half = option
 $\frac{2}{3}$ = Mali + Guinea. Need to equip now
OSD to make w/ Mali et al. Conced.

~~Used keep responsible & contains leading off~~

- Tunisians plan to replace Ghana in Kenya so they can do 8th + FR zone
- Zambians to N.W.

~~N.S. (ed) when I press Tunisians to move on up - several reasons~~

~~Used mainly parceled~~

Security situation in Goma

- Morocco no.
- FR won't get involved. Still FR in General 15th
 - running airport
 - may help remain francophone
 - not likely to do any security tasks.

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Security in Goma

RFI radio
not heard in
Goma - as of yesterday

- new proposal to move (do we support directly or indirectly)
 - preference. Get voluntary. FRC agreed to more voluntarily
 - with pushing. Need to talk to UN about Res. response
- Expand current
 - likely result
- Alternatives to slopes
 - (wt FR, Belgiums)
- fixed security

Leave needs 8-10
more accommoda
vacancy - we don't
know how much

(left) get info from
UNHCR

Talk to French / Belgians

Doesn't solve problem
- we still need to deserve Res.

- still will be people left in camp who are encroaching

Have military N. to Burundi (or Ugandan border) - poster of COTNDA

They wait more voluntarily - most likely

NJ: State will pursue one option (voluntarily)

(talk to UN, FR/Belg.)

talk to agency - what can Res. contribute

Options Paper - by Tuesday

expand current mission / AOR - focus on small areas

raise

Collect USSR - info (area)

What's required paper by 10

UNHCR field

we haven't completed lot of
packets

- 2 forklifts in Bata

- Kigali Airport
spare

Some confusion of UNHCR over withdrawal from Goma
- concerned abt - security provided by UN presence

Database


needs to talk to UNHCR - paper for plans
+ write up

{ reserving
judgment

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Commercial


- in conf. DOD Approp. supplemented request.
- deadline Oct. 7 - ~~3 reports~~ - 2 due in 2 days



Bi-journal assessment


- Log assessment // infrastructure requirements. = done.
- Answer = we can better support Dp. Rep. Kigali.

Clarke: we weren't talking substitute, but in addition to Bi-journals...




Add US support

- Gabor: we can do almost all of list w/ DOD + UNMA



RADCOM

- UN-supported radios along specific spec for RADCOM UNAPPROVED
- We need to go back + ask what they really need



UN = standing up RADCOM Kigali. They need alternative capacity

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No US help to Radio Kigali
further

- it up + run it (Adv). Pot - not up.

BAD RADIOS

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

- needed in heavy traffic
only in Kigali now.

① Do we have
enough
people
to do this?
- Do we have
enough
people
to do this?
- confirm all whether it continues to broadcast, - we think it is.
- If we want to knock off, must put US people + equip. on
ground - either jam or replace by overriding

No other country has capacity to jam w/in frequency spectrum needed.

- USG can do b/c of Somalia where we leased.

- # people ??

- near station

- relatively small equip in comp.

relatively easy to do

~~blocker~~
on receiving end
put up electronic fence

Should we lease to USG + put them on ground.
or
or

② Talk to French: about willing if we provide technical means?

③ War Crimes angle??

→ Refugees Aspects

US Presence - use as heavy lift pt.

not near us or far
we fear in
Balkan

Issues: do refugees in SW require support - no need logistically less

- would US presence facilitate stability \oplus detects resources for
Kigali effort

JCS - we can support Rwanda best
from Kigali

Burmese refugees - another issue / mission

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ICs didn't look @ issue of helping Burundi refugees (for Rwanda)

- ~~Clear~~ ~~Refugees is not my concern~~

- ~~Over~~ ~~Refugees in Burundi~~ ~~be best served out of~~ ~~Uganda~~
or ~~Burundi~~ = 6 of us; half dozen of us

- ~~ICs to discuss options~~ → ~~POST-DCAF decision~~

~~could be
one
decision~~
~~more
complex~~

~~Burundi~~ ~~What else can we do?~~

- Some movement on political issues. Was hopeful
- even w/ agreement, still a problem...

~~steps~~

- Pressure military to hand over

~~Keep RPA
under review~~

- Pressure EU + Jan
threat if they
don't hand over

- Threatening court

- Conf. in Burundi

~~Next week~~ - ~~WED~~

~~Add support
fund and
needs~~

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Rwanda

AHG Meeting Rwanda 9/7/94

S/Rep

Henri Rosenthal ?

- send paper down

- key officials = favor Rwandan affair (?)
- RPA can't pay military fees
- Army = only functioning institution, but can't find assets that foreign govt has sequestered outside govt

Rwanda
Water Supply

Refugees - UNHCR = v. concerned about orphans issue (100,000+)

- return - positive return - 150 into Zaire. 750 returned.

Burundi - offer to interview Pres. to stay on to 1998 -

sign of political dialogue

(5 people killed) @ church on Sept. 4 - still going on but isolated.
long-term concern; still no goodwill.

SS/45 split agreed in cabinet, but no deep compromise

- short-term breathing space in Burundi

1) Future of Support

Big, urgent
assessment

EURO matrix

- UNHCR request vs.

We do analysis of new charted
request

* People in Kigali. Chas. ordered 2d hr. process by 3 in Kigali

TL: dual assurance - that we don't leave unless equal or better

Walt - we need paper that shows what we've done + response
to requests + shows how we've handled off (to whom; what)

- Maintaining Support - plans after we leave. } goes to
- draws on info paper & public presentation } audience

Spotlight for
refugees
in Africa
our
priorities

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TL: keep 3 in legal

Bates: will do

TR: Forces to make final decision on drawdown.

Walt - public presentation - TR - push for Friday

Security in Camps

Moore:

- Bad options, no consensus.

- Zaire acknowledged responsibility but not signed on to any options

- UN sending teams → Zaire corps / got to address security needs

- meeting in Addis - we hope will focus on security issues

Other/united regional states (US, UN, Kroc=observers)

- Moose: UNHCR = too difficult. Could rely on finding other countries to go in.

- Abe Salim if UN could do something → @ OAU mtg.

- keep UNHCR expansion on table.

Charles - need to offer FAR some control - not just drawdown

- We need to try to encourage military reintegration. 8 is problem

⇒ try reintegration doesn't solve problem of militias (two approaches)

- look at possibility of assisting w/ military integration

|| - Bids, 2nd

- 8, training

- problem = getting too close to govt

Storaenge (TR): we've got to get w/ Kagame govt

Moose - raises question of what kind of assistance do we provide

AD - we've don't have any concrete assistance plan

World Bank has \$200 mil in blocked accounts
\$4 mil average to Bank. Must be paid

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- Problem = paying military . . .
- need to mediate / settle land disputes
- Bank (Fund) UNDP = all looking at it, but have constraints to deliver short term resources

Friends of Rwanda - FR, GERMANY, JAPAN, BPL.

- to raise \$
- US to do high level campaign to raise \$ for org.
- AID to do plan - on what's needed + strategy for getting it (state)
- urgent ↑ next week.

Can we recover assets of old govt. Accounts have been vacated.

UNAMIR Deployment

- 200000 in yesterday
- 200000 request
- Tunisia - slow roll b/c no equipment / lack logistic support

Need UNDP session for convened LOA. - not until 12th

10-14 days to get equipment in.

- forces go to NW.
- UNAMIR + RPA liaison office in SW
- Slowdown: USP unit let paper work stand in the way.
 - try to get lawyers to look at expediting options
- USUN will take another Run @ Arman + Comor.

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Leaders

- workshop didn't do analysis, equipment list. Radio ~~carpool~~
- want us to help in collecting equipment - hope to resolve via: is Peer with list
- will find out how to solve problem. Will find out how to fix UN radio capacity + make it happen

Teacher ally
friendly

Bad leaders

- UN doesn't want to jacks. - to fix. under-priced fairly
- alternative UN radio could try to avoid bad signal w/o having to pay. - will know more.

Friends

Moore: more of the same.

~~Moore to check
team
for what is proposed
to team
to see if it's checked~~

- carries on deployment units to make sure right types are deployed
- will talk to Sales on about expanding OAU members + making Res. more effective.

~~Moore: we could use greater effect of demonstrating US presence.~~

~~Beijing area~~ - Moore, I think it would have a positive political impact.

~~Moore: occasional visits
to fact. embassy~~ - It's - logically not a vet job. Keep eye out for real users on occasional basis

~~Moore: visiting freq.~~ - We certainly can go in port periodically, if ordered. for UNCR.

~~Moore: visiting freq.~~ - we need logistic support, natural handling

~~Moore: visiting freq.~~ - we need strong reason (for logon) for going in.

~~Moore: visiting freq.~~

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Over - DD draft #2 - not back

State paper = final decisions - are today
in state

Want back up by end of week.

TL - if clearance problems, let me know

Emergency??

Supplements - pretty good. steps

- We're having reput'g regents

- meets exit schedule by Oct. 7.

- Byrd comfortable w/ 4/170 miss in A4

- will press

- ahead for draft Ravetta letter → thru (Gordon, Deeb)

We're opposed to fixed deadlines in legislation - Tell Deeb what we

desire

desire

NO more

1) Report coming what we have done w/ UNCR - analytical

piece w/ DD recommend how to drawdown by Sept 30
or not.

- have written if big changes

- get back to you w/ reply.

2) DD Public Affairs sheet - acceptable, request not
drawdown by week's end.

3) Corps - info in Aldis

- pursue all options w/ regard to UNAMIR expense

- request to Salis

clear
in state
ALD

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- 4) OJD will deliver equipment asap w/ breaking law
 - Gear equipment - they should be in it
 - USWV is

5) Readiness

- goal = resolve what they want, when
 - will put together package + deal w/ either lease/loan
 - will solve problems
 - Training

Procedure -

- End - make max use of what we're doing already
- explore 2 ideas
-

Report done by end of this week
OJB to deliver supplemented

Strategy on
up to 6 hrs.
needs in Kwarda
Sue of J,
Trends,
Strategy

~~SECRET~~

Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda
Wednesday, September 7, 1994
10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
White House Situation Room

AGENDA

1. Situation Report..... CIA
2. Operation Support Hope
 - Timetable for U.S. Withdrawal..... *JCS*
 - Additional USG Contributors.... *State/AID*
3. Security in Refugee Camps in Zaire.... *State/OSD*
4. UNAMIR Deployment..... *OSD*
5. Radios..... *OSD*
6. Burundi..... *State*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-Sep-1994 15:58 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:
RECORDS (RECORDS@A1@OE0B)

FROM: Rice, Susan E. (rices@NSCSTF@OE0B@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~ Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda

Message Creation Date was at 14-SEP-1994 15:36:00

Tony/Nancy--

We had proposed holding an Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda on Thursday. Since that time, State and DOD have substantially narrowed their differences on the key issue of the extent of continued USG support for UNHCR efforts in the region.

Given this, and the exceptionally pressing demands on your time this week, we recommend NOT holding an Ad Hoc Meeting this week. Instead, we will forward to you a memo to the President recommending that he approve the JCS withdrawal plan and the provision of specific additional goods and services to UNHCR. We will also update you on other developments re: Rwanda/Burundi.

We will let you know when we think the time is ripe for another Ad Hoc meeting.

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 14-Sep-1994 15:36
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DOCNUM: 052054
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA21:ZVKCMTCYM.TXT
A1 Folder: SEP94
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Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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PER E.O. 13526**

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Reunited

Ruanda 9/23/94

Burundi

Abdullah = upbeat Ruanda now got next week.

Ruanda - problem in S.E.

Support Hope

Total
- 450 - in Entebbe = 360
- 3 bigals

*

Press stat. today

- Draft Press stat. }

|| Clear cave dams
in face of
deluge in Zaire
+ Tanzania for camps
using excess

UNAMIR

- Ethiopians have all kinds of problems

Zaire - will

try to deploy

now delayed

by bad lift problems

moving (bigals 1587) equipment

• UN operating or assuming that they will get equipment

as it becomes available

Nigerians will self deploy

also Sept 30

260 people

• contingents - badly under-equipped

UNISN 3934 - refugees fr. UNAMIR (will over 25th)

Tunisia

20th - 32

2 weeks 600

will go concerned

Burundi - Abdalleh wants adequate radio.

Radios - date to come

India

150 - 30th

650 + 2 weeks

1st lift request yet

Lift request for Mali - were said yes!

slaved by black

will bring
an wheeled
ATC

Tunisia AF

Take from Gaus

- adding Russia
fr. others into
will leave

SA will sell

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Ad hoc Group:

- State (Ad) - 6 month plan

◦ Ad paper.

◦ cables not cleared adequately

3 of 7 Bosnian massacre sites → hasn't
fixed any ~~any~~ ^{any}.

With us w/ programming (not policy)

Tigali 1606

May see beginning, once he comes back.

↳ hopefully will return.

State 25423

War crimes (HR issues)

- Eng of 5 investigators under ~~UNHRC~~ UNHRC

- interim investigator head (= OS. attorney) → HR

- War crimes - FR/Russia & (aboard) expanding Yugoslavia tribunal
Commission of experts - repatriating

FR: objectives

- need different judges (FR-speaking)

- areas = different (Bosnian Rep/ War crimes - Bosnia)

- needs different (separate prosecution) effort (w/ legal)

Russia - wary, but why? - unclear

- may be wary

- get classification out of Moscow early before summit.

NZ offered
rep. proposal

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 26 September 94 16:27
FROM Rice, Susan E.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: RE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO Richardson, Craig
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Sounds good. Why don't you run with this. Ask eric for the appropriate contact person at DOD. It's likely to be someone in Pat Irvin's office, if not her. She's DAS for humanitarian. I don't know who the JS person would be. Again try Eric.

We survived the speech. The POTUS plugged Menem by name. All in all, considering, it's gone well. The BBG meeting was a success, and POTUS had a nice brief visit to the UN Situation Center, which was rewarding from my perspective. We had customary speech hell, but in the end, I think it was ok.

Thanks again for all your tremendous help. Your memo on White HELL is becoming the gospel on the subject. Congrats.

From: Richardson, Craig V.
To: Clarke, Richard A.; Rice, Susan E.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED] More White Helmets
Date: Monday, September 26, 1994 03:38 PM

I just spoke to Chat Blakeman -- really nice guy. He mentioned the line in the POTUS UNGA speech and suggested that "Looks like we are headed more toward your guys' view of White Helmets than the Peace Corp-type view." I agreed.

On Wednesday, Frijjero (Menem's envoy) is essentially meeting with the same crew that met last Friday at State. Chat proposes that we (1) arrange for a crisis response person from DOD to show up at that meeting or (2) arrange for a separate Frijjero visit to the DOD element that does -- say -- the Rwanda ops or (3) both. I said I thought this was a good idea, since it really doesn't make sense to have a Peace Corps type as interlocutor, in light of the POTUS speech.

Reactions? Suggestions? Who should be call at DOD?

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 October 94 23:37
FROM Steinberg, Donald K.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~ Update on Mandela
TO Cicio, Kristen K.
Darby, Melanie B.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Millison, Cathy L.
Reed, James W.
Sens, Andrew D.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wolin, Neal S.
Wright, Allison M.
CARBON_COPY Anderson, Marjorie
Atkin, Timothy J.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Blakeman, Earle C.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Feinberg, Richard E.
Harris, Elisa D.
Jensen-Moran, Jeri L.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Mazzuchi, Anthony D.
Norman, Marcia G.
Owen, Elisa J.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Rocha, Victor M.
Rossin, Larry
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Sartor, Cyril
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.
Steinberg, Donald K.
Teraji, Barbara
Marcel T. Thomas

Cathryn, Thorup L.
Turner, Veronica B.

TEXT_BODY

Nancy, Will and Others:

I spoke this evening with Hennie de Klerk, the Americas director for the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and honcho of the Mandela State Visit. He said that the President, Foreign Minister and others will be discussing various aspects of the visit tomorrow (Sunday) afternoon in New York, including the question of the radio address and the walk at the Lincoln Memorial. He said that the plan is now for Mandela to depart from Washington on Friday night after the S.A. Embassy's reception, which could complicate the radio address planning. He stressed there were no hard feelings over the change in Mandela's overnight plans on Tuesday, although he implied that Mandela had warmed up to the idea of staying at the White House and was actually looking forward to it....

We discussed the substance of the visit, including the 14 separate initiatives we plan to pursue, and he thought all of them were reasonable. He wanted to look at the language we planned to use and I faxed him a non-paper describing the initiatives. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d He left open the possibility of issuing a joint communique on behalf of the two governments or presidents describing some or all of the new initiatives.

Hennie affirmed that it would be good for the two Presidents to talk about Africa-wide issues, not just the bilateral relationship. He appreciated that President Clinton plans to thank Mandela for his initiatives in Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola. I mentioned some of our new initiatives vis-a-vis conflict resolution, demobilization of oversized African armies and debt relief -- he agreed that these might be good topics for the Presidents to discuss and to which they could publicly reaffirm their commitment. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

We talked about the Southern Africa Enterprise Development Fund. We agreed that the best way to handle the announcement of this Southern Africa-wide program is to have President Clinton announce it at the press availability on Wednesday with Andy Young (the new board director), Brian Atwood and the Ambassadors from the Southern African nations present.

(Dick/Larry) I asked about Haiti. He said that he does not yet have an

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answer as to what President Mandela will say. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(Elisa) I asked about MTCR. Hennie said he expected the agreement to be signed in Pretoria on Monday and that a quiet release would be issued there. He wasn't certain how the South Africans wanted the issue to be address publicly during the visit -- that is, whether they wanted to be congratulated on this step. He said he would get back to us on the issue.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

I'll be talking with Hennie again tomorrow afternoon if there's anything anyone would like me to raise with him.

Don

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Rwanda 10/5/94

Gen. Dallaire stg.

"Seemingly ideal PKO, w/ all ingredients for success" ... (nation ready to become such implementable ~~good~~ plan) ... becomes such a tragedy, we must reassess" + ask how to prevent replication of such things elsewhere in Africa.

- Africa has lot of potential to replicate this. \rightarrow significant problems for ~~future~~.

- still believe that UN=right tool, not leadership by indep. sovereign states. (Sovereign states that have capability should be held in reserve for extreme cases.)

- French operation saved lots of people, but Céleste scenario. Not the way to go (old colonial power, held by ~~as such~~)
- A waste of resources. Should have been used for later.
 - French should have equipped + used air AF batts. first.
- Such initiatives will continue to weaken UN

- If we continue to render UN ineffective, we'll pay the cost.
UN should be in Sierra Leone, Tanzania assisting Generalissimo Concessions, under UNL, protectors for good+bad guys. + HK monitors

- Not going in - flaws vs. all principles - int'l community sharing responsibility

flaws in camps want int'l community to hold off assistance to Kigali govt.

What do we do now?

Dallaire = 2 concepts

- 1) Sanify - use troops + civilpol. \rightarrow put on border. Fan out to more batt. into camp \rightarrow to: 1) protect HR members (camp 2) Repatriating
- 2) Don't allow camps to become permanent (martial support)

2 flight planes
- Concept A? Intend
- Operate (united) does to
6,500? *will be up to us*

Agree for
permanent, engaged
deployable army for UN!
- Permanent needs to
be deployable ~~full~~

- Kigali as magnet, mobile pts - along the way. will cost same
Costabilities

Total + 300 - withdraws to north

Face: 8,100 + 130 Cypol - will be able to do security job

equipping batts + NGOs could reconstruct infrastructure in Rwanda

- Tried to convince Schwada to bring in 2,000 humanitarian capability
- build infrastructure. Frustrated that US stayed @ Kigali airfield

- Need radio shs.

Interpositional?

Ch. VII?

Can SW troops do
headquarters? park

Concept - don't hit all camps simultaneously

- go first to Tanzania (consent + guarantee) \rightarrow Pre-look

- mission - set up disarming; securing of threatening people; do they detain?
- escort guards for relief/HR functions
- facilitate repatriation; establish secure atmosphere for camps
- pick up pt \rightarrow village = guaranteed safety

Observations

① He who has Rwanda surrounded as 3 flanks (Tanz, Burundi, Zaire)
- RPF couldn't counter effectively on 3 flanks.

② In initial aspect of operation, initial peace process w/ resistances for implementation, UN not able to meet those resistances, which never allowed peace process to get off ground. (UN couldn't move fast enough)
- By time UN in, situation had changed.

③ Need to prepare ground in Rwanda - building up some bases in Rwanda.

Jubilee's
concept =
being
enabled by
UN.
Rwanda v. France

active resistance
+ gain
what.

Need of discretionary
powers
for last clean
to settle the part.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 October 94 16:16
FROM Rice, Susan E.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Update on Funding for Rwanda's IFI Arrears
TO Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wolin, Neal S.
CARBON_COPY Atkin, Timothy J.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Lindsey, Wanda
Norman, Marcia G.
Owen, Elisa J.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Sartor, Cyril
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.
Steinberg, Donald K.

TEXT_BODY

NOTE FOR LAKE

State has agreed to provide \$2 mill. of the \$7.2 mill. required to pay off Rwanda's IFI arrears. State is demarching Germany and Belgium to make generous contributions as well. State hopes for responses by mid-late next week.

At this time, we will need to determine the amount of the remaining requirement, if any, and State may need to provide the balance. Depending on the size of the shortfall, State/AID may have to be "encouraged" to find the funds.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 11 October 94 17:13
FROM Atkin, Timothy J.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO Deshazer, Macarthur X.
CARBON_COPY Rice, Susan E.
TEXT_BODY

Mac:

At the Rwanda SVTS, not much new info today - FYI, there is drawdown authority for \$25M this fiscal year (95) specified for warcrimes tribunals but not country specific, so... the Rwanda portion can be funded from that too.

Arrears: State has identified \$2.5M and is prepping demarches to go out (maybe tomorrow) to seek other donors. OMB is confirming w/Treas that the total World Bank arrears is \$4.4M and not linked to the African Devt Bank arrears.

Security issues/UNAMIR mandate will be addressed by the peacekeeping core group later this week.

No SVTS on friday - next meeting will be next Tues at 1:00 pm.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 15 October 94 10:18
FROM Atkin, Timothy J.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal
TO Simon, Steven N.
CARBON_COPY Rice, Susan E.
TEXT_BODY

hi steve: the war crimes tribunal working group is focusing on putting together a \$3M voluntary contribution to jump start the establishment of the Rwanda portion of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal. So far, they have identified \$1M within the DOS budget that can (and is willing to be) reprogrammed for this function. Still trying to think of where \$2M more can come from!!???

Once the budget needs are id'd at the UN and approved in december, we will make our assessment contribution out of the \$25M of drawdown funds for war crimes tribunals.

Any thoughts about the start up contribution?????????????????????????

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UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Rwanda

DATE: 25 Oct 94

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM

Susan Varisco

212-415-4252

(Phone Number)

SUBJECT

UN Options: Rwanda

7

AGENCY	NAME	FAX#	PHONE #
NSC	Rice	(202) 395-1206	(202) 456-9351
AF	Bushnell/Hastin	(202) 647-0156	(202) 647-4493
IO/PHO	Loftis	(202) 647-0156	(202) 647-2708
XSOD/PPR	Gacespov	(703) 613-5521	(703) 615-2322
OSD/ISA	Kem	(703) 615-3355	* 703-611-9753
J-5/MEAF	Baltimore	(703) 617-0255	* 703-614-9407

REMARKS:

call first

denotes: confirming
slow/more of time
may look like U.S. client BTR - moving forward
 couple items outstanding

Bard (Paraguai) - have another log. unit, if necessary
 - do not visit - except. v. generally

Germany
 Ukraine
 India
 Turkey?
 Morocco
 Brazil
 Russia
 Korea

Office of Political Military Affairs
 US Mission to the United Nations
 799 UN Plaza
 New York, NY 10017

Phone# (212) 415-4333
 Unclass FAX# (212) 415-4154
 Class FAX# (212) (b)(7)c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

TO: Interagency Group on Rwanda

FROM: Susan Varisco

SUBJECT: Rwanda: UN Options for Security in the Camps

- Security for humans /
 help Paul
 - HR members
 - 25 October 1994
 - UN sponsored
 negotiations
 - organized
 - War Crimes
 - UN
 - members
 - review
 - part of
 - mandate
 - move to
 - do get
 - agent

DPKO has received several reports in the last week from the UN-Zaire Joint Working Group (led by the Deputy Force Commander of UNAMIR) and from SRSG Khan. USUN has not received copies of the reports, but has been briefed on their conclusions.

Jt. Working Group Conclusions:

UN Report

The initial report submitted by the UN participants concludes that a 10,000-12,000 size force is required to separate and move ~~desain~~ the militia, leaders, and the army and contain them thereafter. It also concludes that the only force capable of accomplishing this mandate is a strong national force or multinational force consisting mainly of one strong state.

Country, with no end in
 sight.

① *try w/ Carter* The report also stresses the need to start a political dialogue between refugee leaders and the Government of Rwanda as well as initiate significant social and economic reconstruction inside the country.

Joint Report

The formal report includes Zairian input, but contains a less substantive discussion of the options. It proposes three options:

- ② *no* o A purely diplomatic approach to removing military, militia and leaders from the camps.
- ③ *7. put down Zaireans
lot of it are which
Rej. d. have us* o Joint Zairian/UN and Tanzania/UN Ch VII operations. Zaire and Tanzania would have the leading role and the UN would provide logistical and other support.
- o The recommended option is a Ch VII national operation as described in the UN report above.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SRSG Recommendation:

(4) possible
In his initial submission the SRSG recommended a smaller UN force (size undefined). The force would provide security for humanitarian operations and attempt to "suppress" the militia through presence. Ch VII authority was recommended.

Khan also emphasized political dialogue and socioeconomic reconstruction as integral components of the operation.

w/ police

(5) 2nd
The SRSG submitted a second recommendation after DPKO requested a Ch VI option. He suggested a UN operation that would train Zairian and Tanzanian forces to police the refugee camps and protect humanitarian workers. This option would presumably include material assistance as well.

SYG Report:

possibly
but slow

After this week's interagency meeting, DPKO will develop its own report to submit to the Council. It will probably present a range of options based on the submissions of the Jt. Working Group and the SRSG and USG input.

no way
ever
"elite" troops
extremely ill-disciplined

Judgments

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Rwanda

Rwanda 10/25/94

Rising violence in SW

- RPF attacks; Threat to close down DP camps (harmless for interlocutors)
- Could spark panicked movement, clarify burning camps w/ UNAMIR
- began breaking off Prenats
- Refugee agreement signed on SAT (after 2000 arrivals Rwanda keeps -Tuguruwings to encourage voluntary repatriation) \$1430 mil. for 2 years
- Standard repatriation agreement
- But now has some access to camps.

Burundi

- violence in N. Burundi - haven't yet spread to Bujumbura
- RPA attacked refugee camps across border, killing 57 others.
- Apparent split w/ in RPA

Meeting in NYC 8pm.

Short term strategy paper - Preu

Economic Assistance Paris Areas Mtg (Thurs. Oct 27, 8pm.) US, Cdn, Belg.

totally = close to 9.5 mil. will pledge. (Belg w/ cond.) - maybe Germans Cdn \$3-5 mil. (not all \$ areas)

EF-FOR mission & what happens to UNHCR?

UN in MY

- ask UN off. plen to hand over log. funds when whitey leaves

X Presented ~~Unanticipated~~
~~Unforeseen~~ Needs
Funds

UNHCR

- 2 countries / 2ndaries
- 28% of 1st round of refugees (verified) not遣返 after 60 days
rest no agreement = early Nov
" w/ agreement = early Dec.
- 2 countries & Nov. (hope) w/ in 15-18 days
- UN teams → unable to work @ agreement

Withdrawal

- P. Nov. - Dec 1 UK off - logistics
- Canadians: Jan 25 (UN hope Right Cane 1st element) - Signals
- Australians - mid Feb. 95 (Hospital)

UN negotiations w/ Bkh = ongoing


War Crimes - IWB

- about to make 2nd contribution to commission experts of document
- contribution to support Tribunal in legal
- resolutions - tabled, indefinitely - procedures want capital punishment.
Tribunal wants life in prison
- No papers on it of war crimes - farred

UN Report

1 doc.

- want to know what options we have; what will provide
- Tell left hand





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EO 13526 3.5c

b7d

Intelligence Report

Office of African and Latin American Analysis

28 October 1994

Rwanda: Reassessing the Demographic Balance

3.5c

Since the systematic genocide between April and June 1994 of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda, a large influx of Tutsi exiles from neighboring states and the massive flight of Hutus appear to have boosted the Tutsi share of the population. We estimate that about 5.3 million people are now living within Rwanda's borders, approximately 11 percent of whom are Tutsis.

- More than 2 million Rwandans, mostly Hutus, have become refugees in neighboring states this year. Nearly as many are displaced within Rwanda, *and Rwandan Patriotic Front threats to forcibly close displaced person camps could drive many of these Hutus into exile as well.*
- The slaughter of an estimated 375,000 Tutsis earlier this year has been largely offset by the return of some 340,000 longtime Tutsi exiles, mainly from Burundi and Uganda. Most of Rwanda's surviving Tutsis are settling around Kigali and in the eastern part of the country, according to EO 13526 1.4c press reports. 3.5c

We expect this pattern to persist for the next year or two. The RPF, which dominates the new regime in Kigali, is based in the Tutsi diaspora and undoubtedly views the new demographic balance as tightening its grip on power and as protective of Tutsi ethnic interests. Top RPF leaders have publicly stated, for instance, that they could wait "50 years" for the Hutu refugees to return.

- *Most Hutu refugees appear unwilling to return home as long as the RPF is in charge.* EO 13526 1.4c individual Hutus fear retribution by Tutsis, and Hutu leaders want to keep refugees in the camps, where they form the political base for a self-styled Hutu government-in-exile. 3.5c

Over the longer run, however, Hutu refugees are likely to return, restoring a demographic balance similar to that of early 1994. All the neighboring states say that the refugees are an unacceptable burden and must be repatriated as soon as possible, according to EO 13526 1.4c press reports.

- *In particular Zaire--which is under the heaviest refugee burden and had close ties to the ousted Hutu regime--may eventually be tempted to support an anti-RPF insurgency by the Hutus at least partly as a way of inducing them to return home.* Uganda's President Museveni supported the RPF's insurgency in part to rid his country of unwanted Rwandan Tutsis. 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

2

ALA 94-40021

EO 13526 3.5c

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"Dead are the dogs and the rats, making way for the cows and the drum."

--Legend of the Tutsis' arrival in Rwanda, referring to symbols of wealth and sovereignty

A Look at the Key Variables

Overall Trends. Since the ethnic civil war resumed on 6 April 1994, we calculate from the admittedly incomplete and at times contradictory information available to us that the population living within Rwanda has dropped to 5.3 million, or by about 30 percent, from the 7.7 million inhabitants estimated by the US Census Bureau on 1 April.¹ This drop is the net effect of three main factors:

- *Flight by "new" refugees.* According to [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c US Government agencies, some 2.2 million Rwandans have left the country since April. Nearly all are ethnic Hutus who fled the Tutsi-dominated RPF as it gained control and formed a new government. Although an estimated 75,000 Tutsis left the country in April and May, relief agencies report that at least 60,000 of them have since returned.
- *Deaths.* In June, we estimated that 500,000 Rwandans had died in the fighting--about three-quarters of them Tutsis killed in a campaign of genocide orchestrated by the subsequently ousted regime.² Based on information available from [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c press reports, we calculate that since June another 80,000 or so Rwandans have died; most appear to be Hutus--victims of disease in refugee camps and, to a lesser extent, of Tutsis avenging the deaths of their kin.
- *Return of "old" refugees.* Somewhat offsetting the demographic impact of deaths and refugee flight, around 60 percent of the 545,000 longtime Rwandan Tutsi refugees residing in neighboring states have repatriated. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] 200,000 Tutsis have returned from Burundi alone. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] there has also been

¹Intelligence Report ALA 94-40002 (Confidential [redacted] 3.5c) of 23 June 1994, *Rwanda: Establishing the Demographic Baseline*, evaluated changes in the country's population between 6 April and 1 June 1994, with a particular focus on the Tutsi minority. We estimated then that 125,000 Hutus and 375,000 Tutsis--about 60 percent of the 628,000 Tutsis believed to have been in Rwanda on 1 April 1994--had been killed and that another 418,000 Rwandans had fled to neighboring states.

[redacted] 3.5c

²In a report issued on 28 June 1994, the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the UN Commission on Human Rights found on the basis of available evidence that "the term 'genocide' should henceforth be used as regards the Tutsi." [redacted] 3.5c

large-scale movement from Uganda and smaller flows from Tanzania and Zaire. These refugees fled ethnic clashes in Rwanda between 1959 and 1964, as Hutus ousted Tutsis from their traditional dominance; they and their children form the core of the RPF's leadership and military forces. [3.5c]

Likely Effects on Fertility and Mortality Rates

The massive demographic disruptions this year probably have reversed Rwanda's progress in reducing fertility rates since the early 1980s. The US Bureau of the Census says there was a decline from 8.5 children per woman in 1983 to about 6.2 children in 1994, reflecting both increased use of contraception and a rise in the average age of marriage. [EO 13526 1.4c] however, the fighting, genocide, and refugee flight destroyed most of the country's social infrastructure--almost certainly including the family planning network, whose restoration probably is not a high priority for the new RPF regime. In the Hutu refugee camps, contraception is almost completely unavailable, and [EO 13526 1.4c] [3.5c] up to 90 percent of refugee women of childbearing age are pregnant; this may also reflect widespread prostitution and rape in the camps' unsettled conditions. [3.5c]

The mortality rate among Rwandan populations probably also has increased, reflecting poor nutrition, illness, and other stresses associated with the mass migrations, as well as the destruction of health care facilities. In addition, these factors probably have boosted the rate of AIDS infection, which, according to the Census Bureau, accounted for the rise in the crude death rate increased from almost 17 per 1,000 in 1985 to an estimated 20 or more per 1,000 this year.

[3.5c]

In combination, these demographic changes, according to our calculations, have increased the proportion of Tutsis in Rwanda from around 8 percent to 11 percent--despite Hutu extremists' efforts last spring and summer to eliminate the group. Various sources report that most of the Tutsi returnees and survivors of the massacres in Rwanda are concentrating in a sort of "Tutsi-land" around Kigali and in the eastern prefectures of Kibungo and Byumba.³ [3.5c]

The Ethnic Angle

Rwanda's new demographic balance reflects deliberate policy choices by the RPF regime's leaders. [EO 13526 1.4c] RPF leaders have encouraged the repatriation of longtime Tutsi refugees from neighboring states--the constituency that has been the hardest core of the RPF's support--because of fear that Tutsis were spread too thin within Rwanda. [EO 13526 1.4c] [3.5c] the RPF is encouraging Tutsi repatriates to occupy the houses and other property of Hutu refugees, despite the government's public denunciation of such

³Until this year, according to Rwandan Government census data, the heaviest concentration of Tutsis was in the four southwestern prefectures, where the group accounted for about 15 percent of the population. This was the last region captured by the RPF, and we believe these Tutsis suffered particularly heavy losses. [3.5c]

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expropriations. The RPF probably views in a similar light the concentrated resettlement of Tutsis around Kigali and in the east, which bolsters the minority's ability to protect itself against future genocide attempts. 3.5c

The Hutu exodus appears to be a result of both political manipulation by leaders of the ousted Hutu regime and the security concerns of Hutu individuals and communities. Hutu government leaders who had orchestrated the massacre of Tutsis encouraged the massive flight of Hutus from the country--some 460,000 to Tanzania in April and more than 1 million to Zaire in July--in an apparent effort to deny legitimacy to the RPF, various reports say. Since mid-July, according to a variety of reporting, harsh crackdowns and Hutu fears of reprisals by RPF troops and Tutsi vigilantes--as well as possible threats from radical Hutu militiamen--have driven at least 80,000 into Tanzania, as well as smaller numbers who joined the refugees already in Zaire.⁴ 3.5c

UN agencies estimate that another 2 million Hutus are displaced within Rwanda, with the largest concentration in the southwest, where they fled to a humanitarian safe zone established during the French military deployment between July and September 1994. Like the refugees, these displaced persons fear RPF reprisals should they return home, and aid workers report that they appear resigned to remain in internal exile indefinitely.

• EO 13526 1.4c the RPF has threatened to close down camps sheltering some 800,000 displaced Hutus in the southwest because it views the displaced persons camps as safehavens for radical Hutu militiamen. Although UN pressure has led the RPF to back down from this threat for now, we judge that even the rumor of an RPF move against the camps could panic this skittish population into a mass exodus to Zaire and Burundi. 3.5c

Victims of a Lesser Genocide

Rwanda's smallest ethnic group--the pygmy Twa, marginalized hunters and gatherers who made up only about 0.4 percent of the population in April--appears to have suffered even greater losses in the fighting than the Tutsis and Hutus.

EO 13526 1.4c speculates that as many as three-quarters of the Twa population may have been murdered, and press reports indicate that Hutu refugees in Zaire are preventing their Twa countrymen from receiving food aid. This undoubtedly reflects Hutus' longstanding disdain for the Twa, who served Rwanda's traditional Tutsi overlords as court jesters, spies, and assassins.

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

Prospects and Implications

Trends Likely to Continue for Now... The RPF-dominated regime in Kigali has little incentive to change its ethnically driven policies. Even after the RPF is satisfied that all willing Rwandan Tutsis have taken advantage of their new right to return, the Front is not likely to encourage a large-scale repatriation of Hutus. Kigali says tens of thousands of Hutus are guilty of war crimes--which, taking into consideration their families, casts suspicions on hundreds of thousands of the refugees--and many Tutsis undoubtedly welcome a chance to give Hutus a taste of exile.

- Vice President Kagame--the regime's apparent strongman--has publicly said his government could wait "50 years" to seek justice against mass killers and settle the refugee issue; he says there is no need for haste in resolving the issue because of the international community's willingness to feed the refugees. 3.5c

✓ In any case, there are signs that many Hutus will remain unwilling to return to their homes in Rwanda as long as the RPF controls the government. Individual Hutus probably will continue to fear for their security because of widespread reports of RPF and Tutsi retribution, as evidenced by the fact that only a trickle have left refugee and displaced persons camps. Hutu leaders probably will persist in fostering these fears--continuing to use such tactics as physical threats and propaganda--in order to retain a political base for a self-styled government-in-exile.

- EO 13526 1.4c radical Hutu militias control the largest camps in Zaire and Tanzania, which they use for military training and as bases for raids into Rwanda.
- Hutu leaders and rank and file hope to eventually return in force to Rwanda to oust the RPF, but EO 13526 1.4c military commanders recognize that their troops will not be able to do so for some time. 3.5c

...But Are Unsustainable in the Longer Run. Although the international community is likely to continue providing enough food aid and other necessities to keep the Hutu refugees alive, we doubt that so many angry, dispossessed people can be kept in refugee camps indefinitely. Harsh conditions in the camps undoubtedly will lead some to overcome their fear of the RPF--and their own Hutu leaders--to repatriate spontaneously. 3.5c

Moreover, host governments in the region will become increasingly insistent that the Rwandans repatriate. The refugees represent an enormous strain on the limited resources and fragile environments of all the host states, and their presence has worsened chronic ethnic conflicts in Zaire and Burundi.

- Kinshasa and Dar Es Salaam have both said they want the refugees gone as soon as possible, according to press EO 13526 1.4c reports.
- EO 13526 1.4c Burundi's Tutsi military commanders have identified the Rwandan Hutu refugees there as the greatest security threat to the coalition government in Bujumbura.

P

Secret

- The longer this huge refugee population burdens Rwanda's neighbors, the greater the chance in our view that at least one of them—particularly Zaire, which has received the largest group and had close ties to the ousted Hutu regime—would support an anti-RPF insurgency at least partly as a way to send the refugees home. Uganda's President Museveni supported the RPF's insurgency in part to rid his country of unwanted Rwandan Tutsis. 3.5c

6

~~Secret~~


ANNEX 1

Rwanda: The Demographic Score Card, 1 April-1 October 1994

	Total	Hutu	Tutsi	Twa (Thousands)
Population on 1 April 94				
Numbers	7,657	6,998	628	31
Percentage	100.0%	91.4%	8.2%	0.4%
Less:				
Deaths	585	195	375	15
Deaths through 6/94	510	125	375	10
Refugee deaths since 7/94	65	60	0	5
RPF revenge killings	10	10	0	0
Outflows of "New Refugees"	2,155	2,135	15	5
to: Tanzania	542	537	5	0
Zaire	1,332	1,317	10	5
Burundi	270	270	0	0
Uganda	11	11	0	0
Plus:				
Return of "Old" Refugees	339	0	339	0
from: Burundi	200	0	200	0
Uganda	100	0	100	0
Tanzania	19	0	19	0
Zaire	20	0	20	0
Population on 1 October 94				
Numbers	5,258	4,868	577	11
Percentage	100.0%	88.8%	11.0%	0.2%
Memorandum Items:				
--Internally displaced	2,000	0		
--"Old" Refugees in Other Countries	0	206		
--Burundi	0	45		
--Uganda	0	100		
--Tanzania	0	31		
--Zaire	0	30		

Changes in Population Inside Rwanda
1 April - 1 October 1994


(in Millions)



EO 13526 3.5c

9

Rwandan Population Movements, April-October 1994



EO 13526 3.5c

PREPARED 25 OCTOBER 94

10

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Rwanda 10/31/94

8569 1
Open. News

St Rep

X border raids

- FAR may attack within days
- refugees preparing to return by force (possibly even via Tanzania)
 - RPF may also precipitate strikes

Internally, RPF placing military training w/ Ugandan Army

- use in robbery for revenge killing anyone RPA b/c not paid.

- beat up Cdr - Pls

- Taking hard lines on Rwandan War Crimes

** - all or nothing

- issues = death penalty, amnesty, location of trials


- many don't (IN P.R.) don't care if Tribunal

- can never back down from death penalty

Rwandans - fragile peace

- with to call bagans
- ABSTENTION = suicide

- RPA hardliners planning to est. own army



Rwandans - in doubt when UNHCR mandate covers up for renewal

^{UNHCR} - make ~~more~~ ^{more} comprehensive to cover all aspects

- another vote = raise troop ceiling

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 02 November 94 09:13
FROM Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: How I spent my day in New York ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Emery, Mary C.
Wolin, Neal S.
CARBON_COPY Atkin, Timothy J.
Beers, Rand R.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Norman, Marcia G.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Rossin, Larry
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.

TEXT_BODY
FOR BERGER

Readout of meetings with Kofi Annan et al on Tuesday.

1. On Haiti: Kofi can't get BBG to focus on the Schroeder appointment while BBG is travelling. He will return around 11 November. Suggest we recommend to JCS getting Schroeder over here as a TDY advisor to Shali.

They are thinking of a hand over date in early February. USACOM is also recommending that date to Shali.

They like the idea of an all day conference on the US/UN transition, which we would host on or about the 14th.

2. On Somalia: They are pleased with the work being done by the three US planners. The Council should pass the withdrawal resolution this week. They NEED a decision soon on the US role in the withdrawal.

3. On Rwanda: I'll submit a detailed report to Tony. Bottom line: they will propose several options to the Council, while we and they together recruit someone to send a highly capable battalion plus into the Zaire area

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 16, 1994

*Rwanda*INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

RICHARD CLARKE

FROM:

TIMOTHY J. ATKIN

SUBJECT: Briefing by Former UNAMIR Commander

Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of UNAMIR forces until last month, gave a briefing yesterday at the Canadian Embassy. He discussed potential UN reforms and the future of Rwanda.

Proposed UN Reforms

1. Establish a Secretary General's contingency fund for rapid funding and procurement in crises and reform the administrative and logistics system to be able to respond to emergencies.
2. Develop a course to train a multi-disciplinary senior crisis management staff (force commanders, chiefs-of-staff, etc). He projects that there will be a need to integrate peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance functions in almost all future UN missions.
3. Establish a standby, emergency response military force (U.S. should NOT/NOT be a part of this force) with a deployable HQ unit. He believes the superpowers should not be a part of this force but their involvement would be a final threat/hammer should it be necessary.
4. Improve information and intelligence capabilities. He relayed he received virtually none from the UN, in any capacity, during his operations in Rwanda.
5. Have an umbrella humanitarian agency coordinate NGOs and military relief capabilities. He talked of the CNN factor in Goma leading to a deluge of NGO activity ultimately becoming a resource center for ex-government officials. Meanwhile, other camps were neglected leading to worse conditions in camps inside Rwanda. Some medical military support efforts were shunned by NGOs to avoid association.

6. Develop an international media agency and be proactive in the propaganda war. He credits the radio propaganda effort by the Hutus as the single largest contributor to the resulting genocide. These countries live by the radio and the message was never countered. The Hutus continue to effectively control all communications with their radio broadcasts.

7. Give and use the authority and capability to conduct "offensive" or deterrent military operations. He noted this can be done under Chapter VI with properly constructed rules of engagement. Chapter VII should be reserved for action against an aggressor. As an example of a deterrent action, he believes forcibly destroying the radio stations propagating messages of genocide at the beginning would have helped dramatically.

[Items 1, 4, 5 and 6 are being addressed, with some variation, through PDD 25 implementation.]

Rwanda's Future

General Dallaire is still optimistic a coalition government is possible but only AFTER leaders of the genocide begin to end up in jail.

He's concerned that, worst case scenario, the GOR could shut its borders at some point, locking out refugees who have not returned, and then there would be a waiting game to see when Hutus attempt to retake all or part of Rwanda.

He argued strongly that the GOR needs the financial resources to function as a government. Proportionately, too much aid is going outside the country, and this is causing deep resentment.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY *Rwanda*

Rwanda

12/6/94

- SIRREP

- Alaquist on Burundi. Tutsi extremists cracking down on Hutus in N.
Tutsi political leaders wait recognition. Hutu leaders in just
- Attack on refugee camp in Zaire. Threatening office.

OSD Kagame Visit Dec. 11 -

10:30 Dec. 12 Full Hanoi

Plenary } w/ Sec. Def.

Lunch - will invite Moose to attend

Postage for

Dot during security, protocol,
annual. in coordination
w/ State

13:30 - 14:30 Lab (Tina Atkin / Steinberg)

DTA

Any V. Clif of Staff
Any-hosted dinner

Dec. 13

13-1400 - Witz, Shattuck, Daley

15-1600 - Moose

4-5:00 - State/AF dinner
A/s Bennett

Embassy Nairobi

to send help to Kenya

DPR, HR meetings,

cartoon

Dec. 14 = Congressional Day

Visit ends 15, maybe 16 (unofficially)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Carey wants to do
DP camps
- HR monitors
- UNHCR

Keep POC, in NY to meet SJC + UNHCR - Carey

- because in NY at roughly same time

Regional refugee conference - Dec. 10th → many countries not happy

2nd Friends of Rwanda in NY. Friday 16th in AD. - same as in Nov. 22.
+ Spain, if they contribute

UN - for ESF expns

grant agent presented to Rwandan chargé. (agreed by AD/GOR)

2nd - flight signature in next 2-3 days
- refurbish of minister (set of existing \$) → goes straight to Wald Polle
- conditions

- POC UNHCR
- unrestricted access to UNHCR
HR monitoring

UNHCR update - more available

Special Envoy - can't discuss until US/UN - in

Rodrigos - ?

· Canning wants to take a liberal view of 607 Refugee Schools (FONE!!)

We can provide DD school supplies + medical consumables
(desks, chairs) → Rwanda.

- DD would fly in.

Possible delivery assistance → DD and
TOMT possible

- Salaries
- Logistics or UNHCR.

State support??

Have to spend
→ on Rwanda

PRM = 950 mill spent in last yr.

Less or camps ▷ do we cut aid to refugees
+ DPO?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9732

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 9, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ~~RICHARD~~ CLARKE
DONALD STEINBERG *sk*

FROM: SUSAN *sk* RICE/TIMOTHY *J* ATKIN

SUBJECT: Update on the Situation in Rwanda and Briefing for
Your Meeting with Rwandan Vice President and
Defense Minister Paul Kagame

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

NOTED

SITUATION UPDATE:

Prime Minister Twagiramungu visited Washington last week for World Bank meetings. He also met with U/S Tarnoff, A/S Moose, A/S Bennet, AID Administrator Atwood, and Don Steinberg. The GOR has established a human rights division in the Justice of Ministry and Twagiramungu indicated a point person would be named shortly to head this division. Twagiramungu also said the GOR would cooperate with the international tribunal, give free access to UNAMIR and the human rights monitors, and grant broadcast authority to UNAMIR radio.

In private conversations with DAS Bushnell, she said Twagiramungu talked of Hutu/Tutsi tensions within the GOR and the need for a more genuine inclusion of Hutus in decision making and power sharing.

UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS

Last week the UN Security Council extended UNAMIR's mandate ~~by~~ through June 9, 1995. The resolution included two "new" tasks which, in fact, UNAMIR has been conducting for some months: (1) provision of security for war crimes investigators and human rights monitors; and, (2) assistance in establishing and training a new, integrated national police force.

The Security Council also voted positively on a Presidential Statement requesting more information from the Secretary General on refugee camp security. The focus of camp security would be to create an environment from which refugees could repatriate.

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Declassify on: OADR

GOR EFFORTS

Kagame told UNHCR the RPA will not use coercion to close IDP camps as long as the UN works toward camp closure. Recent reports suggest the GOR is now working with the UN to coordinate and encourage the closure of these camps.

While the RPA has granted UNAMIR/UNHRC monitors access in most areas, there are still local level confrontations from time to time.

Human Rights Watch notes that while prison conditions in Rwanda are grim, there is no evidence that detainees are being tortured or abused.

Embassy Kigali points out that the first group of ex-FAR officers to have indoctrination and political training is scheduled to be integrated into the RPA this month. There is also a GOR/UNICEF initiative to demobilize "child" soldiers and enroll them in schools.

MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME

On Tuesday, December 13, you will meet with Rwandan Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame at 2:00 p.m. in your office. The Rwandan delegation, escorted by Vince Kern from OSD, will include Kagame and two advisors. Attendees from the NSC will include Nancy Soderberg, Richard Clarke, Donald Steinberg and Susan Rice. Talking points are summarized at Tab I and a table of USG support for Rwanda is at Tab II.

Your goal during this meeting is to obtain a pledge from Vice President Kagame to move forward on several fronts while pledging U.S. support (as indicated in brackets):

1. Name a point person to head human rights division of Ministry of Justice and allow UNAMIR/UNCHR monitors complete and unimpeded access inside Rwanda. **[\$2.5M to the World Bank to clear arrears, which would produce approximately \$50M for governance. Continued support of nutrition, water, seed and shelter programs -- several million.]**
2. Authorize UNAMIR radio to operate, cooperate with the International Tribunal, establish more effective discipline among RPF troops and mechanisms for dealing with land disputes. **[Provision of equipment, technical services and rebuilding of infrastructure for the Ministry of Justice. Approximately \$600K.]**
3. Personally advocate and instill throughout all elements of the government the fundamental principle of civilian control of

the military. [Provision of technical military assistance, i.e. a demining program.]

4. Continue efforts to reintegrate moderate Hutus into the military and government and work with the UN to relocate internally displaced Rwandans. [Provision of equipment, technical services and rebuilding of infrastructure for the Ministry of Agriculture, Health, Finance, and Plans/Environment. Approximately \$500K per ministry.]

5. Encourage and respect the rights of refugees repatriating to Rwanda. [Provision of community based support for nutrition, water, shelter and community services -- rebuilding of schools and clinics within communities to which refugees return. Unable to figure dollar amount right now but easily will be in the millions.]

VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME'S AGENDA

There is potential for Kagame to seek an end to the UN ban on exporting arms and military equipment to Rwanda. He will likely argue that continued support of the ban indicates the U.S. supports the Hutus in Zaire.

IF ASKED: Rwanda has suffered enough from war and more arms are certainly not the answer. The proper focus should be on reconciliation with moderates and rehabilitation of government services.

While current law prohibits the U.S. from providing military assistance to Rwanda this year, we could consider future aid focused on fostering good civil/military relations (i.e. a demining program).

Kagame is likely to request a meeting with Vice President Gore as a test of the political waters. President Bizimungu met with you and did not meet with the President during his visit in October.

IF ASKED: Not possible in the Vice President's schedule ~~during~~ at this time.

Kagame hopes to generate positive media coverage of his trip, explaining that the GOR is discouraging retribution for recent genocide and Rwanda is open to foreign business.

Attachments

Tab I Talking Points

Tab II U.S. Assistance to Rwanda Chart

Meeting with Rwandan Vice President Kagame
December 13, 1994
2:00 p.m.

SHARED GOALS:

- I had the pleasure of meeting with President Bizimungu when he came to Washington in October.
- It is clear from my conversation with him that our governments share the same objectives of peace and reconciliation for Rwanda.
- It is also clear that many challenges confront us: ensuring accountability for the genocide and other atrocities, creating a sense of security in and around Rwanda, creating conditions favorable for refugee return, establishing a political dialogue, and assuring representative government.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA:

- We are committed to assisting you with each of these challenges.
- As you know, we have identified \$2.5M to pay off your government's World Bank arrears. Through an informal "friends" group we have organized, we are encouraging and coordinating other donor's assistance.
- In addition to a tremendous amount of work through multilateral institutions and with other donors, we are planning how to most expeditiously implement a bilateral development assistance package of \$9M. This package will help in the refurbishing of key ministries, including equipment, technical services and the rebuilding of basic infrastructure.
- Much of the money the U.S. has spent INSIDE Rwanda since the war (tens of millions) has gone to meet basic human needs as food, water and shelter, in addition to seeds and tools for your people to sustain themselves. As more people leave displaced and refugee camps, our assistance will shift to helping them redevelop their communities (community buildings and services).

- Our assistance people on the ground in Rwanda are working closely with your Ministry of Justice to re-establish your domestic judicial system.

NEXT STEPS FOR THE GOR

- Our ability to help Rwanda meet its challenges is limited; yours is more important and, accordingly, expectations are high.
- It is necessary to create a climate of security and respect for the rule of law inside Rwanda. This includes naming a point person as the head of the human rights division in the Ministry of Justice, finding effective mechanisms to resolve property disputes, and maintaining discipline among your troops.
- It is important to instill throughout all elements of the government the fundamental principle of civilian control of the military. You are in a unique position to see that this message is heard and followed.
- We welcome continued cooperation between your government and the UN to develop a coherent plan for the voluntary return of displaced people from internal camps. Forcible closure of the camps and the associated violence negatively affects reconciliation efforts and support from the international community. Part of communicating these efforts could be the use of UNAMIR radio; you need to authorize its broadcasts and identify a frequency immediately.
- The unimpeded access of UNAMIR and human rights monitors is vitally important to the reconciliation process and the continued support of the international community as well.

AREAS OF COOPERATION:

- As we work together on the challenges facing your government we must also deal with the very real problem of continuing violence and intimidation in the refugee camps outside Rwanda.
- We agree some action must be taken and are discussing the issue at length with the UN and the Rwanda operational support group. We hope to have a UN strategy soon, one that supports repatriation.

- We urge continued cooperation with your neighbors and strong support for convening a regional refugee conference to address camp security and other issues.
- We are also committed to ensuring that those responsible for the genocide are brought to justice and welcome your government's cooperation with the International Tribunal. We have committed \$1M to help speed up the tribunal efforts and will have 18 USG experts on the ground in Rwanda very soon.

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Action Items
APNSA Trip To Rwanda Dec 94

1. Ensure prompt delivery of \$2.5M to clear World Bank arrears and urge rapid obligation of \$50M in World Bank reconstruction funds;
2. Obligate funds to support Rwandan Government, including help for National Assembly, water supply, electricity, demining education;
3. Continue to urge reconciliation and integration between Government and moderate ex-government ministers (who have standing with refugees);
4. Continue U.S. support for International War Crimes Tribunal, urge appointment of other justices;
5. Ensure deployment of 147 UN Human Rights Monitors;
6. Continue consideration of options for improving security in refugee camps, including working more closely with Zaire and Tanzania, and possibly provide foreign trainers for local gendarmerie; explore approach to Zaire with, through or supported by Israelis;
7. Encourage UN and Rwandan government efforts to provide for security for displaced persons returning to their villages;
8. Continue to ensure human rights observers have free access country-wide;
9. Find more ways to publicize reconciliation progress, in camps and in Washington; UNAMIR radio;
10. Continue to press government to provide for safe return and protect rights of refugees;
11. Status of Mr. Gacombitsi.

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
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0583

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 29, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

RICHARD CLARKE

PAK
RON STEINBERG

FROM:

TIMOTHY J. ATKIN/SUSAN RICE

SUBJECT:

Rwanda Update

UN Report on Camp Security

The Secretary General released his Second Report on Security in the Rwandan Refugee Camps January 27, 1995. In consultation with Mrs. Ogata, the Secretary General decided the quickest way to improve camp security would be for UNHCR to make appropriate arrangements with Zaire.

The report notes it has traditionally been host country responsibility to provide security for refugees. On January 27, UNHCR and Zairian government representatives signed a security agreement. The agreement covers five months with the option for three month renewals until December 1995. UNHCR will pay soldiers a salary complement and provide uniforms and equipment at an estimated cost of \$13M (raised by voluntary donation). UNHCR will also establish a liaison group to provide training and logistical support. The pact calls for 1500 Zairian troops to:

- maintain law and order in the camps;
- prevent intimidation of refugees who wish to return home and escort returning refugees as far as the Rwandan border; and,
- protect humanitarian agency installations and personnel.

UNHCR is relying on USG backing for and financial support of this proposal. It would be helpful, at an Ad Hoc level, to establish the level of USG assistance.

The Secretary General ruled out peacekeeping, contracted training and monitors, and international police monitors/military observers because of a lack of contributing countries and/or costs.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Refugee Repatriation and the Volcanoes

The likelihood of a volcanic eruption near Goma provides an opportunity to press refugee repatriation. The present level of activity seen in one volcano has been experienced five times in the last 10 years; the volcano has erupted each time.

Our new Rwanda coordinator, Ambassador Townsend Freidman, met last week with Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, acutely aware of the potential danger, has stepped up monitoring of the volcanoes' activities and is drawing up evacuation contingency plans. At the same time, UNHCR is exploring the possibility of moving the camps 30 miles north in Zaire. Friedman urged UNHCR to use the volcano threat to encourage repatriation. While he found some receptivity among mid-level UNHCR officials, there seems to be little enthusiasm at high levels for induced repatriation.

We continue to stress to Friedman the importance of repatriation as opposed to camp relocation. He and others in State are focused on the possibility that the international community will be culpable if the volcano erupts and masses of Rwandans and relief workers are killed. Thus, State is more concerned with moving the refugees away from Goma in general rather than back into Rwanda in particular.

State is drafting an options paper for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a strong push on this one. If you approve an Ad Hoc Meeting, we will add this to the agenda.

UNAMIR

The Ethiopians have indicated they may pull their battalion out of UNAMIR. They are frustrated with the absence of vision and direction for UNAMIR (measured in part by a lack of refugees returning), and with slow payment by the UN. We have pressed the UN and the U/SYG Annan has personally overseen payment to the Ethiopians. We and the UN are stressing to the Ethiopians the importance of their participation and strongly urging troop rotation in mid-February rather than withdrawal.

International War Crimes Tribunal

Justice Goldstone has a four member team in Kigali to finalize arrangements. We anticipate the permanent seat to be up and running around the end of February in Arusha with a small contingent in Kigali. The USG has already ordered computer equipment for the tribunal headquarters.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

To help offset USG agency resource demands of the Rwandan tribunal, State has been pressing the UN to reimburse the U.S. for some Yugoslav tribunal detailees and believes we are close to securing that commitment. At this point DOJ and FBI have resisted providing any investigators for the Rwandan Tribunal. If the tribunal is to begin operating next month we need to identify investigators quickly. It would be problematic if the USG were seen as less committed to investigating atrocities in an African country than in the former Yugoslavia. State believes a call by you to Attorney General Reno is necessary to achieve DOJ/FBI support. Proposed talking points are at Tab I.

AID Efforts

AID indicates the Kigali mission will be operating this week and should accelerate their efforts. AID has been reluctant to tackle the most critical need in Rwanda's justice system:

- funding foreign jurists to adjudicate criminal cases; and,
- technical assistance to the National Commission charged with making administrative determinations about the appropriateness of detaining the 10,000+ criminals in overcrowded prisons.

AID believes U.S. assistance in resolving criminal cases is problematic and could be a lose-lose proposition. If the criteria for release are interpreted too stringently we could be blamed for stalling reconciliation, and if those released are publicized as legitimate criminals we could be blamed for watering down the justice system.

Furthermore, AID believes there may be a legislative prohibition on helping the National Commission (if it's deemed as law enforcement assistance). If so, we could use a legislative exception or presidential waiver to provide the assistance.

The decision regarding appropriateness of USG support for these elements of Rwanda's judicial program is reportedly with Brian Atwood and may need to be discussed at an Ad Hoc meeting.

Military Equipment and Training

State and DOD indicated they are moving forward on providing some initial IMET training in FY95.

DOD has proposed redrafting the UNSC arms embargo to authorize the provision of non-lethal support for the Rwandan military (communications and logistics equipment). State is drafting an issues paper. This will need to be resolved at the Ad Hoc level.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

Intelligence indicates around a dozen APCs missing from Zairian containment areas are likely in ex-FAR control. State has moved slowly to have the UN press Zaire to control the vehicles, return them to Rwanda or destroy them (with GOR approval). State is developing a review of the options and the impact of the arms embargo and international law.

The DATT in Kigali is scheduled to depart next month and no replacement is identified or anticipated. We must have a DATT in Kigali. OSD is working closely with DIA but may require high level attention to break the bureaucratic roadblocks.

Next Steps

The last Ad Hoc meeting was November 29, 1994. An Ad Hoc meeting this week would help rejuvenate the interagency process and clarify direction on USG assistance for the Zairian security force, refugee repatriation, criminal justice system support and arms embargo status. A U.S. delegation departs February 10th for the regional refugee conference in Bujumbura.

RECOMMENDATION

That you contact the Attorney General and encourage support for the War Crimes Tribunal.

Approve Disapprove

That you agree to an Ad Hoc Meeting this Thursday or Friday with the agenda at Tab II.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Talking Points for Call to Attorney General
Tab II Agenda for Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed Agenda
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda

- I. Situation Update.....CIA
- II. Camp Security.....State
 - level of USG assistance
- III. Refugee Repatriation.....State
 - volcano contingency plans
 - camp relocation vs. repatriation
- IV. Administration of Justice.....AID
 - status of equipment, ministry rehab
 - criminal justice issues
- V. Military Weapons/Training.....State/DOD
 - IMET status
 - Arms embargo changes
 - Zairian controlled APCs
- VI. Conclusions.....NSC

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0583REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

January 31, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD CLARKE
DON STEINBERG

FROM: TIMOTHY J. ATKIN/SUSAN STACE

SUBJECT: Rwanda Update

UN Report on Camp Security

The Secretary General released his Second Report on Security in the Rwandan Refugee Camps January 27, 1995. In consultation with Mrs. Ogata, the Secretary General decided the quickest way to improve camp security would be for UNHCR to make appropriate arrangements with Zaire.

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The Secretary General ruled out peacekeeping, contracted training and monitors, and international police monitors/military observers because of a lack of contributing countries and/or costs.

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Operation Retour

As of January 26, over 22,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their home communes via transport and unofficial reports estimate another 20,000 have returned on foot. Open Relief Centers (ORCs) are set up in the communes to provide temporary assistance and, in the case of land tenure disputes, shelter. Most ORCs are receiving little use as people return home directly and the majority of land tenure cases are being resolved in a few days.

Refugee Repatriation and the Volcanoes

The likelihood of a volcanic eruption near Goma in February or March provides an opportunity to press refugee repatriation. The present level of activity seen in one volcano has been experienced five times in the last 10 years; the volcano has erupted each time.

Our new Rwanda coordinator, Ambassador Townsend Friedman, met last week with Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, acutely aware of the potential danger, has stepped up monitoring of the volcanoes' activities and is drawing up evacuation contingency plans. At the same time, UNHCR is exploring the possibility of moving the camps 30 miles north in Zaire. Friedman urged UNHCR to use the volcano threat to encourage repatriation. While he found some receptivity among mid-level UNHCR officials, there seems to be little enthusiasm at high levels for induced repatriation.

We continue to stress to Friedman the importance of repatriation as opposed to camp relocation. He and others in State are focused on the possibility that the international community will be culpable if the volcano erupts and masses of Rwandans and relief workers are killed. Thus, State is more concerned with moving the refugees away from Goma in general rather than back into Rwanda in particular.

State will finish an options paper by noon Thursday for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a strong push on this one.

UNAMIR

The Ethiopians indicated they may pull their battalion out of UNAMIR. They are frustrated with the absence of vision and direction for UNAMIR (measured in part by a lack of refugees returning), and with slow payment by the UN. We have pressed the UN and the U/SYG Annan has personally overseen payment to the Ethiopians. We and the UN are stressing to the Ethiopians the

importance of their participation and strongly urging troop rotation in mid-February rather than withdrawal.

International War Crimes Tribunal

Justice Goldstone has a four member team in Kigali to finalize arrangements. We anticipate the permanent seat to be up and running around the end of February in Arusha with a small contingent in Kigali. The USG has already ordered computer equipment for the tribunal headquarters.

While DOJ and FBI have not yet provided any investigators for the Rwandan Tribunal, while talking with Nancy, Jamie Gorelick assured us DOJ is supportive. To address DOJ concerns and help offset USG agency resource demands of the Rwandan tribunal, State has been pressing the UN to reimburse the U.S. for some Yugoslav tribunal detainees and believes we are close to securing that commitment. At DOJ's request in November, we ensured that security for investigators was added in UNAMIR's mandate.

AID Efforts

AID indicates the Kigali mission will be operating this week and should accelerate their efforts. AID has been reluctant to tackle the most critical need in Rwanda's justice system:

- funding foreign jurists to adjudicate criminal cases; and,
- technical assistance to the National Commission charged with making administrative determinations about the appropriateness of detaining the 10,000+ criminals in overcrowded prisons.

AID believes U.S. assistance in resolving criminal cases is problematic and could be a lose-lose proposition. If the criteria for release are interpreted too stringently we could be blamed for stalling reconciliation, and if those released are publicized as legitimate criminals we could be blamed for watering down the justice system.

Furthermore, AID believes there may be a legislative prohibition on helping the National Commission (if it's deemed law enforcement assistance). If so, we could use a legislative exception or presidential waiver to provide the assistance.

The decision regarding appropriateness of USG support for these elements of Rwanda's judicial program is reportedly with Brian Atwood and may need to be discussed at an Ad Hoc meeting.

Military Equipment and Training

State and OSD are researching if amended legislation for **IMET training** will get through Congress or whether a Presidential waiver may be required.

OSD has proposed redrafting the **UNSC arms embargo** to authorize the provision of non-lethal support for the Rwandan military (communications and logistics equipment). State is drafting an issues paper. This will need to be resolved at the Ad Hoc level.

Intelligence indicates around a dozen **APCs missing** from Zairian containment areas are likely in ex-FAR control. State has moved slowly to have the UN press Zaire to control the vehicles, return them to Rwanda or destroy them (with GOR approval). State is developing a review of the options and the impact of the arms embargo and international law.

The **DATT in Kigali** is scheduled to depart next month and no replacement is identified or anticipated. Walt Slocombe and the DIA Administrator hope to resolve this issue Wednesday.

Next Steps

The last Ad Hoc meeting was November 29, 1994. An Ad Hoc meeting this week would help rejuvenate the interagency process and clarify USG direction regarding assistance for the Zairian security force, refugee repatriation, criminal justice system support and the arms embargo.

A U.S. delegation departs February 10th for the regional refugee conference in Bujumbura.

RECOMMENDATION*Wed.*

That you agree to an Ad Hoc Meeting ~~this Friday~~ with the agenda at Tab I.

Approve JP Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Agenda for Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting

DCI

National Intelligence Council

Rwanda

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

**Rwanda-Burundi: Still on the
Brink**

3.5c

Summary

More widespread violence between Hutus and the Tutsi minority could engulf Rwanda and Burundi at any time in the next year. Growing militancy among Hutus in Zairian and Tanzanian refugee camps poses a security threat to the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), relief workers, and the host countries. Most Hutu refugees are unlikely to return to Rwanda because they believe that the RPF is killing returnees. The Tutsis view the military as their only protection from another round of Hutu-led genocide and will probably continue to use tough security measures that risk widening the humanitarian crisis and conflict. 3.5c

In Burundi, hundreds have died in ethnic clashes in the past few months, while maneuvers by the Hutu ruling party and the Tutsi-led opposition strain a UN-brokered power-sharing accord. Several incendiary issues could spark a coup or ignite an ethnic conflagration. 3.5c

International mediators have had some effect in moderating conflict, but Hutus and Tutsis alike still believe that they are in a zero-sum game of ethnic survival. Policing the Rwandan refugee camps and negotiating a Hutu-Tutsi settlement enjoy the broadest support from the international community, but many Hutus and Tutsis find even these solutions contentious. No option can succeed if strongly opposed by either the RPF or Hutu leaders.

3.5c

Secret

SE 95-5
January 1995


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SPECIAL ESTIMATE

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Rwandan Refugees and Displaced Persons, Late 1994



Rwanda: Hutus and the RPF Digging In Deeper

Hutus Going Nowhere for Now. Most of the estimated 2 million Hutu refugees in Zaire and Tanzania are not likely to return to Rwanda soon, unless compelled to leave the camps by force or because of major food shortages. At the same time, they are prevented by force from moving farther into their host countries. Most refugees appear to remain loyal to the ousted Hutu government, which orchestrated the genocide of at least 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. This *de facto* government-in-exile controls the refugee camps and the distribution of most relief aid and has convinced most Hutus that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) will kill them if they return home. 3.5c

Growing Hutu militancy in the camps is a threat to aid workers and host countries. Some 35,000 Hutu soldiers from the defeated regime's army and 20,000 militiamen operate in or near the refugee camps and occasionally skirmish with Zairian and Tanzanian security forces. Some conduct cross-border raids, in hope of provoking an anti-RPF uprising in Rwanda. The militias also use the displaced person (DP) camps in Rwanda as bases for attacks on the RPF and sympathizers. 3.5c

RPF Hanging Tough. The RPF is more concerned about security and seeking justice against Hutu mass murderers than bringing Hutu refugees home. RPF troops and Tutsi civilians have committed some revenge killings against Hutu civilians accused of murdering Tutsis, and the regime has jailed some 20,000 suspected participants in the genocide. 3.5c

The RPF has no qualms about deploying its 50,000 troops to quash potential threats. It is shutting down the DP camps, which shelter

2 million Hutus inside Rwanda. This could trigger a new mass exodus of refugees. Kigali is also threatening to strike against the Hutu camps in eastern Zaire if Zairian and international authorities fail to halt Hutu military operations there. 3.5c

Burundi: Another Flashpoint

Deep-seated differences between the Hutu ruling party and the Tutsi-led opposition are increasing the likelihood of a major ethnic flareup in Burundi, as both test a UN-brokered power-sharing agreement. More than 350 Burundians have died in ethnic clashes since October 1994, with the incidents spreading into Bujumbura from the northern border region. Tutsi extremists are plotting to murder dozens more prominent moderate Hutus, and Hutu radicals have targeted President Ntibantunganya—a Hutu—and other government leaders they consider traitors. 3.5c

Powersharing Falters. Despite a power-sharing agreement awarding them virtual veto power, the Tutsi-led army and opposition hardliners have mounted coup attempts and legal challenges against the government. Meanwhile, radical Hutus have demanded an immediate transfer of all power to the majority. In December, political maneuvering threatened to splinter the multiparty government. Tutsi pressure forced a Hutu activist to step down as National Assembly Speaker. The President described this as an assault on the Hutus' hold on power and feared that Tutsi hardliners would launch a civil disorder campaign. 3.5c

Scope Note

This Special Estimate assesses the continuing political crisis in Rwanda and Burundi and the regional impact. It assumes that, over the next year, the international community will continue to donate current levels of relief aid but will not provide the enormous additional military and economic resources necessary to stabilize the ethnic conflict or to induce the refugees to return home. It also assumes that despite population movements within and between the affected countries, local parties are not ready to consider permanent ethnic partition as a long-term solution. It does not examine the international community's response to a worsening humanitarian crisis in the event of widespread violence in Burundi. Some agencies believe that recent patterns of ethnic segregation—especially in Burundi—will at least dampen any new outbreak of violence. [3.5c]

- **Rwandan refugees.** Burundi's Tutsi military leaders claim that the 200,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees camped in Burundi who arrived last year are their country's greatest security threat. A possible influx of up to 300,000 more—responding to the RPF's threats to close DP camps in southwestern Rwanda—would heighten the Tutsi fears. The military and Tutsi vigilantes are already raiding refugee camps and Burundian Hutu settlements.

- **Military integration.** Ntibantunganya has publicly stated that the military—now at least three-fourths Tutsi—must mirror Burundi's population mix—about 85-percent Hutu. Tutsis, however, view the security forces as their guarantor of survival and will veto any program to change their ethnic composition. A program to redress the military's ethnic imbalance was the proximate cause of the October 1993 coup attempt.

- **Hutu insurrection.** The Tutsis' continued reliance on brute force to suppress Hutus is strengthening the appeal of Hutu radicals calling for a violent uprising. Several thousand Hutu militants—some with light infantry weapons—have established contacts with Rwandan Hutu fighters based in Zaire and are most active in northwestern Burundi. A Hutu revolt would spark a brutal response from the Tutsi-controlled army. [3.5c]

Outstanding Tensions. Even if the current political crisis cools off, other incendiary issues remain:

- **Coup investigation.** A UN proposal to release its report on the October 1993 coup attempt—which led to the murder of elected Hutu President Ndadaye and massive bloodletting—would likely exacerbate tensions if accepted. This report probably echoes the conclusion of human rights groups that senior Tutsi officers and opposition political leaders instigated the failed coup. If implicated by the report, these officials may launch another coup to safeguard their interests.

Regional Impact and Response

Although countries in the region want a quick resolution to the crisis in Rwanda and Burundi, none has much leverage or influence over the warring factions. Zaire and Tanzania are reeling from the massive refugee flows. In remote

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border regions of both countries, militant refugee communities challenge and at times supplant the national government. Refugee violence frequently spills into local villages—particularly in Zaire, where refugees are backing ethnic Hutu Zairians in fighting with the Bahunde ethnic group. The refugee influx has ruined forests and topsoil and depleted water supplies. Meanwhile, prices of essential goods in the affected areas have skyrocketed with the presence of the refugees, relief agencies, and foreign workers. 3.5c

Officials in Zaire are weighing the benefits of increased aid flows and their desire to enhance their international image against the cost of refugee induced instability. President Mobutu has strong links to the former Hutu regime and has on occasion supported Hutu refugee leaders. Nonetheless, Zaire's security forces—which have a limited ability to maintain order in the refugee affected areas—have recently attacked several refugee camps. Tanzania has essentially remained neutral throughout the crisis. Uganda

is probably continuing military and political support to the RPF—many of whose leaders helped President Museveni fight his way to power. 3.5c

Limited Opportunity for Outside Influence

Proposals from regional and Western governments, international organizations, and voluntary agencies to defuse the regional crisis by deploying a force to police the camps face intense resistance from Hutus and Tutsis, who have little confidence in international security measures:

- UNAMIR peacekeepers in Rwanda did not halt the slaughter of Tutsis last spring. Their deployment after the RPF's victory has not convinced Hutu refugees and DPs that they can safely return home.

- Hutu leaders feel threatened by the UN international crimes tribunal and probably view UN peacekeepers' deployment alongside RPF troops in recent security sweeps of DP camps as proof of a UN bias.
- A proposal to send an international police force to maintain security in the Zairian and Tanzanian refugee camps is foundering on UN member states' refusal to commit forces. Moreover, Hutu militants in the camps are adamantly opposed to disarming or relocating.
- The RPF believes a policing operation would fail to defang the Hutu military.
- Burundi's military opposes any international force, and uncooperative Tutsi soldiers have sidelined the Organization of African Unity military observer mission. 3.5c

Outside pressure is not likely to change the conviction of most Hutus and Tutsis that they are engaged in a zero-sum game of ethnic survival. The RPF will not even consider negotiations until Rwanda's exiled Hutu leadership admits to some culpability and regret for the slaughter. Meanwhile, the Hutus in both countries fear that the RPF's victory will embolden the Tutsis to reassert their precolonial overlordship. 3.5c

Nonetheless, the attention of international mediators and Western aid donors may have some success in reinforcing political moderates in both countries. In Rwanda, the presence of human rights monitors undoubtedly has slowed the pace of retribution against suspected Hutu murderers. Swifter action and resource commitments by the international community for

the international crimes tribunal could encourage more RPF restraint against suspected genocide criminals and lessen the Hutu fear of vigilante justice. Furthermore, Museveni—a trusted mentor and confidant to Vice President and Defense Minister Kagame—could help argue that Rwanda will remain unstable unless Hutus are given a greater role in governing, but his influence should not be overestimated.

3.5c

In Burundi, if ethnic violence remains at current levels or subsides, then political moderates from both the Hutu-majority and Tutsi opposition parties may have an opportunity to salvage a national consensus. Such mainstream leaders—who have worked closely with the local UN representative to negotiate the power-sharing accord—have been sidelined but not removed by extremist elements. The international community can continue to work closely with such moderates as they try to consolidate a political middle ground. The longer run negotiating trade-offs in both countries will involve a complex web of minority political rights guarantees, land-tenure issues, and physical security protections that include representation in and control of security forces. 3.5c

This Special Estimate was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa and was coordinated with the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and Headquarters, Marine Corps. 3.5c

~~SECRET~~

REVISED

Agenda

Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda

DATE: Wednesday, February 8, 1995

TIME: 3:00 P.M. - 4:30 P.M.

PLACE: White House Situation Room

I. Introduction.....NSC

II. Situation Update.....CIA

III. USG Support for UNHCR Camp Security Program..... State

IV. Volcano Contingency Plans.....State

V. Justice Issues.....AID

- status of U.S. contributions of equipment,
support for ministry rehabilitation
- criminal justice issues
- USG contributions of personnel to War Crimes Tribunal

VI. Military Weapons.....ALL

- Arms embargo
- Zairian controlled APCs
- IMET
- Kigali DATT

VII. Burundi.....State

VIII. Conclusion.....NSC

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

War crimes Tribunal

DOD	5	AsICED	OK
DOJ	7		3
FBI	6		—
	13		

Cyber Nix TPs.

NS → Jamie Gorelick
- State/L + Goldstone talked
to Jamie

- Security = in unclear mandate
- Gore raid agents could carry concealed weapons

- Housing - being worked

• Rovner has offered Embassy for use
by Tribunal (State /FBI to trap pune)

- Ambrose's action.

- DOJ issue: Crisis in U.S. → sending resources

Reinforcement

• Jamie needs Reg were to get reimbursement
for Yugoslavia - not true.

• Goldstone recommended most 3 US.
Position is on Reg - get reimbursed.
UN & agreed.

- Jamie told Nancy we support, but issues

Next steps

- Ambrose: housing
- Reinforcement (or Cyber?)
- Reply to Nancy

Withdrawal • Please

Brennan, known
will approach
Gore if Nancy
is NO.

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John John AD says lose/cost let par off
Can we support freq juists decrements
John 2 for 1 round to judiciary
Metis near cases lost of markets
JP 90% of cases = criminal - mostly
Airt hard to sue
decrements disrupts
→ result politicized cases
→ sue support.

Steve Jewell Brian
X 57680 5-16-85

20x24
Bill McIntosh
→ director
of graphics
X 53624